INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely afreet reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zed) Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. GADAMER, TRADITION AND SUBJECTIVITY by Camille Atkinson April 1998 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty o f Political and Social Sciences of the New School for Social Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor o f Philosophy Dissertation Committee: Dr. Richard Bernstein Dr. Agnes Heller Dr. Gail SofFer Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. UMI Number: 9900460 UMI Microform 9900460 Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. A11 rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Dissertation Abstract: Gadamer, Tradition and Subjectivity In Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer maintains that "tradition" and "prejudice" are contitutive of hermeneutic understanding, or the kind of understanding that is proper to the human sciences. This has led certain critics to accuse him o f "conservatism" insofar as he appears to be ignoring, and thereby tacitly validating, the intellectual or political power structures that determine what counts as traditional, what it means to belong to a tradition, etc. On the other hand, there are those who charge him with undermining the possibility for truth in interpretation, inasmuch as understanding is determined by the "prejudices" o f the interpreter and is thus inherently subjective or relative. In the former case, the claim is that Gadamer's account o f hermeneutical reflection merely involves the appropriation of what is simply "given" to us by tradition, and that he does not provide any room for critique. The other objection is that Gadamer's hermeneutics precludes the possibility o f objective understanding, and is therefore arbitrary. In both cases, it is this appeal to tradition and prejudice that concerns his detractors. However, the irony is that he is accused of being both "too radical" and "not radical enough." How is this possible? This is the basic question I will be exploring. And, I believe that the answer ultimately lies in the fundamentally different conceptions o f "truth," "objectivity," and "subjectivity" which are operative here. It is also unclear what Gadamer means by tradition and prejudice, and to what degree we are constituted by them or understanding is dependent on them. This is why I believe it would be worthwhile to take a closer look at these concepts, consider fheir relation to one another, and evaluate Gadamer's hermeneutics in light o f the claims of his critics as well as in relation to those of whom he is critical. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Gadamer, Tradition and Subjectivity Table of Contents Chapter I. Introduction....................................................................................................................... 1 II. Pre-Gadamerian Accounts of Tradition......................................................................... 8 1. Descartes and the Suppression o f Tradition........................................................... 8 2. Descartes' Precursors and the Cartesian Legacy in Enlightenment Thought........................................................................................... 24 3. Romantic Hermeneutics and the Retrieval o f Tradition......................................45 III. Gadamer's Appropriation of Heidegger and Aristotle................................................ 70 1. Aristotle's Concept of Phronesis........................................................................... 70 2. Heidegger's Critique and Reconstruction of Subjectivity.................................107 IV. Gadamer's Concept o f Tradition.................................................................................138 1. Introduction............................................................................................................ 138 2. Gadamer's Concept o f Truth................................................................................141 3. Experience, Openness and the Priority o f the Question....................................150 4. The Wirkimg of the Text and the Normative Concept o f the Classic.............157 5. The Vomrteile of the Interpreter and Gadamer's Concept of Historically Effected Consciousness............................................... 169 ii Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6. Bruns and Petrarch on the Concept of Tradition................................................180 7. Nietzsche on History.............................................................................................. 185 8. Tradition as Narrative............................................................................................ 191 V. Gadamer Meets His Critics.........................................................................................206 1. Wamke and Caputo on Gadamer's Conservatism.............................................207 2. Hirsch on Authorial Intent and Objectivity in Interpretation...................................................................................................... 227 3. Soffer on Authorial Intent and The Ethical Implications of Gadamer's Hermeneutics................................................................................. 238 4. Ricoeur on The Antinomy o f Tradition and Autonomy of the Text................................................................................... 262 VI. Conclusion.....................................................................................................................276 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter I: Introduction Since Jurgen Habermas' review of Truth and Method, Hans-Georg Gadamer has often been criticized for being a conservative thinker. However, and perhaps ironically, he has also been censured for defending a hermeneutics which is inherently relativistic or subjectivistic. The former charge is usually leveled by critical theorists who are troubled by his appeal to tradition as not only a condition for the possibility of understanding but as a source o f authority. The latter accusation is voiced primarily by those who see Gadamer's reliance on prejudice and a Heideggerian conception of truth as precluding the possibility o f truth in interpretation, insofar as it encourages the interpreter to ignore authorial intent and project her own meaning upon the text. What both anti-Gadamerian positions have in common are concerns with historicism - i.e., to the extent that understanding and truth is regarded historically, there seems to be no ultimate standards or criteria for evaluating conflicting claims about a literary text or any other object o f interpretation. Thus, the critics argue, truth is either determined by fiat, in accordance with the dominant traditions o f the time which is typical o f conservative thought; or, it is entirely subjective and merely relative to or dependent on the interpreter's preunderstanding. It will be my contention here that Gadamer's hermeneutics is neither inherently conservative nor crudely Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. subjectivistic; rather, such criticisms make certain assumptions, explicitly or implicitly, about the nature of tradition, prejudice, and truth which Gadamer rejects. Further, I will argue that both sets of critics hold to traditionally Modernist presuppositions about the nature of subjectivity vs. objectivity, authority vs. reason, determinism vs. freedom, and truth vs. untruth in such a way that obscures their understanding o f Gadamer's position. Moreover, if one accepts the historicization of the subject, explicated by Heidegger in his analytic of Dasein in Being and Time, as Gadamer does, then it only follows accordingly that understanding too must be historical (presuming, of course, that we are talking about human subjects and not some other kind). However, this does not mean that truth becomes relative, subjective or, in a word, arbitrary. But, neither is it something objective, absolute or capable of transcending historical conditions. Let me say at the outset that my readers are under no obligation to accept the basic premises o f historicism, although I myself find it hard to imagine how human beings could be anything other than historical creatures. Nonetheless, if one does agree with a Heideggerian ontology of finitude and temporality, then I believe it would only be consistent to embrace a Gadamerian hermeneutics of tradition. This is what 1 will be attempting to demonstrate in the following four chapters, beginning with a critical look at Gadamer's number one nemesis -namely, Descartes, the "founding father" of Modernity, and the Cartesian method. Chapter I is necessary because it is important to show Gadamer's place in the annals of philosophy and to whom he is responding. If one agrees that the history of Western thought can be characterized as an ongoing dialogue between different philosophers and their respective methodologies, then the significance of any individual thinker can only be Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 evaluated in light of his predecessors, whether they represent his adversaries or mentors. Therefore, in the first chapter, I will examine some o f Descartes' most influential ideas and basic principles. For it is he who laid out conditions for truth and displayed an attitude toward tradition and authority which became basic premises for subsequent Enlightenment as well as Romantic thought. Therefore, I will first show how Gadamer's conception of tradition is determined negatively - in terms o f what it is not - as a response to Descartes' legacy and the predominance o f the Cartesian method in the human sciences. However, Descartes is not the only thinker I will focus on in this chapter, as I believe that it is necessary to consider his views in relation to those of his predecessors as well as his successors - specifically, Francis Bacon, a virtual contemporary, who developed his own scientific method; as well as Friedrich Schleiermacher, defending a Romantic approach to interpretation, and Immanuel Kant who found the conditions for the possibility of understanding in a transcendental turn. In Chapter II, I will begin to lay the foundations for a positive conception o f tradition by examining how Gadamer appropriates elements of Aristotelian and Heideggerian thought. Specifically, by drawing from Aristotle's model o f ethical inquiry and his paradigm of practical reason as phronesis along with Heidegger's reconstruction of subjectivity manifest in his analytic o f Dasein as well as his account o f the 'fore-structure o f understanding," Gadamer will be able to defend his hermeneutics o f tradition. In other words, he will describe an approach to interpretation and hold to a conception of truth which rely on tradition yet also contain the seeds o f a critical moment. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 It is in Chapter III that I will attempt to reveal what Gadamer means by tradition as well as truth in interpretation. For the kind of truth with which he is concerned is one which can only be grasped contextually, and thus is inseparable from tradition. Gadamer does not hold to a prepositional or correspondence theory o f truth - namely, one which maintains that the truth-value o f individual statements depends upon whether or not they accurately correspond to some objective state o f affairs or subjective intentions. On the contrary, Gadamer conceives o f a truth which is much closer to Heidegger's notion of disclosure and is not radically distinct from untruth. It is a kind o f truth which characterizes Dasein's Being-in-the-world and possesses an ontological significance which takes it beyond the customary claims of epistemology. Truth as meaning is uncovered diaiectically - in an actual 'dialogue" between text and interpreter. To understand truth in this manner - in terms o f what is meaningful or relevant to some present situation ~ is to obviate the traditional subject/object dichotomy and to give up any supposedly objective notion of 'the text itself." Moreover, this theory o f truth has affinities with Gadamer's concept of experience (Erfahrung) which is identified with openness and the very structure of questioning itself, as I will show in part 2. In Chapter II, part 3, I will turn to a positive account o f tradition by making a distinction internal to the concept itself. First, a text (especially classical works) always has its own history of interpretations which, to some extent, is constitutive of its meaning. This history of effects ( Wirknng) is accessible only by examining the interpretations of other readers which will affect how we understand the work. Moreover, these previous interpretations are 'Authoritative" to the extent that they confront us with questions which Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 require us to risk our own prejudices. This does not mean that one must completely subordinate her own judgments with regard to the primary material, but it does insist that a basic respect for the ways in which a text has been interpreted or applied by her predecessors will serve to evoke further truths. Certainly, how one understands prior interpreters writings will also be a matter of interpretation but this is endemic to the very nature o f hermeneutic inquiry. Nevertheless, 'tw]e do not see Plato as Descartes or Kant saw him, but we certainly see Plato differently because of Descartes and Kant."1 And this is something that cannot be ignored, even if one does not examine the secondary sources directly, for these works also have and continue to have historical effects which determine how we will understand the primary text. However, this effective history of the text is not the only element which is brought into play, as there are also the prejudices ( Vomrteile) o f the interpreter to consider. This points towards the second meaning o f tradition insofar as it is constituted by Gadamer's concept o f historically effected consciousness. Every interpreter belongs to some historical situation, or has a 'jjlace" in history, which may include a complex network of traditions and their respective prejudices -e.g., her native language, social or economic status, ethnic heritage, religious affiliation, intellectual interests and personal or political commitments -some of which may intersect and some of which may conflict. Moreover, conflict is something that can also be found within traditions which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to clearly determine where one ends and another begins. Thus, because of the inevitability o f tensions within and among traditions, the interpreter's own consciousness will invariably be characterized by conflict * David Couzens Hoy. The Critical Circle. (Berkeley: University o f California Press. 1978). p. 41. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and change. Therefore, a 'logic of things" (see Heidegger) will not suffice if one is to give an adequate account of either the objects of interpretation - texts, traditions or other human "artifacts" - or the subject. The last three sections o f Chapter III will explore what other thinkers have said about tradition and history. Specifically, Gadamer's complex and dynamic conception of tradition has certain affinities with the views of Friedrich Nietzsche, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Gerald Bruns. By examining their positions in comparison to Gadamer's, I hope to show that there are ways of thinking about tradition and our relation to it other than those alluded to by his detractors. Lastly, I will directly take on the claims of Gadamer's critics. And, although there are basically two distinct sets of concerns - those who find him 'fconservative" or not 'Vadical" enough due to his regard for tradition as opposed to those who find his views inherently relativistic or radically subjectivistic - they share certain fundamental presuppositions about truth and tradition as well as the nature of human subjectivity. Since these reflect assumptions which Gadamer does not share, it will be important to discover the source of these critics differences with him and whether any common ground for dialogue can be found. I will contend that it cannot, insofar as the difference is reducible to an ethical disagreement or a basic conflict o f values. As long as Gadamer and his detractors are beginning from distinct ethical premises, they will be conversing at cross- purposes. Paul Ricouer calls this 'the antinomy of tradition" (manifest in the debate between hermeneutics and critical theory), and claims that it is ultimately reducible to an 'Antinomy of value." In other words, as long as Gadamer insists on recognizing our debt Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 to the past and the ways in which our prejudices not only do, but should, shape our understanding, and others persist in searching for a 'jjlace outside" o f history from which all that has been handed down can be understood as it is in itself' or for the sake o f transcending it, there can be no substantive agreement. However, I believe that Gadamer's position reflects a more practical as well as ethical approach to objects of interpretation, and intend to defend it as such. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 Chapter II: Pre-Gadamerian Accounts of Tradition (1) Descartes and the Suppression of Tradition Why does Gadamer go to such lengths to retrieve the notion o f tradition as a source of truth? In order to answer this question it will be first be necessary to show how tradition initially possessed a negative connotation, so that it will become evident that Gadamer is responding to a very specific conception of it -specifically, one that grew out of Descartes' epistemology and the legacy of his method. I will argue that Gadamer is reacting to Descartes' emphasis on method and the influence o f his thought which stresses the autonomy of human reason over and against tradition, prejudice and authority. According to Gadamer, this position itself reflects an illegitimate prejudice of rationalism and leads to various forms of subjectivism. However, it is significant that neither Gadamer nor Descartes says explicitly what they mean by 'tradition,'' which one o f the things that I will attempt to do here. For it is my contention that most of the criticisms leveled against Gadamer rest on a misunderstanding of what tradition entails or upon particular unexamined assumptions o f Modernity. Thus, in order to explicate his conception of tradition, showing how it is both constitutive of human understanding and functions authoritatively in textual interpretation, it will first be necessary to consider why he is so Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 critical of Enlightenment and Romantic methods o f inquiry. Again, since it is a very specific understanding o f tradition that he finds objectionable, this earlier conception must first be taken into account. In addition, I will argue that Descartes' attempt to suppress tradition is inextricably linked to the particular assumptions he holds about reason, the nature of truth, and what constitutes a properly philosophical method of inquiry. These presumptions or prejudices have had a legacy of their own in as much as Enlightenment thought has tended to explicitly embrace them and Romantic thinkers have implicitly done likewise, despite their attempts to distance themselves from rationalistic presumptions. In other words, romanticism also holds to an ideal o f truth as that which can be immediately intuited and to the possibility o f a presuppositionless method, despite its rejection o f the primacy of reason and its emphasis on the psychological or affective modes o f thinking. What then does Descartes mean by tradition and why does he reject its validity in his quest for truth? What is it in particular that makes him regard it so suspiciously, and why must it be suppressed or any claims to its authority rejected? In Discourse on Method, Descartes begins by describing his formal education and laments that it only led him to skepticism about the possibility o f knowledge: For I found myself entangled in so many doubts and errors that, as it seemed to me. the endeavor to instruct myself had served only to disclose to me more and more of my ignorance. [Consequently.! I felt free to judge of all men whatsoever by myself, and so to conclude that there was no body of knowledge in the world of such worth as I had previously been led to expect.2 Descartes is assailed by so many doubts and errors because he had found that none of his formal studies were capable of guaranteeing the kind o f certainty he was after, since all 2 Rene Descartes. Discourse on Method, trans. Norman Kemp Smith in Descartes' Philosophical Writings. (New York: The Modem Library. 1958). p. 95-6. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 the reasonings of philosophers and teachers resulted in knowledge that was merely probable." Believing that knowledge must reflect something indubitable, Descartes at first resolves to seek truth elsewhere by travelling to different countries and attempting to profit from various life experiences, conversations with different peoples, 'hnd at all times making reflections on the things that came my way" (Descartes, 1958, p.99). Yet, during these years of travel, he found nothing which would reassure him that definitive truths were attainable but instead discovered almost as much diversity in the customs and manners o f others as he had in the opinions of the philosophers. The only lesson to be had here, he concluded, was 'hot to be too confident in any belief to which I had been persuaded merely by example or custom" (Descartes, 1958, p. 100). Instead of basking in the liberating light" o f his own ignorance, perhaps taking his cue from Socrates, and proceeding to ask questions accordingly, Descartes interpreted this diversity as evidence of error and saw the influence of custom as darkening the 'hatural light" of reason. As a remedy he thus resolved to take himself as an object of study and to do so in solitude. Since this diversity o f opinion and custom served only to provide him with evidence that knowledge is not possible and truth merely relative, he now shifts his focus inward to examine the contents of his own mind. This epistemological problem o f uncertainty and doubt is one he hopes to solve with a new method of inquiry. For it is not due to a lack o f '£ood sense" or deficiency in one's capacity to judge correctly that we fall into error, but rather only 'that our thoughts proceed along different paths, and that we are, therefore, not attending to the same things" (Descartes, 1958, p.93). The main problem of knowledge, he admonishes us, is to direct Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11 our minds properly and 'keep to the straight road" or 'Hght path." Moreover, since 'hll of [the sciences] stand together and are interdependent," only one ''path" or method is necessary.3 That is, Descartes rejects the Aristotelian position that any method of inquiry must take its cue from, or conform to, the nature of its object. Rather, Descartes assumes that such an approach will lead us astray for '[n]othing is so likely to divert us from adopting the true path in our pursuit o f truth as the directing o f our studies not to this comprehensive end but to particular topics" (Descartes, 1958, p.2). Thus, finding the proper method is the first step to finding truth; and this can only be done when we consider the nature o f understanding or 'human discernment" in itself, for it always remains the same regardless of the differences among the objects to which it is directed. This is an assumption which Gadamer rejects. For a different paradigm o f human understanding, I will show how he turns to an account o f moral deliberation which is developed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. One which will allow for and accomodate the diversity and contingencies of fife instead o f attempting to suppress them (see chapter II). One might also ask here, why does Descartes begin the Discourse by setting the stakes so high and equating truth with indubitability? Is this, as Bernard Williams suggests, merely Descartes own 'prejudice?" Specifically, one which is accounted for by his being "over-impressed" with mathematics?4 Williams says that Descartes never supposed that mathematical reasoning possessed indubitability. This is so, Williams maintains, despite Descartes' claims to have 'delighted 3 Rene Descartes. "Rule I." Rules For The Guidance o f Our Native Powers, trans. Norman Kemp Smith in Descartes' Philosophical Writing^. (New York: The Modem Library. 1958). p.3. 4 Bernard Williams. Descartes: The Project o f Pure Enquiry . (New Jersey: Humanities Press. 1978), p.36. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12 in mathematics because o f the certainty and self-evidence o f their reasonings;" and, in Rule II, that 'Arithmetic and geometry alone are free from any taint o f falsity or uncertainty." (Descartes, 1958, p. 97 and p. 6 respectively) For Williams notes that in Part IV of the Discourse, Descartes goes on to say that one can even be mistaken in mathematical deductions "feven of the very simplest geometrical questions some men err in reasoning" (Descartes, 1958, p. 118). Which indicates, he argues, that simply because some mathematical propositions 'inay turn out to possess the required kind o f certainty, what makes them important for the enquiry is their certainty, not their being mathematical" (Williams, 1978, p.36). While it may be the case that Descartes is more concerned with certainty here than with mathematical reasoning itself, what Williams ignores is that it is the mathematical paradigm o f method and the nature of mathematical objects themselves with which Descartes is impressed. In other words, Descartes believes that a mathematical methodology provides the best means of reaching indubitable truths; and, that arithmetic and geometry 'Alone treat o f an object so pure and simple as to admit o f nothing that experience can render uncertain" (Descartes, 1958, p.6). Moreover, since the understanding is, for him, always one and the same, there should be no reason why a mathematical type o f method will not suffice for ascertaining the truth of nonmathematical objects provided only that we direct our thoughts 'properly" - i.e., towards those objects which indeed 'hierit" our attention. And, Rule II establishes the criterion by which we can determine precisely which objects meet that criterion - namely, only those which can be 'perfectly known." At first, this would seem to limit us to arithmetical and geometrical propositions, but this is not necessarily the case according to Descartes. For Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13 he goes on to consider why it is that these studies yield knowledge that is indubitable, the answer lying in the nature o f reason itself. Specifically, reason consists exclusively in intuition and deduction - such constitute the Actions of our understanding by which we are able to arrive, without fear of deception, at the knowledge of things" (Descartes, 1958, pp.9-10). How then can one distinguish between these two forms of reason? What is the relationship between them? And, how do they assist us in determining which objects are genuinely worthy o f study? Deduction, according to Descartes, is not equated with the merely probable syllogisms favored by the Scholastics." Though they may be useful as a form of 'hiental exercise for the young," they do not add anything to one's store o f knowledge (Descartes, 1958, pp.5-6). Moreover, in Rule IV, he goes on to say that these operations 'Which dialectic labors to direct [are] here useless or rather positively harmful; for nothing can be added to the pure light of reason which does not in some way obscure it" (Descartes, 1958, p. 15). Instead, deduction, for Descartes, is constituted by 'the pure illation o f one thing from another" (Descartes) - namely, what one would call an inference. However, it would seem then that deduction must be dependent upon something else as a source of primary information. For one must have something from which to draw upon. Could this something be 'fexpenence," or 'fexperimentation" as an empiricist like Bacon (see below) might suggest? No, Descartes is most definitely not advocating or appealing to any sort of experimental method which relies on perception, for it is in this way that one can go wrong as it is 'bur experiences o f things [that] are often fallacious" (Descartes, 1958, p.6). On the other hand, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 14 deduction...can never be wrongly performed by an understanding that is in the least degree rational. For none of the deceptions which can befall men are due to faulty inference; they are due solely...to our relying on certain imperfectly understood experiences, or to our venturing on judgments which are hasty and groundless (Descartes. 1958. p.6). Thus, the fault or sources of error lies entirely within us, not in the method, reason itself, nor in the nature o f the object, provided that we have confined our attention to those objects of which certitude is possible. (A claim I will return to in chapter II.) This is why mathematical objects are exemplary for Descartes -- 'they entirely consist in a sequence of consequences which are rationally deduced" (Descartes, 1958, p.6). In other words, knowledge o f them relies strictly on intuition and deduction without recourse to experience of any kind. The remedy he recommends for avoiding error is to conduct our thought along the proper lines and to limit our inquiry to those things which already display a degree o f certainty or "perfection" akin to that o f mathematics. Which would seem to imply that the only proper objects of study are purely rational objects o f intuitive understanding - e.g., God, the Cogito, the principle o f non-contradiction, etc. This caveat is also confirmed in Part II o f the Discourse where Descartes enumerates his four rules of method: The first w as never to accept anything as true that I did not know to be evidently so; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to include in my judgments nothing more than what presented itself so clearly and so distinctly to my mind that I might have no occasion to place it in doubt (Descartes. 1958. p.41). Thus, in order to reach the kind o f certainty or indubitability that he is after, he determines that one must begin from assumptions which are always already self-evident. This need not imply that one must necessarily limit their studies to mathematical objects; but, that 'in our search for the direct road to truth we should not occupy ourselves with Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 15 any object about which we are unable to have a certitude equal to that o f arithmetical and geometrical demonstrations" (Descartes, 1958, p.7). Thus, in order to know, one must already know something. And this is what is provided by intuition: By intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, but the apprehension which the mind, pure and attentive, gives us so easily and so distinctly that we are thereby freed from all doubt as to what it is that we are apprehending. In other words, intuition is that non-dubious apprehension of a pure and attentive mind which is bom in the sole light of reason... (Descartes. 1958. p. 10). Intuition, therefore, consists in the immediate grasping of self-evident truths, and deduction consists in connecting or linking these various bits of information in a consistent manner. But, what sort o f objects are these and how numerous are they? Descartes' proper objects o f intuition are simple ideas or propositions which can be immediately grasped by the understanding -i.e., one can intuit That he exists, that he thinks, that the triangle is bounded by three lines only, the sphere by a single surface, and the like" (Descartes, 1958, p. 10). Because o f the simplicity of these objects, intuition is "Surer" than deduction (though deduction can never be wrongly performed by us provided it relies not on information provided by the senses but rather on intuition exclusively). Still, both operations are required for knowledge, and are constitutive o f reason or rational understanding. It might be said that intuition provides us with certain irreducible 'htoms" or foundational data, which deduction then forms into an entire philosophical system. Thus, it is clear that Descartes regards intuition as infallible -i.e., as a source of indubitable knowledge upon which further systematic knowledge can be built. Moreover, he claims that these pure intuitions are much more numerous than people think, and that we need only to direct our minds towards the proper objects. Still, he fails to enumerate Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16 what these might be other than those mentioned above. Like geometry, Descartes' method begins with certain indubitable propositions or axioms and then proceeds in a deductive fashion. So, Descartes is not advocating that we occupy our minds solely with mathematical objects 'tf]or truly there is nothing more futile than to occupy ourselves with bare numbers and imaginary shapes, as if we could be content to rest in the knowledge of such trifles" (Descartes, 1958, p. 17). Rather, he seeks to extend this mathematical paradigm o f method to all sciences or to rational investigation in general, even though it is not clear that this is possible. In Part II of the Discourse, Descartes explicitly states that he is seeking a method that will have all of the advantages o f logic, geometry and algebra but will remain free o f their respective defects. These three possibilities are the only ones he even considers as legitimate methods of inquiry. However, logic, being purely formal, serves more to explain or systematize what one already knows than to learn or discover anything new; while geometry and algebra extend 'bnly to what is highly abstract and seemingly of no real use" (Descartes, 1958, p. 106). Descartes offers no justification as to why he only considers these as possible methods other than the purity of their respective objects. And, other than the Cogito, God, or principles o f logic and mathematics it is not clear what other kinds of objects would display the kind of immediate clarity and distinctness that he is after, though he does state that there are many more. It does appear, as Williams suggests, that he is 'bver-impressed" with the certainty of mathematical objects and seeks to understand only those other things which meet this same standard of indubitability. Also, it may be their immediacy which he finds compelling. For mathematical deduction Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17 relies solely on reason without recourse to anything derived from perception or our sentient nature which he sees as inherently problematic. Again, it is inferences from experience which are most often fallacious. If we are seeking indubitable truths, we must avoid two primary sources o f error - precipitancy," or over-hastiness in judgment, and prejudice" (see, for example, his first rule in Discourse Part II) -by consistently following a rule-oriented method and by limiting our inquiries only to what can be clearly and distinctly known. But, what does Descartes mean by prejudice here? Is it everything that is gleaned from experience, or does it ultimately amount to the same thing as precipitancy? How do we know when we have been over-hasty in our judgments? What is the source of prejudices and why are they to be avoided or suppressed? In Part II of the Discourse, Descartes appeals to the metaphor of the lone architect to support his claim that the proper method for philosophical inquiry is a solitary one. Without offering any argument, he simply states that, there is less perfection in works composed of several parts and the product of several different hands, than in those due to a singlemaster -workman. [T]hat buildings planned and executed by a single architect are usually much more beautiful and better proportioned than those which others have attempted to improve, adapting walls to serve purposes other than that for which they were originally designed (Descartes. 1958. p.101). It is thus clear from the beginning that Descartes is opposed to any kind of team-work approach, and distrustful of any input from others. The assumption is that truth is to be sought by the individual who isolates himself from the world o f everydayness which already indicates a rejection of tradition or any kind of shared cultural and historical values, norms, interests, etc. For any information obtained in this way is neither pure nor immediate - that is, it is by nature experiential, mediated through the senses, and depends Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18 upon some notion of an intersubjective world. Again, this stands in sharp contrast to the type of inquiry or practical reason exemplified in Aristotle's ethics, which takes the polls as its basic starting point; or is made manifest in Heidegger's ontological account of Dasein as Being-in-the-World. For instance, it is precisely because we find ourselves immersed in a world of social relations that we can proceed to ask what the good is according to Aristotle; or that it is only due to the fact that we, as Daseins, always already find ourselves in some concrete context or set of existential conditions that we can question what it means to be. On the other hand, Descartes' distrust o f this kind of mediated understanding evinces his preference only for that which can be immediately grasped by the individual subject alone. He considers anything that is handed down to us by teachers, philosophers, our cultural practices or religious leaders to be fundamentally prejudicial to pure philosophical inquiry. Moreover, according to Descartes, objective truth is not to be secured for the sake of something else but only for itself. What this implies is that, for him, truth does not necessarily have any practical value, as moral truths do for Aristotle or hermeneutical truths do for Gadamer. For Descartes, tradition is constituted by a set of unexamined assumptions which are simply given to us in everyday experience, or passed on to us by others, and uncritically embraced. It manifests the kind of knowledge which has been gleaned from merely accepting what those in authority have taught us and by subordinating our own reason. He assumes that the legitimacy of these authorities (whoever or whatever they may be) has never been questioned, and that one has merely accepted their claims as true without further ado. These are the prejudices that Descartes cautions us against, as they are simply taken for granted. They cannot be Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19 embraced as self-evident intuitions o f the mind for they do not fulfill the criteria o f clarity and distinctness, as they are neither pure nor simple atoms o f immediate knowledge. Moreover, since traditions must be passed on to us by others, they represent a mediate or indirect form o f knowledge. They reflect complex phenomena and are most likely tainted by the prejudices of more than one 'Authority." There is no way we could weed out what truths they may possess -one has no method for separating the wheat from the chaff, so to speak, in this case. Therefore one must reject such prejudices altogether by banishing them from one's thought. Still, in another sense, Descartes seems to display some ambivalence towards the tradition he has inherited. For, on the one hand, he claims that [\v|e should read the writings o f the ancients, since it is an immense help to be able to avail ourselves of the labours of so many other men; and we should do so both in order to learn what has already, in the past, been correctly established, and also that we may be apprised as to what, in all those disciplines, still remains to be thought out (Descartes. 1958. p.8). But, on the other hand, he worries about the 'danger" of becoming Infected with their errors" if we occupy ourselves exclusively with these kinds of things. He goes on to note that one might become blinded by the sophistic arguments o f his predecessors; and, that since "Scarcely anything is said by any waiter that is not directly challenged by some other writer, we should still always be left uncertain which of the two should be believed" (Descartes, 1958, p.9). In other words, once again, because we find so much diversity of opinion and because we can so easily be led astray by subtle argument, one should trust nothing less than the 'light" o f his own independent reason. As mentioned above, this distrust o f diversity and equation of truth with indubitability has led Descartes to defend a method of philosophical inquiry that is as close to mathematics as possible. One which Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20 does not depend on the mediation of the senses, as we find in appeals to experience, nor on the authority of tradition or anything at all extrinsic to individual subjectivity. In Part II of the Discourse, this same distrust is manifest where Descartes claims that, the sciences found in books...built up. as they are. little by little, from the opinions of many different contributors, do not get so near to the truth as the simple reasonings which a man of good sense, making use of his natural powers, can carry out respecting what happens to come before him" (Descartes. 1958. p. 102). Again, this evinces Descartes rejection of any method o f inquiry other than that o f the independent, solitary rational subject investigating the contents of his own mind, intuiting basic truths and drawing inferences from them. Our prejudices can be accounted for by the fact that, as children, we have been dependent upon our appetites and our teachers so that it is almost impossible that 'bur judgments can be so correct and so reliable as they would have been, had we from the moment of our birth been in entire possession o f our reason and been all along guided by it alone" (Descartes, 1958, p. 102). Thus, we need to rid ourselves of all the unexamined presuppositions or prejudicesthat were acquired before we had the full use of our reason by weeding them out and starting over "from scratch" somehow. Descartes continues to invoke the building/architect metaphor implying that since the foundation o f his knowledge most likely rests upon the false opinions o f his own personal history, he must begin anew the search for truth by 'Emptying my mind o f them one and all, with a 'dew to the replacing of them by others more tenable, or, it may be, to the re-admitting of them, on their being shown to be in conformity with reason" (Descartes, 1958, p. 103). Descartes' unequivocal faith in the capacity o f an individual's reason to stand alone as the judge of what is true or clear and distinct could not be more evident than in this context. It is assumed that one's reason is perfectly capable of standing Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21 on its own - apart from prejudices, appetites, etc. - and can discover truths in an entirely independent manner. But, we must ask, how will reason know which of our former opinions must be discarded or which must be 'fe-adjusted'? Again, how will one know whether or not he has been over-hasty in coming to a judgment? No explicit criteria are offered for this other than the four rules of method delineated in Part II - the first and foremost being 'hever to accept anything as true that I did not know evidently to be so: that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice" (Descartes, 1958, p.41). Though he does not explicitly voice any concern that the understanding itself might be inherently colored or tainted somehow (as Bacon will argue below), which would place one in the position o f depending upon a prejudicial faculty to weed out prejudice, this may be what leads him to attempt to cast out all of his previously held beliefs. Again, it is "Undue haste" and such prejudices which are to be avoided at all costs which is why Descartes resolves to proceed in his quest for truth only after much preparatory work has been done in 'footing out o f my mind all the false opinions that had been instilled into me earlier" (Descartes, 1958, p.44). However, he presumes that this can be done acontextually - i.e., without any specific point o f reference or without a view to any particular situation or set o f circumstances. And, this is precisely what Gadamer or Aristotle in his ethics would maintain cannot be done. Returning to the example above, according to Aristotle, the good can only be determined by taking distinct concrete conditions into account, and one's 'prejudices" can only be evaluated in contexts like this. But, Descartes too acknowledges that one cannot effectively doubt everything. Or, to extend the architect analogy as he does, he further claims that one still needs a home or Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 someplace in which to live while the destruction and rebuilding process is proceeding. This leads him to insist that perhaps some things must be at least tentatively preserved and allows him to establish a provisional ethics in Part III o f the Discourse. I believe that this section is key insofar as it is in the context o f ethical or practical judgments that Descartes is forced to concede the limits o f his method. First, he admits that, when it comes to action, one cannot remain forever in doubt since he cannot avoid acting in the world, and this means committing oneself to some particular judgment. Thus, instead o f questioning traditional moral claims, Descartes simply validates their authority by resolving, to obey the laws and customs of my country, adhering unwaveringly to the religion in which, by God's grace. I had been educated from my childhood, and in all other matters regulating my conduct in conformity with the most moderate opinions...as commonly exemplified in the practice of the most judicious o f those among whom I might be living" (Descartes. 1958. p. 111). It appears that Descartes has completely reversed himself insofar as he is no longer willing to doubt everything, indeed, he explicitly admits that he cannot do so. He has even gone so far as to manifest a respect for traditional authorities and promises to defer to their reasoned judgments. Presumably this is because, once again, one requires some form o f 'hccomodation" while the destruction and reconstruction o f all one's former opinions takes place. In other words, we all need some place, some 'home," in which to live and act. Perhaps he is not so much contradicting himself here as he is implicitly acknowledging a distinction between abstract speculations of the mind and concrete actions in the world. In the former case, when he is inquiring into the nature o f truth itself and the possibility of certainty in knowing, Descartes is willing to assume that one can maintain a critical Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23 distance which is a luxury one does not have when it comes to the actual practices o f daily living. Where, or to whom, do we turn then for guidance? Again, Descartes tells us to look to the very same educators or customary authorities -those 'hiost judicious" - whose teachings he had previously rejected. However, he qualifies this by calling his moral code provisional," and promises to return to an examination of the three maxims he has set forth In due course." Unfortunately, Descartes never does provide us with any substantive ethical theory, so we can only surmise as to its possible content or character. To reiterate, what I believe this suggests is that Descartes himself implicitly acknowledges a distinction between the kind of truths attainable in intellectual judgment, theoretical speculation, or 'Science," and those which may serve as the basis for practical judgment and action. In other words, as long as one remains in an introspective or reflective mode, ideas of any kind may be entertained; but, once one is called upon to act in the world, possibilities are circumscribed in very particular ways depending upon the situation or conditions to which one is subject. Thus, one cannot assume that he is free to act to the same degree that he is free to think. This should also make clear why Gadamer consistently claims that a scientific method o f understanding, as it had been envisioned by Descartes, is not sufficient for hermeneutics or the social sciences. For these disciplines pertain to human actions and relations. They are more akin to ethics or the plastic" arts, in which Descartes' notions o f objectivity and methodology are out o f place and inappropriate, than to mathematics or the 'hard" sciences where these ideals may retain some validity. This is why Aristotle insists that practical wisdom or phronesis is the form o f reason appropriate for ethical or political inquiries, which are concerned with the good Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 of human actions, and must take their cue from this type of 'bbject." So too for Gadamer does the object of hermeneutic inquiry differ significantly from what Descartes considers to be the proper object o f rational investigation. For objects o f interpretation -i.e., human artifacts and phenomena -are constituted by a complex relation between the universal and the particular, or between part and whole, and are not things which can be immediately intuited or be expected to display the kind of clarity, distinctness, and certainty that Descartes is seeking. Hermeneutic understanding cannot be characterized simply by acts o f induction or deduction any more than ethical choices can; or, by cases in which a clear and distinct idea is immediately intuited, and all subsequent truths are then logically derived from it. Rather, it is dialectical, and closer to the kind of practical understanding that is involved in moral deliberation and choice. In order to see what precisely this entails, I will need to turn to an examination of Aristotle's concept of phronesis and show how Gadamer appropriates it as a paradigm for hermeneutic understanding. However, before doing so, it may be helpful to see how pervasive and influential Descartes' notions of truth, reason, and method have been. Especially insofar as they have affected two distinct philosophical movements with two different perspectives on tradition and its authoritative value. (2) Descartes' Precursors and the Cartesian Legacy in Enlightenment Thought In a simplistic sense, one could say that Romantic hermeneutics arose in response to the rationalism o f the Enlightenment. However, it did not succeed in transcending all of the presuppositions of Enlightenment thought, as it nonetheless harbors many Cartesian Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 assumptions. Specifically, both Romanticism and Enlightenment rationalism manifest a deep prejudice against prejudice," hold to a transcendent conception of subjectivity and uncritically accept that reason and respect for authority stand opposed somehow. For example, each attempts to ground human understanding in a universal method which transcends historical and cultural conditions and valorizes the individual subject. However, the Enlightenment privileges reason and the autonomy of the rational subject over and against tradition, while Romantic philosophers submit to the truth-claims of traditional texts and emphasize a psychological approach to interpretation which is grounded in an affective bond. In attending to the prehistory of Romantic hermeneutics, Gadamer discusses the influence of Luther and the Protestant Reformation (see Truth and Method, Part II, chapter I). For it was Luther who, prior to Descartes, first criticized the influence of tradition, and deemed it unnecessary for the proper understanding o f Scripture. For him, the Bible comprises a unified whole whose meaning is unequivocal. The assumption being that there is nothing outside o f Scripture itself that can be added to it which can serve as a mediating principle o f understanding. Rather, the lone individual through the use o f his own reason, enlightened by faith, can grasp the meaning of the entire sacred text. There is evidence of a hermeneutical circle here insofar as there is a circular relation between part and whole, but it is entirely self-contained. Specifically, the meaning o f each piece of Scripture illuminates the meaning of the Bible as a whole, and a grasp o f the whole further elucidates one's understanding o f each part. According to Gadamer, this constitutes a rigidly dogmatic conception o f meaning which entails the displacement o f Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 Church authority, the rejection o f all traditional interpretations o f Scripture, and the valorization of the individual's autonomy and power to understand for himself. Each of these elements is carried even further by Descartes as well as his heirs, and is extended beyond Biblical hermeneutics to understanding in general. For further evidence o f this trend, we can look to science and the thought of Francis Bacon who can also be seen as anticipating Descartes. Specifically, Bacon finds that there are certain tendencies o f the human mind that need to be corrected if one is to see nature properly and advance in understanding. These sources o f error he calls Idols," or 'phantoms," and are either 'Adventitious" or Innate." 'The adventitious come into the mind from without-namely, either from the doctrines and sects o f philosophers or from perverse rules o f demonstration. But the innate are inherent in the very nature o f the intellect which is far more prone to error than the sense is."5 He goes on to identify four o f these 'false notions which are now in possession of the human understanding, and have taken deep root therein" (Bacon, 1960, p.47): First, there are the 'Idols of the Tribe" which are inherent in human nature and spring from our tendency to regard man as the measure of all things, forgetting that our perceptions are often colored by feelings, interests, and so forth. The metaphor that Bacon uses here, to describe the general character o f human understanding, is that o f the 'false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolors the nature o f things by mingling its own nature with it" (Bacon, 1960, p.48). The second set o f innate phantoms are those peculiar to the individual, which he calls "Idols of the Cave." 5 Francis Bacon. The New Organon and Related Writings, ed. Fulton H. .Anderson. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. I960), p.22. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27 For everyone (besides the errors common to human nature in general) has a cave or den o f his own. which refracts and discolors the light of nature, owing either to his own proper and peculiar nature; or to his education and conversation with others; or to the reading o f books, and the authority of those he esteems and admires...or the like (Bacon. 1960. p.48). The distinction between these first two sets of idols can be stated thus: The former constitutes a kind of general bias to which all humans are vulnerable and reflects an anthropocentric view of nature; while the latter is due to one's personal prejudices which results in a form of individual subjectivism. As both are innate or endemic to the understanding and cannot be eradicated, the only possible remedy is to be as conscientious as possible in following proper methods of experimentation and induction. "All that can be done is to point them [the idols] out, so that this insidious action o f the mind may be marked and reproved" (Bacon, 1960, p.23). In particular, Bacon admonishes 'fevery student of nature" to follow this as a general rule - namely, 'that whatever his mind seizes and dwells upon with peculiar satisfaction is to be held in suspicion, and that so much the more care is to be taken in dealing with such questions to keep the understanding even and clear" (Bacon, 1960, p.56). Basically, what Bacon is telling us is not much different than what Descartes has said above - i.e., that one put his own interests, questions, tendencies, and so forth aside and correct these prejudices through the "light" o f reason. The last two idols or instances of false reasoning are those o f the 'Market Place" and the 'Theater." The 'Idols o f the Market Place" point to the misleading nature of language and the defects inherent in human interaction and communication. 'For it is by discourse that men associate. . . [a] nd therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding" (Bacon, 1960, p.49). There are basically two forms o f idols imposed Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28 by language: 'They are either names o f things which do not exist...or they are names of things which exist, but yet confused and ill-defined, and hastily and irregularly derived from realities" (Bacon, 1960, p.57). These kinds of errors are 'the most troublesome of all," according to Bacon, 'for men believe that their reason governs words; but it is also true that words react on the understanding" (Bacon, 1960, p.56). Ultimately, there is no way around this problem. For even if one attempts to conscientiously define his terms and use words in as unambiguous a manner as possible, 'definitions themselves consist of words, and those words beget others, [and so on and so forth]" (Bacon, 1960, p.57). In this one minor respect, I think that Bacon and Gadamer would concur. For Gadamer too insists that language and understanding are inseparable. Words are not merely tools over which we have complete control or mastery. Rather, in language, there is a 'fclaim to correctness," a Teal relationship between words and things." 6 And, every conversation is 'h process of coming to an understanding." 7 However, it is Bacon's contention that the relationship between words and things is always distorted in acts of communication, so that we are actually prevented from understanding and, more often than not, misunderstandings ensue. On the other hand, Gadamer is less pessimistic about the possibility of reaching truth through dialogue and sees dialectical understanding as, to some extent, a self-correcting process. (Another reason for his optimism is perhaps due to his notion of truth which substantially differs from Bacon's as I will explain in chapter 3). ® Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Method, trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. (New York: Continuum. 1994). p.407. 7 Ibid. p.385. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29 Lastly, the 'Idols o f the Theater, or o f Systems" have Immigrated into men's minds from the various dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws o f demonstration" (Bacon, 1960, p.49). These idols are, unlike the preceding three, adventitious rather than innate and, though numerous, rest more on superstition or conjecture than on any proper methods of experimentation and induction. They do not 'Steal into the understanding secretly, but are plainly impressed and received into the mind from the playbooks of philosophical systems and the perverted rules of demonstration" (Bacon, 1960, p.58). Moreover, Bacon claims, there is no point in attempting to refute such false doctrines, as 'We agree neither upon principles nor upon demonstrations [so] there is no place for argument" (Bacon, 1960, p.58). On the other hand, these idols are perhaps the easiest to circumvent or purge ourselves of, since they are not endemic to the understanding itself. Not only do we have recourse to 'fextemal signs which show that they [false systems] are unsound" but we can also understand the 'tauses of such great infelicity..." (Bacon, 1960, p .59). Thus, 'h knowledge o f the signs prepares assent; an explanation o f the causes removes the marvel-which two things will do much to render the extirpation o f idols from the understanding more easy and gentle" (Bacon, 1960, p.69). In sum, with Bacon and Luther, we can see an evolution of thought which anticipates Descartes, and lends that much more strength and credibility to the presuppositions that: a) the proper use o f reason is methodological; b) the individual rational subject is capable of discovering truths independently provided that, c) he frees himself o f all sources of error by transcending all personal, cultural, historical-in a word, 'human"- conditions. It Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30 is thus worth examining how this legacy has unfolded, according to Gadamer, in order to see what it is in particular that he finds objectionable. Part II of Truth and Method revolves around Gadamer's criticism of the ways in which prejudice has been discredited, particularly by Enlightenment thinkers. For Gadamer, prejudices are not always a barrier to understanding or the uncovering of truths. Rather, 'Understanding will be concerned not merely to form anticipatory ideas, but to make them conscious, so as to check them and thus acquire right understanding from the things themselves" (Gadamer, 1994, p.269). (What constitutes these prejudices or anticipatory ideas will be examined later when I consider Heidegger's influence on Gadamer in chapter 2.) By responding this way, it is clear that Gadamer is objecting to a very particular conception of prejudice that has extended from 15th and 16th century thinkers (like Luther and Bacon) to Descartes and his Enlightenment heirs, all the way through Romanticism to the present day. By looking at this evolution or history of ideas, Gadamer himself claims that we can see Descartes' legacy in the Enlightenment and the fundamental assumptions it harbors against prejudice. For instance, Gadamer maintains that it was not until the Enlightenment that the term itself acquired the negative connotation that it still carries today. As we have seen above, nearly anything which has been handed down via 'tradition" or which is endemic to human existence has been considered inherently prejudicial and a barrier to truth in understanding, so that 'fcorrectives" to these sources of error have been offered. Thus, Gadamer maintains that the 'fessence" of Enlightenment thought is manifested in 'the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power" (Gadamer, 1994, p.270). Why is this? How is prejudice explicitly defined Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31 according to Descartes and his Enlightenment heirs, and why must we take such pains to avoid it? Where Descartes identified two sources o f error-precipitancy and prejudice; Gadamer says that Enlightenment thinkers distinguish between two kinds of prejudice-i.e., those due to overhastiness and those due to a reliance on human authority. 'Either the respect we have for others and their authority leads us into error, or else an overhastiness in ourselves" (Gadamer, 1994, p.2 7 1). What Gadamer refers to as overhastiness and what Descartes calls precipitancy ultimately amounts to the same thing and is really no different than the general problems of induction Bacon identified - namely, that most of us fail to use reason properly or methodologically and thereby fall under the sway of idols, prejudices, or false notions. Moreover, what Descartes refers to as prejudice or what Bacon calls 'Idols of the Theater," is precisely this reliance on traditional authorities that Gadamer identifies as a 'fespect" for others. For those following Bacon and Descartes, prejudice is simply equated with erroneous reasoning or unfounded judgment whether this is due to overhastiness or submission to the authority o f others. The assumption here is that truths can only be ascertained and errors avoided by an autonomous rational subject who consistently follows a precise method of investigation or experimentation. How then is this possible? Who or what in particular represents these authorities that one should be cautioned to reject in favor o f his own independent reason, and how can these sources o f error be overcome or avoided? Since Descartes does not discuss this at any length, I will turn to one of his heirs whose thought, I think, parallels his in this respect. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32 In his essay, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?,'" Kant criticizes the kind of prejudicial thinking and lack o f freedom or responsibility that results from a failure to use one's "own understanding."8 The assumption is that most individuals remain under the sway o f 'klien guidance" and never make use of their 'hatural endowments," thereby allowing themselves to be kept in a kind of intellectual bondage or state of Immaturity." To become 'fenlightened" requires the kind o f mental cultivation that enables one to be entirely self-reliant, to eschew 'dogmas and formulas," 'doctors" and 'Spiritual advisors." To follow these traditional authorities is to abdicate responsibility by merely submitting to and following the judgments of others. According to Foucault's interpretation, [B|y immaturity, he means a certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else's authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for. Kant gives three examples: we are in a state of immaturity when a book takes the place of our understanding, w hen a spiritual director takes the place of our conscience, when a doctor decides for us what our diet is to be. In any case. Enlightenment is defined by a modification of the preexisting relation linking will, authority, and the use of reason.9 Kant makes no attempt to explain why we must reject these traditional authorities or how it is that one's own reason is necessarily subordinated when she does rely on them, nor does he critically examine what may make someone or something legitimately authoritative. Instead, he simply takes for granted that the only true authority can be one's own unfettered reason or 'hatural" powers of understanding. The dichotomy that is o Immanuel Kant Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss. (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991). p.54. 9 Michel Foucault "What is Enlightenment?,'' Interpretive Social Science, cds. Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan. (Los Angeles: University o f California Press. 1987). p. 159. While I am aware that this use o f Foucault is somewhat unorthodox here, it is my belief that although he may be equally critical o f Gadamer and his hermeneutical method as he is o f Kant's transcendentalism, there are parallels between Gadamer's criticism of Descartes' "attitude" toward tradition and what Foucault has to say regarding Kant and the problems o f Modernity in general. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33 implicit here is that one is either entirely free and independent in the use of her own native faculties or is completely bound by tradition and dependent on others for guidance. Moreover, like Descartes, Kant fails to consider the ways in which reason itself may be unavoidably dependent on the claims of others, or be culturally or historically determined - though he does acknowledge certain inherent limitations in the First Critique and elsewhere. Also, as Foucault points out, an implicit relationship between reason and the will is presumed but not examined in any particular detail. This is typical o f Enlightenment thinking, and can be seen as one of the legacies left to us by Descartes. More specifically, reason is held to be something uniform and universal -presumably it works in the same manner and discovers the same truths regardless o f who the subject is, or where and when he exists. Thus, any creature naturally endowed with reason is capable of reaching objective truths in virtually any area of human interest (science, politics, ethics, etc.). It is the individual's will which gets her into trouble and may primarily be blamed as the source of most errors. Presumably one has the capacity to effectively choose whether to accept direction by another or to be autonomous in her thinking and judging activities. In other words, I must simply will myself to be independent and rely only on my own native rational faculties without recourse to anything "extrinsic" to them. Descartes explains this susceptibility to error as resulting from our Intermediate" state of being: I am something placed between sovereign Being and not-being in such fashion that while there is nothing in me. in so far as I have been created by sovereign Being, which can deceive me or lead me into error, yet none the less, in so far as I likewise participate in nothingness I find myself subject to innumerable imperfections, and ought not therefore to be surprised that I should be liable to error (Descartes. 1958. p.213). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34 What accounts ror our proneness to mistakes in reasoning is this 'defect" in the human mode of existence -specifically, in the human will and its finitude or imperfection. According to Descartes, the intellect by itself is free from error -- '[f]or by the understanding alone, I neither affirm nor deny anything, but merely apprehend the ideas o f things that I can affirm or deny." Judgment, on the other hand, depends upon the concurrence or cooperation o f two things -the understanding and the will, or 'tny power o f knowing and the power o f choice." And, because the will is free or unlimited, it has the tendency to extend itself illegitimately, rendering judgments about that which it does not yet know. For it is the faculty o f understanding that is 'b f small extent and extemely limited," despite its being free from error (Descartes, 1958, p.215). Thus, Descartes finds that in order to avoid error, the infinite faculty of will must remain subordinate to the finite yet perfect faculty o f understanding, and that the proper use o f freedom entails abstaining 'from all judging of a thing which I do not apprehend sufficiently clearly and distinctly." For only then is it evident that '1 am acting rightly and am not deceived" (Descartes, 1958, p .218). This is simply a recapitulation o f one o f his four rules o f method (mentioned above), but it underscores a transcendental element o f choice. In other words, one must somehow be capable of choosing to choose correctly -specifically, I can either choose to use my freedom properly and subordinate my faculty o f judgment to what reason alone tells me, or I can misuse this freedom by making judgments about objects which remain unclear by allowing myself to be submissive to my feelings, desires, the claims of another, or some other form of 'klien" influence.10 In many respects, resonances of Bacon are 10 In his Foundations of the Metaphysics o f Morals. Kant refers to this as the "heteronomy" o f the will as distinguished from the autonomous will which is determined and guided by reason alone. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35 evident here as w ell. For he too believed that one could correct or resist the tendency to think in an Idolatrous" manner, and that this was simply a matter of choice. Moreover, he also equates prejudicial thinking with the influence of feelings, particular interests, or traditional belief systems, as indicated above in his 'Idols o f the Cave and Theater." Again, in Kantian ethics we find the same assumption regarding human freedom and its capacity to transcend existential conditions. For it is not the empirical subject, constituted by one's particular desires and inclinations which may be historically or culturally determined, that chooses to respect the moral law; rather, it is the transcendental use o f practical reason that determines how one should act. In fact, in the Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, the will is nothing but practical reason whereby 'fevery rational being who has a will also has the idea of freedom [such] that it acts only under this idea " (italics mine)11 Thus, being a free moral subject means having the capacity to transcend any empirical conditions and to act strictly out o f respect for the moral law, which is determined solely by the individual rational subject. Despite reason's proclaimed autonomy, it was also considered vulnerable to corruption, whether by our sentient nature, false notions or phantoms, etc., all o f which provide fertile ground in which prejudices may take root and grow. This is why they must be weeded out and a proper method for understanding consistently followed, as Kant, Bacon, and Descartes all maintained despite their significant differences in other respects. Furthermore, for all these thinkers, it is the Church or religious dogma that is considered the greatest threat to enlightened thinking, since these authorities placed faith and 11 Immanuel Kant. Foundations of the Metaphysics o f Morals, trans. LW . Beck. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1959). p. 66. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 revelation over and against human powers of reasoning, thereby denying individuals the right or freedom to think for themselves. Still, these men of the Enlightenment and their predecessors have simply rejected one form of faith for another, for theirs is simply a faith in the power of independent thought and its capacity for purity and autonomy. It is merely assumed that so long as prejudices are rooted out and banished from the mind, which then attends only to objects appropriate to human understanding consistently follows the proper rules of method, then one has nothing to fear and truths will emerge out of this discursive process. Rational inquiry is thus characterized in a linear fashion - each truth building upon those prior to it, like the blocks of a building -and, presumably, culminates in a complete system o f clear and distinct ideas. What taints reason and prevents it from functioning freely and properly or reaching truth, as Descartes understands it, are various non-rational factors, such as custom and tradition or respect for those in authority. But is this faith in the freedom o f methodical thinking not an irrational faith or prejudice too? It seems to me that Gadamer is correct to call the Cartesian or Enlightenment attitude toward prejudice a prejudice" itself. For no attempt is made to critically examine the nature of prejudice itslef or explain why it should always be equated with error, or why reason must stand in opposition to traditional sources o f authority. It is merely assumed that the 'Independent" reason of the individual is the only 'Unprejudiced" source of clear and distinct truths. Moreover, this Enlightenment prejudice against prejudice presumes that something which belongs to tradition is deemed authoritative simply because of its historical status. In other words, what becomes manifest here is a genuinely vicious circle - namely, the presumption is that something belongs to tradition because it has the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37 authority to make truth-claims upon us, yet, at the same time, something has authoritative value because it belongs to tradition. Since Enlightenment thinkers like Kant recognized the impossibility of getting outside this circle, they instead reject all claims to authority other than that of the autonomous rational subject. So too does Bacon manifest a similar 'Enlightenment" attitude toward tradition (despite his preceeding this historical period) when he discusses the futility o f disputing the truth-claims of traditional authorities or accepted philosophical dogmas. For, he notes, as there are no shared common presuppositions or methods of demonstration, there are no conditions for the possibility of dialogue or refutation. However, as Gadamer does not agree with these conceptions of reason, truth or tradition, he will be able to show that it is possible to criticize what is found in traditional or classical texts without having to deny their validity or authoritative value altogether. In other words, according to him, it is possible to consistently claim that one is bound by tradition without having to assert that what is handed down to us cannot be differently appropriated or overcome in some manner. But, this will depend on three assumptions which distinguish him from the thinkers above: One, a conception of subjectivity that affirms its immanence and historicity, as opposed to asserting its capacity for self-transcendence. Second, his is a dialectical or dialogical model o f understanding, rather than one which depends solely on rational introspection or independent reflection. And lastly, Gadamer's hermeneutics manifests a conception of truth as the disclosure o f meaning, as opposed to one which is propositional or appeals to ideals of correspondence. (These claims will be developed in chapters II and III below.) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 This discrediting c f prejudice, then, is tied to very particular conceptions of reason and truth - ones which gained significant ground during this age o f enlightenment, even if they did not ultimately originate there. It is also indicative o f a specific philosophical perspective or 'Attitude" - one which may be seen as characteristic o f modernity in general, according to Foucault: [Bly attitude." I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality: a voluntary choice made by certain people: in the end. a way o f thinking and feeling; a way, too. of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit. no doubt. like what the Greeks called an ethos (Foucault. 1987. p. 164. italics his). Rather than distinguish the modern from the preor post-modern, Foucault attempts to determine what constitutes this particular attitude and how it has, from the beginning, struggled against tendencies towards 'fcountermodemity." What, then, does this modem attitude consist in, according to Foucault? And, in what ways do these dispositions still manifest themselves today''12 Foucault maintains that, '[m]odemity is often characterized in terms of consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a break with tradition, a feeling o f novelty, o f vertigo in the face of the passing moment. [And,] it is the will to heroize the present" (Foucault, 1987, p. 164) We can see this in Kant when he claims that although 'We" do not live in an enlightened age, 'We do live in an age of enlightenment. [T]he way is now being cleared Before I proceed I should say something about why I am using Foucault here, especially since he has been highly ciritical of hermeneutics. However, like Hubert Dreyfus. I believe that he. along with Heidegger, has been one of the "most original and influential interpreters of the contemporary world." See " Beyond Hermweneutics: Interpretation in Late Heidegger and Recent Foucault." in Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects, eds. Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica (Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press. 1984). p.66. And insofar as Foucault is interpreting the world and historical phenomena, he is engaging in a hermeneutics o f sorts whether or not he would explicily recognize it as such. Moreover, in his geneological approach. Foucault too anempts to get at or uncover deeper structures o f meaning that are not always readily apparent which is not unlike what Heidegger and Gadamer are doing when they seek out the ontological foundations of understanding. Dreyfus concurs when he states that, "Foucault, like Heidegger, has always been interested in an intelligibility o f human activity: not in the ideas subjects have in their minds [a la Descartes], but what unifies their practices." (p. 79) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39 for [men] to freely work in this direction, and that the obstacles to universal enlightenment, to man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity, are gradually becoming fewer (Kant, 1991, p.58). However, Foucault goes on to say that the modem disposition is not simply a form of relationship to the present; it is also a mode of relationship that has to be established with oneself. The deliberate attitude of modernity is tied to an indispensable asceticism. To be modem is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux o f the passing moments; it is to take oneself as the object of a complex and difficult elaboration (Foucault, p. 166. italics mine). This is probably most evident in Descartes to the extent that he decides to take himself as an object of study. In both the Discourse as well as the Meditations, this solitary 'Asceticism" is apparent -he isolates himself from as many worldly distractions as possible, strips his mind of all previous opinions, and looks exclusively to the contents of his own consciousness. In this manner, he becomes certain that he exists, that he exists as a thinking thing, and that God exists. Thus, the 'felaboration" o f himself as Foucault would call it, as well as his relation to God and the world, emerges out of this process of isolation and self-transcendence. However, it is precisely because o f this pronounced emphasis on the solitary thought of his individual self that Descartes fails to find his way back into any intersubjective world o f human action or interaction, and is criticized for solipsistic thinking. Again, it is the autonomy of the rational subject that is stressed over and against history, culture, tradition, social relations, or anything pertaining to lived experience. And, this tendency remains compelling even today despite its apparent disadvantages and a wealth of academic criticism. What I am saying is that the search for objective certitude in virtually all areas o f human endeavor is one that is still very much Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 with us today. This 'Vnodem attitude" and its attendant 'Asceticism" involving a retreat from worldly empirical conditions continues to be found among scientists, artists, philosophers, and 'brdinary" citizens alike. Moreover, this desire for transcendence is not limited to specialists or intellectuals but seems to be endemic to the human condition at this time, if not always. One need only to teach an introductory philosophy course or speak with people on the street, or in any social venue, and one hears appeals to the "bbjective" perspective and rigorous methods of science which are values over the "Subjective" theories of nearly any other discipline. So, it is not only Descartes who remains 'bver-impressed" with mathematical certitude, but almost anyone who has grown up in this post-Enlightenment age. Indeed, simpiy to call something a 'Science" or to use scientific terminology in any inquiry is to gain a kind of credibility and respect for the truth of one's conclusions that could not be had were one to relegate one's activities to the realm o f 'Art." (Consider, for example, how we now speak of medicine in the West as 'friore art than science," since doctors here have proved to be infallible in so many ways and people are looking to traditional practices of the Far East as an alternative.) What should we do then about this 'prejudice9" Should we seek to avoid the temptation to follow a strict scientific approach to objectivity altogether? Must we instead simply embrace the ongoing 'flux" of our existence and forgo any attempt to seek stable, fundamental truths? Can one renounce this modem attitude completely? Need we choose between the Enlightenment and its faith in the autonomy of critical reason and its capacity for apprehending uiversal truths and the relativism of post-modemity and its suspicion of any and all claims to truth? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41 Foucault says, no, it is not a question o f either criticizing or accepting Enlightenment rationalism and its form of subjectivism. Rather, '{w]e must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment" (Foucault, 1987, p. 168). Like Gadamer, Foucault seems to be saying that the task before us is to understand our heritage - that by appropriating, which also involves critiquing, any tradition, we gain not only a sense of history but we learn something about ourselves as well. This is evident when we look at the legacy o f Descartes in particular since, in appropriating it, we understand ourselves better insofar as we learn something about this modem attitude and its origins. According to Foucault, this kind of self-understanding enables us to turn Kant's negative claim, that speculative reason must give up all attempts to transgress its limits (as he determined them), into a question which may yield a positive contribution. Specifically, in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product o f arbitrary constraints?" (Foucault, 1987, p. 170) The consequence of this reformulation, according to Foucault, is that inquiry will no longer be characterized by a search for formal, universal structures culminating in some grand metaphysical system (Descartes) or general theory of rationality (Kant). Instead, becoming 'fenlightened" will require historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying" (Foucault, 1987, p. 170). In other words, understanding involves an encounter with tradition and an acknowledgement o f the responsibility that that entails. This critique, Foucault argues, is less transcendental than it is genealogical insofar as it attempts to consider what remains Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42 possible for humanity not in spite o f the contingencies of our history, but because o f them. Moreover, this reflects a conception o f human freedom that acknowledges its conditionedness. It is indicative of the fact that one may always be free to choose between certain alternatives but the alternatives themselves will always remain empirically conditioned. A mere mortal does not enjoy the kind of freedom which would allow him to transcend the fundamental contingency o f his very being. (As I will show in the next chapter, this points to an understanding o f the human subject that is more Heideggerian than Kantian or Cartesian, and supports Gadamer's claim that tradition is always constitutive of understanding.) Foucault goes on to argue, along lines that I believe Gadamer would be sympathetic to, that understanding ourselves historically means abandoning all pretenses towards thinking globally" cr 'radically." In fact, he insists, 'We know from experience that the claim to escape the system o f contemporary reality has led only to the return o f the most dangerous traditions" (Foucault, 1987, p. 171) Though he offers no concrete examples, and is probably referring to certain political practices, one might still say that both Kant and Descartes could serve as instances of those who have tried to 'fescape" from their contemporary realities (though I do not see the implications o f this as particularly 'dangerous.') Specifically, although Descartes sought to overcome the skepticism and dogmatic scholasticism of his day by clearing a path to objective knowledge, he succeeded mostly in only muddying the waters further and leaving us with an even more radical form o f subjectivism. Thus, it appears that denying one's historicity, by attempting to radically break with tradition, often renders one even more vulnerable to life's contingencies. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43 Foucault concludes this argument by saying that he prefers partial transformations" in our ways o f thinking and acting, however imperfect they may be, to 'the programs for a new man that the worst political systems have repeated throughout the century." (Foucault, 1987, p. 171) Still, he does acknowledge one entirely legitimate objection to this position - one which must be put to Gadamer as well: namely, i f we limit ourselves to this type of always partial and local inquiry or test, do we not run the risk of letting ourselves be determined by more general structures o f which we may well not be conscious, and over which we may have no control?" (Foucault, 1987, p. 171) This is the very heart o f the problem for those critics who have expressed concern for the political or ethical consequences of Gadamer's account o f hermeneutical understanding. Foucault offers two responses of his own here: [TJhat we have to give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits. And from this point of view the theoretical and practical experience that we have of our limits and of the possibility of moving beyond them is always limited and determined: thus we are always in the position of beginning again (Foucault. 1987. p. 171). Foucault does not place a priori limits on knowledge, as Kant does. He does not get caught up in the project o f using reason to critique reason, nor does he pretend to know where the parameters to rational inquiry must be drawn prior to the actual experience of inquiring. For how can we know such things beforehand? How can one know that thingsin -themselves, for example, are unknowable until we actually begin our search and have to confront the limits o f our rational capacities in a concrete context? It is only by continually stretching ourwelves, so to speak, and forging ahead in any critical investigation that we can determine through practical experience what is and is not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44 possible for us. Limits can only be determined when one reaches a point beyond which she cannot go. If enlightenment is to be regarded as a freeing of oneself or the freedom to think critically for oneself, as Kant maintains, it is nonetheless a freedom that can only exist within certain limits and is subject to various conditions. Still, these limits and conditions are almost never known to us in advance. This is perhaps one reason why Gadamer characterizes understanding 'hs participating in an event o f tradition" (Gadamer, 1994, p.290). It is an event which must take place again and again, for understanding is also deemed provisional and truth is constituted by what is meaningful, which implies that it can only be determined contextually or in relation to particular conditions. Thus, as Foucault says, becoming enlightened, insofar as it involves the critical appropriation tradition in an actual encounter with it, places us in the position o f always having to begin again. For nothing is everlasting. Answers to questions, and the parameters of such, only lead to further queries and the pressing of those limits. Truths, according to Gadamer, and so too for Foucault it would seem, are not the product of immediate intuition. Nor are they discernible in terms o f an isomorphic correspondence between subject and object and conducive to propositional expression. Rather, truth is constituted by what is meaningful and can only be determined in a process of mediation (see chapter III). On the other hand, for Descartes, and nearly anyone who shares his Enlightenment attitude, truth is conceived as something universal, necessary and immediate. Further, it must be something which can be expressed in simple propositions or axioms. Descartes' conception of truth is one presupposes a direct correspondence between subject and object, can be reduced to propositional assertions, and appears to be Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45 either logically or empirically self-evident. Consider, for instance, his ontological argument for the existence o f God in the Discourse . From his idea of a perfect being, he immediately concludes that it must exist, for it would be contradictory to presume that the more perfect (God) could proceed from the less perfect (himself). Still, as Foucault insists, despite the denial o f truth as something immediate, we need not reject all claims of the Enlightenm. As we are all, to some extent, children o f this tradition too and must acknowledge its positive contributions. What, then, are these? Which elements o f this tradition should be preserved according to Gadamer? Perhaps the best way to answer these questions is to turn to Romantic hermeneutics, by examining how Schleirmacher sought to distance himself from the Enlightenment insofar as he defends tradition as a source of truth, embraces its authority, and rejects the claims o f reason. (3) Romantic Hermeneutics and the Retrieval of Tradition Descartes' influence remains evident even in Romantic hermeneutics which, at first glance, would seem unlikely given the latter's subordination o f reason to feeling and its retrieval of the authoritative value of tradition. However, the Cartesian legacy can still be found in its emphasis on the primacy o f the individual subject, an ideal of truth as something 'bbjective" or universal which can be expressed propositionally, and its acceptance o f the dichotomy between reason and tradition or respect for authority. In other words, Descartes' subjectivistic method and ideal o f truth continue to be felt even though the subject of Romantic thought is not a rational Cogito nor a Kantian transcendental 'I," and tradition is not regarded as something to be overcome. Romantic Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46 hermeneutics arose in response to the rationalism o f the Enlightenment and rejected it in favor of a more affective or psychological approach to understanding. However, as I will show and Gadamer himself maintains, it did not entirely move beyond all o f the fundamental assumptions o f Enlightenment thought (nor should one expect that such is possible, if one accepts a Gadamerian or Foucaultian view of tradition and and the constitutive nature of its effects). First, both manifest a deep 'prejudice against prejudice'" by equating it with bias or unfounded judgment and by assuming that an interpreter can transcend it by grasping universal truths, provided that the proper method of interpretation is adhered to; second, Romanticism uncritically accepts the dichotomy between reason and authority (tradition) but simply reverses the Enlightenment hierarchy by valorizing the latter over and against the former. In order to show how this occurs, I will turn to one o f the foremost Romanticists, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and his general theory of interpretation. According to Schleiermacher, interpretation is an '&rf ' - that is, an art which pertains to speech (whether oral or written) and understanding. As such, it is concerned with all forms of expression and is the same whether we are considering works of literature, law or theology. This means that hermeneutics is fundamentally philosophical insofar as it is 'h part of the art of thinking." 13 It is the kind of thinking which takes place whenever one understands what is said by another. Specifically, when one understands someone else's utterance, she is effectively reexperiencing the words and thoughts o f the other insofar as she is grasping 'the thinking that underlies a given statement." (Schleiermacher, 1985, 13 Friedrich Schleirmacher. "General Theory and The Art o f Interpretation," The Hermeneutics Reader, ed. Kurt MuellerVollmer . (New York: Continuum. 1985). p.74. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 p.74) Thus, 'Understanding takes place only in the coherence of these two moments [thinking and speaking]," which means that interpretation is twofold - i.e., grammatical and psychological. The former refers to "what is said in the context of language and its possibilities;" and the latter to what is said 'hs a fact in the thinking of the speaker " (Schleiermacher, 1985, p.74) Both are equally important, according to Schleiermacher, with neither being subordinate to the other, and both the grammatical and psychological aspects of a work must be accounted for in terms of a hermeneutical circle. But what does this kind of circular understanding entail? And, what are the rules of method which must be followed if one is to interpret texts or literary works properly? For Schleiermacher, understanding is essentially a reconstructive process. The grammatical element belongs to what is 'bbjective" in the text - namely, the ianguage itself and the particular form that it takes which involves a circular relation between whole and parts. For example, a sentence constitutes a unity wherein individual words can only be understood in terms o f the whole, yet the meaning of the whole is dependent upon the meaning of each word. Similarly, the text as a whole can only be grasped by understanding each part and each part depends on an overall grasp of the work itself. Moreover, in grammatical interpretation, the presumption is that the interpreter and author share a common language. Where this is not the case, the problem o f translation arises - namely, 'ti]f...readers are to understand, they must perceive the spirit o f the language that was the author's own and be able to see his peculiar way o f thinking and feeling."14 However, because of this latter requirement and the fact that '[e]very act of speaking is based on 14 Friedrich Schleiermacher, "On the Different Methods of Translation," in German Romantic Criticism, ed. A. Leslie Wilson, The German Library: Vol. 2 1. (New York: Continuum. 1982). p.7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48 something having been thought" (Schleiermacher, 1985, p. 75), psychological interpretation is also necessary according to Schleiermacher. Moreover, it too involves a circular relation between parts and whole, because every individual speech act is related to the totality o f the speaker's thoughts. Both the grammatical and psychological approaches are needed then if one is to truly understand written works. Palmer says that the former belongs to 'the moment of language" and is 'Essentially a negative, general, rather boundary-setting procedure in which the structure within which the thought operates is set forth."15 The psychological aspect, however, focuses on what is subjective and unique to the author. 'For this, a certain congeniality with the author is required; this is not a boundary-setting operation but the truly positive side of interpretation" (Palmer, 1969, p.89). But, what does such "Congeniality" entail, and how does it guarantee truth in interpretation? For an anwer to this, we will have to see in greater detail what is involved in the psychological method of interpretation. Although both of these interpretive tasks should always be utilized as they are completely equal and interdependent, according to Schleiermacher, there are cases when that which is to be interpreted is primarily 'bbjective" (such as the details o f '))ure history'). In these instances, the psychological emphasis should be kept to a minimum; whereas, when one is interpreting more 'personal" artifacts (like letters), the grammatical should be minimized and the psychological maximized (Schleiermacher, 1985, p. 78) What, then, are the rules or respective methods for each, and how does one determine which approach should be the dominant one? 15 Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher. Dillhev. Heidegger, and Gadamer. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969). pp.88-89. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49 For the grammatical side, Schleiermacher distinguishes two canons of interpretation: One, '{a] more precise determination of any point in a given text must be decided on the basis of the use o f language common to the author and his original public.'' (Schleiermacher, 1985, p.86) The second is that 'the meaning of each word o f a passage must be determined by the context in which it occurs." (Schleiermacher, 1985, p.90) Although these two principles are formally distinguishable, in actual practice each refers back to the other. While the first establishes a common linguistic sphere to which author and original readers belong, the second compares what is said in one text with what the author or his contemporaries may have said in other works. In other words, one must always remain in the same linguistic sphere as the author and original readers as a first step in the interpretive process. If the reader is not familar with the language of the author, the question is, 'What roads are open to [the genuine translator]?" - that is, how should an interpreter proceed 'Who wants to bring those two completely separated persons, his author and his reader, truly together, and who would like to bring the latter to an understanding of the former as correct and as complete as possible without inviting him to leave the sphere of his mother tongue" (Schleiermacher, 1982, p. 9). Schleiermacher considers two possible alternatives -leaving the author in peace" by moving the reader 'towards him," or moving in the opposite direction by bringing the author 'towards" the contemporary reader. Ultimately, Schleiermacher opts only for the former, and admonishes the translator to note, which words, which combinations, still appear to him in the first splendor o f novelty; he [must observe| how they insinuate themselves into the language through the special needs o f the author's spirit and his expressive power; and this type of observation very essentially determines the impression he derives. It is therefore the task of fanslation to transplant that very same impression into its reader; Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 otherwise he loses part of what was intended for him-often a very important part (Schleiermacher. 1982. p. 13). If one asks how this is to be done, it becomes clear that a great deal of background etymological scholarly research and facility with both the author's and reader's respective languages will be necessary. Schleiermacher admits that although this is the ideal aim of translation, it is not ultimately possible to accomplish it; and, that one 'Will have to be content to achieve in particular what he cannot achieve in general." In other words, we should be willing to praise the translator merely i f he manages to salvage similarity with regard to the more important objects in particular writings, or even in parts o f them only" (Schleiermacher, 1982, p. 14). In essence, then, it is always to the original intention of the author that one must look for the true meaning o f a work whether one is focusing on the grammatical or the psychological side of interpretation. For the words one is trying to understand are always the words o f an 'bther" and the meanings of words are determined by her, not by the translator or those for whom he is translating. However, even when there is a shared linguistic sphere and translation is not necessary, there are always cases in which the immediate context of the sentence itself or the text as a whole is insufficient for establishing the meaning of a word. Then, in grammatical interpretation, one must still look further for comparative purposes to other works by the same author or to those by other writers who belong to her same historical period. Consequently, Schleiermacher claims, the distinction between these two canons of grammatical interpretation i s more apparent than real" (Schleiermacher, 1982, p. 14). In sum, the grammatical side can be characterized as an essentially negative process of understanding in which certain Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 possibilities o f meaning are excluded. As Palmer indicates above, the positive aspect of interpretation occurs at the psychological level. In order to reconstruct the thoughts o f the author himself, some background knowledge of the his life and his particular 'Style" or way of using language is necessary. Schleiermacher distinguishes two methods of psychological or 'technical" interpretion which, like the canons o f grammatical interpretation, are formally distinct but inseparable in practice. These methods are 'divinatory" and 'fcomparative." In order to proceed along the lines of the former, the interpreter must transform herself and seek 'to gain an immediate comprehension o f the author as an individual." In contrast, the comparative approach subsumes the author under a 'general type." 'It then tries to find what is in him distinctive by comparing him with others of the same general type." In this maimer, each method is dependent upon the other though they rest on different presuppositions. 'The divinatory is based on the assumption that each person is not only a unique individual in his own right, but that he has a receptivity to the uniqueness o f every other person." (Schleiermacher, 1985, p.96) This manifests the 'tongeniality" that Palmer refers to above, and that with which Gadamer will take issue as I will show below. While grammatical interpretation is primarily comparative, once a common linguistic sphere has been determined, the psychological method is equally comparative and divinatory. However, though Schleiermacher never quite makes clear when one is to be emphasized over the other or under which precise conditions the psychological or grammatical side should take precedence, he does argue that both forms o f interpretation are historical. The interpreter must take account of the development or evolution of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 linguistic terms (an aspect o f the grammatical); and attempt to re-create the relationship between the author, his original audience, as well as divine his conscious as well as unconscious intended meaning in its original context (reflecting the historical conditions of the psychological side). But, Schleiermacher notes that this presents the interpreter with an infinite task, 'because in a statement we want to trace a past and a future which stretch into infinity," as understanding not only means understanding the text as well as the author but doing so 'feven better" than he himself did (Schleiermacher, 1985, p.83). Above all, the interpreter should seek to avoid "Active" misunderstanding which bccurs when one reads something into a text because o f one's own bias. In such a case the author's meaning cannot possibly emerge" (Schleiermacher, 1985, p.83). So, according to Schleiermacher, meaning is entirely dependent upon the author's intentions whether or not he was actually conscious o f them. Again, this entails putting oneself 'bbjectively and subjectively" in the position o f the author so that the text may be understood firstly as the author himself did and, secondly, 'feven better." (Schleiermacher, 1985, p.83) 'On the objective side this requires knowing the language as the author knew it [and, subjectively speaking,] knowing the inner and outer aspects of the author's life." (Schleiermacher, 1985, p.84) But, how realistic is this? Can an interpreter really expect to achieve this ideal? Schleiermacher admits that, on the grammatical side, 'tlarifying what is vague is [a] never-ending [process];" and, that the end of psychological interpretation 'ban only be approximated." (Schleiermacher, 1985, p.87) For '[n]ot only do we never understand an individual view [Anschauung] exhaustively, but what we do understand is always subject to correction" (Schleiermacher, 1985, p.95) Still, despite these disclaimers, the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reconstruction of authorial intent (both 'fconscious" as well as 'Unconscious') remains as his primary aim of interpretation and, like so many before and after him, he consistently presumes that reading something o f one's own into a work constitutes one of the worst kinds of misinte"pretation. So, although he wants to account for historical developments in language as well as the existential conditions or concrete context o f an author's words, he continues to assume that the differences in perspective or orientation which might ensue from such evolutionary and practical changes can and should be transcended by the interpreter via some universal bond of congeniality. But, where is the evidence for this trans-historical connection? What makes one as an interpreter deceptive" to the claims of another as irreducibly "other?" And, what guarantees the accuracy o f this basically intuitive, almost mystical, process o f divination? It is questions such as these which have led critics, like Gadamer, to accuse Schleiermacher o f lapsing into a 'bad metaphysics" despite his positive contributions regarding the historical developments o f both thought and language and the dialectical model of interpretation manifest in his appeals to a hermenetical circle. Certainly, Schleiermacher has advanced hermeneutics beyond that of Luther who looked only to the text itself (in his case the Bible alone) and regarded it as a complete whole. Specifically, Luther assumed that one need look no further than to Scriptural writings themselves in order to discern the meaning o f words or to understand the whole of these sacred writings; while Schleiermacher extended hermeneutics to include secular texts as well and expanded the part/whole relation o f the hermeneutical circle to include historical conditions and contexts as well as developments in linguistic structures and the connotations of individual terms. Nonetheless, although his model of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54 understanding is a dialectical one, it is not a genuinely dialogical one where both subject (interpreter) and object (text) "Speak" to and inform one another. Rather, it is a one way process wherein the interpreter merely listens" to what the text, as an expression o f the author's thoughts, has to say to her. This places the tradition of the text in the sole position of authority with the interpreter playing a subordinate role and deferring to the universality of its truth-claims. Further, according to Palmer, 'Schleiermacher's was a dialogical hermeneutics which regrettably did not realize the creative implications o f its dialogical nature but was blinded by its own desire for laws and systematic coherence" (Palmer, 1969, p.94). He believed that this order was possible because of the supposed universal bond of 'tongeniality" which unites all human beings, but he never makes clear what this entails or what makes it possible. 'Only after many years," Palmer claims, 'Would the assertion be advanced that the universals in understanding which Schleiermacher saw in scientific terms could better be seen in historical terms" (Palmer, 1969, p.95). This is the position Gadamer will maintain by following Heidegger's lead. For both historicize the understanding itself and take seriously the preunderstandings or prejudices of the interpreter as a source of truth, rather than simply attending and deferring to the historical conditions and traditions to which the text and author belonged as Schleiermacher does. In the section entitled 'Schleiermacher's Project o f a Universal Hermeneutics" in Truth and Method, Gadamer emphasizes Schleiermacher's reliance on the divinatory method that is grounded in a concept of 'tongeniality" insofar as it prescinds from the assumption of a ' re-existing bond between all individuals regardless of time or place" Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 55 (Gadamer, 1994, p. 189). For Schleiermacher, 'hll individuality is a manifestation of universal life," and his method 'Will be concerned equally with what is common, by comparison, and with what is unique, by intuition" (Gadamer, 1994, p. 189-190). The act of understanding, then, involves the "reconstruction of the production," in as much as interpretation requires recreating the author's conscious and unconscious intended meaning. Though this describes an intuitive, almost mystical, type of subjective process, it is nonetheless directed towards something objective or 'the work itseif' (though this too is merely the manifestation of another's Subjective" thoughts). Again, we can see here the implicit Cartesian or Enlightenment presuppositions. For example, Schleiermacher distinguishes between what is subjective as opposed to what is objective in interpretation and, at the same time, presumes that it is through a subjective (or primarily psychological) methodology that the truth of the object may be ascertained. Second, although he recognizes linguistic and etymological changes as well as the historical situation and life of an author, he still assumes that any distance these may have from the interpreter's own historical conditionedness can be overcome. The truth is what lies in the text itself and must be uncovered by 'feoing back to the origin of thought" (Gadamer, 1994, p. 186). What this suggests, according to Gadamer, is that not only is the work "objectively" knowable or capable of being understood 'in itself," but so too is the life and individuality of the author understood insofar as both belong to a shared tradition to which we too, as interpreters, have access or belong through this universal bond of congeniality. Thus, the divinatory process actually depends upon a collapse in the distinction between self and other, and presupposes a relation between the author, interpreter and tradition that is not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56 critically examined. The interpreter is therefore not 'deceptive" to the other as uniquely 'bther," despite Schleiermacher's insistance to the contrary (see above). In these ways, hermeneutics aims toward universality and is designed to solve the problem" o f the irreducibility of individuality or the conception o f the text as 'bther." For the interpreter is deemed capable of understanding the text insofar as it is a part o f the author's entire life - this constituting the subjective side o f interpretation. However, the interpreter can also understand the text objectively insofar as each word and sentence is grasped in terms of the work as a vvhole and the whole is understood in terms of these constituent parts, though some account of the 'facts" surrounding its original production and evolution must also be offered. Subjectively, it appears that the interpreter compares herself to, and identifies with, the author which allows for the truth of the text to emerge in a dialectic of difference and sameness until, finally, all differences are subsumed. Objectively, each term or part o f the text is compared to and identified with the whole until a grammatically complete work emerges. So, despite Schleiermacher's claims that understanding is a dialectical process and never-ending, he still wants to maintain that some kind of closure is possible (though of a provisional nature only) and that 'tomplete knowledge" is an ideal worth striving for even if it is ultimately unattainable in practice. This account of interpretive understanding is untenable for Gadamer. For Schleiermacher is merely appropriating Cartesian or Enlightenment rationalism in a Romantic context. Whether one is understanding something objectively due to one's reason or some kind of mystical intuition like divination, the appeal is still to a universal, transcendent subject - namely, one who can ignore her own historical conditionedness Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57 yet, at the same time, remain capable o f attending to the same kind o f situatedness o f the author and original readers. Moreover, whether historical differences and distance are acknowledged and then overcome (as in Romanticism), or simply ignored and rendered meaningless (as the Enlightenment attitude implies), one continues to deny the fundamental finitude and historicity o f both interpreter and text, and regards the object of interpretation as something accessible through immediate intuition or divination. According to Gadamer, what Schleiermacher has done is to substitute 'living feeling" for the 'told rationalism o f the Enlightenment" (Gadamer, 1994, p.63). In this way, Schleiermacher resembles not so much the Kant o f the First or Second Critiques but the Kant of the Critique o f Judgment, in as much as the condition for the possibility of universal or 'bbjective" aesthetic judgments lies in feeling rather than reason. For example, Kant notes that although "we speak of the beautiful as if beauty were a quality of the object and the judgment logical," this is not the case because such judgments spring ffom concepts and 'from concepts there is no transition to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure" which necessarily attends all aesthetic judgments.16 Still, Kant insists that these judgments are no less universal than those of science or morality. Therefore, judgments o f 'taste, with its attendant consciousness o f detachment from all interest, must involve a claim to validity for all men, and must do so apart ffom universality attached to Objects, i.e. there must be coupled with it a claim to subjective universality" (Kant, 1952, p.51, italics mine). Differently put, Schleiermacher, not unlike the Kant seen here, has simply substituted objective necessity with subjective universality. In other 16 Immanuel Kant, The Critique o f Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), p.52. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58 words, the condition for the possibility of 'bbjectivity" or universality in interpretation lies not so much in the object itself but is grounded in an appeal to what is universal in human subjects. In either case, the basic assumptions remain unchallenged. For Romantics, like Schleiermacher, unquestioningly accept the claim that bringing anything particular o f one's own (i.e., interests, prejudices, etc.) to the work, or failing to understand the intentions of the author in a disinterested manner, constitutes an illegitimate prejudice or bias, and perpetuates an antithesis between what is subjective and what is objective even though, in this case, the latter is subsumed under the former. Further, Schleiermacher, only succeeds in reversing the values of Descartes and his Enlightenment descendents by 'Seeking to establish the validity of what is old simply on the fact that it is old" (Gadamer, 1994, p.273). As I mentioned above and will continue to argue below, this indicates that although Schleiermacher retrieves tradition as a source of truth by appropriating the claims of classical texts, he does so in an uncritical manner and thus fails to demonstrate why we should regard it as having authoritative value. Last, Schleiermacher distinguishes between partiality and overhastiness as the causes of misunderstanding. To the lasting prejudices due to partiality he contrasts the momentary ones due to overhastiness, but only the former are of interest to those concerned with scientific method (Gadamer. 1994. p.278). In many respects, we can see not only Cartesian assumptions manifest here but echoes of Bacon as we'l. For both presume that certain prejudices can be eliminated or minimized by consistently following the proper method. This emphasis on method in interpretation coupled with the perpetuation o f certain dichotomies, such as tradition vs. reason or the submission to the authority o f another vs. the reliance on one's own rationality, as well as the appeal to an ideal aim or end to the interpretive process despite its practical Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 impossibility all suggest that Romantic hermeneutics has not succeeded in overcoming a basic Enlightenment attitude or set o f assumptions which is what has led to Gadamer's critique. To illustrate this further, I will consider what Gadamer has to say about the tradition vs. reason dichotomy. Gadamer claims that Schleiermacher has merely inverted the hierarchy here instead of seeing the two as dialectically related as he would. For example, Schleiermacher unquestioningly accepts the authoritative value of all traditional or 'fclassical" works and subordinates the autonomy of the individual to their truth-claims insofar as they are expressed as authorial intent. Schleiermacher's Romantic hermeneutics revives the ideal of tradition as a source of truth which, Gadamer acknowledges, is a valuable contribution. The problem is that he does so in terms of seeking out the author's intended meaning which, presumably, can be handed down in an unaltered and unadulterated form. In addition, while Gadamer sees the Enlightenment distinction between faith in authority and the use of one's own reason as legitimate, insofar as it allows one to maintain a critical relationship to tradition and the classical works which belong to it, the two cannot and should not be strictly separated in practice. For authority Is ultimately based not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on any act o f acknowledgment and knowledge" (Gadamer, 1994, p.279). In other words, if one uncritically accepts the claims that tradtional texts make upon us merely because they are antecedently deemed 'Classics," then one has indeed subordinated his reason and autonomy to an authority which may not merit this kind of respect. Descartes and Kant, among others, have enabled us see this - namely, that some critical distance and reflection must be cultivated if genuine Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60 understanding is to be possible. Still, this view presumes that certain things can be 'bbjectively" known, and that understanding is universal or everywhere and in every case the same -i.e., that humans have the capacity to see from an entirely disinterested or 'God's eye" perspective. In Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, this pretense to objectivity is manifest in notions o f the 'text itself' or authorial intent which remain static and are accessible by any interpreter so long as she follows his canons of interpretation or the proper method. Not only does Gadamer reject this reification of the object of interpretation as well as the possibility o f an interpreter completely identifying with an author who belongs to a different place and time, but he also does not see reason and the authoritative value o f tradition as necessarily dichotomous. Rather, as indicated above, the two can be seen as interdependent in as much as the basis authority is constituted by 'hn act of freedom and reason" (Gadamer, 1994, p.280). Although Schleiermacher extended hermeneutic interpretation to include secular as well as sacred texts, he was almost exclusively concerned with texts whose authority seemed to be beyond dispute. Moreover, his conception of a 'fclassic" was determined solely by the fact that certain works had been returned to again and again as legitimate sources of truth throughout the centuries. However, for Gadamer, this is not enough. For the classical is not merely 'h quality that we ascribe to a particular historical phenomena", rather, it refers to 'h notable mode o f being historical: the historical process o f preservation (Bewahnmg) that, through constantly proving itself, allows something true (ein Wahres) to come into being" (Gadamer, 1994, p.287). Schleiermacher, on the other hand, does not claim that classical works must continue to '£rove" themselves or that their authority should be tested or Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. questioned. Instead, their value is presumably self-evident because they have been returned to again and again, and it is then up to the interpreter to find the proper means of appropriating the truth-claims determined by their authors. Moreover, truths do not 'tom e into being" for nim as they do for Gadamer; rather, the truth or meaning o f a work has already been settled in accordance with authorial intent and it is simply up to the interpreter to discover what this is and has been. The classical works and their truths which have belonged to tradition are merely revived but not critically examined by Romanticists. This renders their argument circular in a particularly unilluminating way -specifically , something is deemed classic and authoritative because it belongs to tradition, but what counts as traditional are precisely those works which have been deemed classical. Considered from Gadamer's point of view, this would constitute an illegitimate, or genuinely 'Vicious," hermeneutical circle as it is entirely self-contained and rests upon unacknowledged or unexamined assumptions. For the authority of tradition as a whole rest on the authoritative value of the classical works which comprise its parts, yet these works can only legitimately make claims upon us to the extent that they are already part of or belong to the 'Whole" of tradition. According to Gadamer, this part/whole relation must be worked out in the interpretive process, it cannot simply be taken for granted at the outset. Thus, a more fruitful way of looking at reason and tradition would be to see how they are dialectically related, and acknowledge that both concepts are inherently ambiguous and call for elucidation in concrete contexts. "And whether one wants to be revolutionary and oppose it or preserve it, tradition is still viewed as the abstract opposite of free self-determination, since its validity does not require any reasons but conditions us Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. without our questioning it" (Gadamer, 1994, p.281). Still, this does not imply that one cannot or should not question traditional claims. 'Rather, a particular critical attitude again addresses itself to the truth of tradition and seeks to renew it" (Gadamer, 1994, p.281). Certainly, we must ask what is this 'truth o f tradition" to which Gadamer appeals? Why is he not just as guilty o f subordinating the autonomy of an individual's reason to that of traditional authorities as he accuses Schleiermacher of doing? First, as already stated, Gadamer does not accept an 'Unconditional antithesis between tradition and reason." For the appropriation of tradition is itself an 'hct o f reason, though an inconspicuous one" (Gadamer, 1994, p.281). This is because Gadamer's notion of understanding is a dialectical one which depends upon the mediation of many particulars. But, secondly, Gadamer's notion of truth is fundamentally different ffom Schleiermacher's (a point I will develop later in chapter III). For now, let it suffice to say that the truth to which Gadamer is referring is historically determined and closer to Heidegger's concept o f 'disclosure"; whereas Schleiermacher's emphasis on the static meaning of authorial intent places him in the Cartesian or Enlightenment tradition which holds onto a scientific or objective ideal of truth as that which is universal and transcends any concrete subjective conditions or elements of particularity. For Schleiermacher, the authority o f Scripture and classical works was not a matter of contention or topic of critical reflection. These texts are to be interpreted literally by attending to the object itself and intentions of the author. Moreover, the concept of tradition itself or what constitutes it as a 'Whole," is not critically examined. This, then, takes me back to my fundamental question -what does Gadamer himself mean by Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 tradition and how can his claims regarding its continuity be made sense of? What counts as part of a tradition, and how is this determined? Once again, since he claims that we are constituted by it, arid that there is nothing on the 'butside" which would provide a space for taking an objective stance towards it, is he too not taking it and its authoritative value as something given or a priori? (These are questions which I will turn to directly in chapter III, but before doing so will need to provide some groundwork by considering the influence of both Heidegger and Aristotle on Gadamer's thought.) In sum, Schleirmacher's self-proclaimed 'Universal hermeneutics" actually operated ffom within very narrow parameters. Although he was among the first to take account of the historical context of a work, re-affirmed the authoritative value of tradition, and provided a dialectical model o f understanding, his way of relating it to history and tradition was somewhat naive and leads only to further questions. For example, why should reason and authority be construed in opposition to one another? It is not enough to say that a text is authoritative, making truth-claims upon us for all time, solely because it belongs to tradition. Again, this type o f reasoning merely begs the question. In addition, what sense does it make to acknowledge the historicity and contextuality o f a work and then seek to transcend one's own conditionedness? It appears to me that his notion of history needs to be broadened -that is, taken beyond the subjective horizon of the author and the 'factual" context of the work's original production, and include the interpreter's perspective and situation. This is what I mainatain Gadamer seeks to do by providing an entirely different paradigm for hermeneutic reflection and understanding. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Unlike Schleiermacher, Gadamer is a philosopher who takes human finitude and temporality seriously and does not shy away from the consequences o f this position. His interpreter is not the Romantic divinator who attempts to grasp the meaning of 'the text itself' in terms of the life or historicity o f the author, nor is his model o f understanding at all similar to the Enlightenment ideal which regards both subject and object in an ahistorical, acontextual manner. History is neither static nor definitively circumscribed, as it and our traditions are always in the making. As human beings, we too are historical creatures, according to Gadamer, who may be said to be works-in-progress. Moreover, the kind of dialectical understanding he describes does not function from within a preconceived dichotomous framework - for example, he does not accept the traditional division between reason and authority that sees them as necessarily opposed nor does he sharply distinguish between what is subjective and objective in interpretation. Last, he does not seek an ideal end to the interpretive process, but regards it as ongoing and without end. How, then, can Gadamer successfully steer his way between an Enlightenment attitude and the claims o f Romantic hermeneutics? What aspects o f the Cartesian legacy or the Enlightenment does he think are worth preserving? And, how can an interpreter maintain a critical perspective yet also respect the authority of tradition? It is my contention that he does this by creating new paradigms o f objectivity and subjectivity through his appropriation o f Aristotle's concept o f phronesis, and the relationship between the universal and the particular, and by construing the subject in terms o f Heidegger analytic o f Dasein. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In conclusion, when Gadamer criticizes the discrediting o f prejudices by Enlightenment thought and Romantic hermeneutics, it is because he sees that they have a positive role to play in interpretation and are not necessarily barriers to understanding. 'Methodically conscious understanding will be concerned not merely to form anticipatory ideas, but to make them conscious, so as to check them and thus acquire right understanding from the things themselves" (Gadamer, 1994, p.269). In many respects, prejudices may be equated with questions insofar as questions are intentional and place parameters on what kinds of answers will be possible. In particular, questions give one a 'fcense of direction" and open up a space in which understanding can occcur (Gadamer, 1994, p.362). This means that the number and types o f responses to a particular question will be finite at any given time or place, but it also means that they provide the very conditions of the possibility of experience and understanding in general. Moreover, in order to even ask a question, some pre-understanding must be present. Only a completely empty consciousness would be devoid of any prejudice, but then so too would the capacity for questioning be precluded. If it were really possible to achieve the state o f Descartes' pure Cogito and to begin inquiring anew, one would have no context or basis from which to proceed. For how can something come from nothing? In other words, how can knowledge arise ffom an entirely open or empty consciousness? Moreover, insisting upon the ideal of a presuppositionless method merely entails a suppression of all prejudices, and therein lies a greater danger. As Foucault also implies, it is the unacknowledged or hidden prejudices which remain most problematic, as there is no means of critiquing that which is not first identified and acknowledged. Instead, it is more fruitful to allow one's own questions and anticipatory Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 ideas to come to the fore, to check and critically examine them against the claims o f the text as an essential part of the interpretive process in order to see whether they are or are not legitimate in a specific context. In sum, even though all questions may be said to be ioaded," to the extent that they intend a particular kind of response and limit the types of answers possible at a given time or place, without them experience itself would be rendered meaningless and understanding could not occur at all. Gadamer thus carves out a space for prejudices which would facilitate, rather than inhibit understanding. One o f the ways he does this is by bringing the concepts of reason and authority together as is evident when he states that 'Authority has to do not with obedience but with knowledge" (Gadamer, 1994, p.279). And, the question which inevitably follows is, to what kind of authority or knowledge is he referring? Once again, the concept of the 'Classic" can provide some illumination here, for classical texts are those which ask timeless questions o f us as interpreters. For Gadamer, they make a claim to truth which we, as concerned readers, must take up and seriously consider. This claim to truth does not reflect something that we must defer to as automatically having authoritative value (as Schleiermacher maintains); instead, it points us in the direction of something which is to be thoughtfully considered rather than dismissed (as Descartes insists). Only then can one determine whether such classics have any meaning for him in his own day and age. For example, when Socrates asks about the nature of 'fciety," he is not simply putting the question to Euthyphro and going through the exercise o f a dialogue for its own sake; rather, Plato is, in effect, posing it to all readers throughout history. To try to place oneself in the shoes o f Plato or any o f his Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 characters is not only impossible, according to Gadamer, but indicative of a fundamental prejudice o f Romanticism. Further, one might ask, how could this possibly be meaningful for us today? What value is there in seeking to uncover the intentions of Plato himself unless they can be applied to some present circumstance. On the one hand, human beings remain concerned with issues o f justice and goodness which suggests that contemporary interests are not entirely different ffom those in ancient Greece. But, on the other hand, the particular exigencies o f the present are distinct and some historical distance or sense of alienation ffom the past cannot be denied. To ignore these differences and seek truth only by means of an author's intentions leaves one open to charges o f irrelevance. In other words, such an approach gives credence to those who claim that philosophy and historical research is ultimately useless or o f merely academic interest because these disciplines have no practical value or do not in any way yield truths which apply to our lives today. (This is precisely the argument that one often hears ffom undergraduate students studying philosophy for the first time, especially those who are at that stage in their lives when the very notion of 'huthority" is met with disdain.) Thus, the case for respecting the authority of a tradition must be made - it cannot simply be taken for granted any more than it should be automatically rejected without further investigation. In sum, while Enlightenment thought ignores the fact o f our historicity altogether and rejects the authoritative value of tradition, Romanticism respects and valorizes the classics and seeks to secure their place in tradition but for the wrong reasons - i.e., simply because whatever has been called classic has been a source of truth for past ages and must, presumably remain so. In other words, 'the classical" is identified with 'the tradition" and deemed of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 68 universal significance without further examination or justification. Thus, all theories o f interpretation have been infected with the same sort of virus so to speak - namely, a dismissal of all that is particular, historical, and finite, and the universal is effectively reduced to a simple article o f faith. For the Cartesians among us this faith is placed in the independent reason o f the subject, whereas the Romantics place their confidence in the authority of tradition and the voice of classical authors without further ado. It should now be clear why Gadamer argues that his predecessors harbor a deep prejudice against prejudice. For it is due to their insistance on universal truths, adherence to the ideal o f a presuppositionless method, and appeal to a subject who transcends all particularity that they fail to see how prejudices may actually be constitutive o f understanding. These earlier epistemological positions have all laid claim to a universal standpoint, but in fact have succeeded only in doing so from their own particular perspective. Such is the seductive allure of the Cartesian method which attempts to give us assurances or guarantees o f certainty, yet this is precisely what has left Descartes and his heirs blind to their own illegitimate prejudices or the slant of their own questions. And, how can one expect to transcend something that is not acknowledged or taken seriously to begin with? Thus, I will defend Gadamer's position that understanding is achieved not by means o f some putative presuppositionless formula but by paying careful attention to ones' own prejudices and questions, and that the legitimacy or illegitimacy o f these can only be discerned in and through the mediative process o f interpretation - i.e., through a dialectic between subject and object. To put it differently, universals can only be reached in relation to particulars, not in spite o f them. Then, once one is made aware of her own Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 anticipatory ideas and is willing to critically reflect upon them, their legitimacy or illegitimacy can be concretely worked out in the context of some present demand. Thus, it is worth asking, from which presuppositions or prejudices" does Gadamer himself prescind? Where or to whom does he look for an alternative model of subjectivity and understanding? As indicated above, I believe that the answers to these questions may be found by turning to an examination of Aristotle's concept o f phronesis and Heidegger's account of Dasein. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 Chapter III: Gadamer's Appropriation of Heidegger and Aristotle (1) Aristotle's Concept of Phronesis In appropriating Aristotle's concept of phronesis as a paradigm for hermeneutic understanding, Gadamer is responding to a particular conception of reason that has dominated philosophy since Descartes. Specifically, one which yearns and strives for the kind of certitude and exactitude which is supposed to be provided by science and mathematics. The question then is, are such universal or objective truths possible in the peculiarly human realm of interpretation and history? And, why turn to Aristotle, who knew nothing about hermeneutics nor manifested any sense of history, for an answer? Just as Aristotle criticizes the Platonic conception o f understanding as episteme, or knowledge of what is immutable, claiming that it is not proper to ethical inquiry, so too does Gadamer criticize Descartes and other thinkers who would attempt to provide an epistemologically firm or objectively certain foundation for the human sciences. For example, even Dilthey who accepted the historicity o f understanding found himself entangled in an aporia. His aim was to complement Kant's three critiques with a critique of historical reason. What Kant sought to do for natural science, by establishing the conditions of the possibility of objective empirical knowledge, and for ethics, by offering Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71 up a formula for discerning one's absolute obligation to the moral law, Dilthey aimed to do for the human or Mife" sciences. Thus, he accepted Kant's conception o f objectivity even though the respective objects of each inquiry differ - phenomena or practical laws for Kant and history or iife itself' for Dilthey. However, this is precisely where the problem arises. For how can human events, activities, and so forth be an object o f inquiry in the same manner in which natural phenomena might be? Or, how can the historical subject be both the condition for the possibility of understanding as well as the object of it, as Dilthey asserts? Since, according to his own position, there is nothing which transcends historical consciousness which can serve as a criterion for the kind o f objectivity he seeks, Dilthey himself has become ensnared in the trap of historicism. Something must be given up then, as one cannot serve these two masters simultaneously - knowledge o f human affairs and events is either fundamentally historical or objective, but not both. In fact, the very concept of objective knowledge itself is problematic for not all objects are alike. So, we should not expect that they can be treated similarly or that there exists only one proper method of inquiry for examining them. I will argue that Gadamer takes his stand firmly on the side o f the historicity of understanding. While Dilthey cannot be rescued from inconsistency insofar as he accepts Kant's scientific criteria o f necessity and universality and, at the same time, grounds understanding in life or history which is inherently finite, contingent and temporal; Gadamer embraces the contextuality and historicity of understanding and completely gives up the scientific ideal o f objectivity by developing an account o f hermeneutic understanding or reason which can accomodate the contingencies o f human existence. To Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72 do this he turns to the Aristotelian virtue of practical wisdom which is developed in the Nicomachean Ethics. Before turning directly to Aristotle's concept o f phronesis, some important preliminary points about the nature of ethical inquiry need to be made. First, Aristotle distinguishes the study o f ethics from that of metaphysics as well as from physics or natural science in general. He does not identify virtue with knowledge o f 'The Good," as Plato did before him, since the mere apprehension o f such an abstraction does nothing to ensure that one will actually be a good person or will act rightly, which is his first and foremost concern. According to Aristotle, the ultimate end or aim for a human being is to become a good person, or to cultivate the kind of desires conducive to moral character. One of the things he shows is how acquiring the right hexis or characteristic attitude is not only possible but a necessary condition for good moral judgment. Knowledge has practical consequences in the sphere o f ethics, as opposed to the merely aesthetic or intellectual appeal that attends judgments o f taste or conclusions o f metaphysics, and moral error is not simply the result of ignorance (despite what Socrates may have said). Thus, it is practical or virtuous activity itself which should be the object o f ethical deliberation: 'Will not the knowledge o f this good, consequently, be very important to our lives? Would it not better equip us, like archers who have a target to aim at, to hit the proper mark? If so, we must try to comprehend in outline at least what this good is."17 There are two points here which distinguish Aristotle's ethics and model of moral reasoning from others. First, he does not regard ethical knowledge as separate from action 17 .Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethi'~s. trans. Martin Ostwaid. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1962). p.4. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73 or deliberation as proceeding in a deductive fashion from ultimate principles. Knowing what goodness consists in is, by itself, no guarantee of one's acting rightly and reasoning about what virtue consists in in particular cases does not proceed syllogistically. Second, Aristotle's concept o f virute is pluralistic to the extent that he recognizes that the good is something that can, at best, only be given in outline." In other words, like Gadamer, he too is quite modesi in his claims as to the possibility of reaching categorical truths or absolute universal principles, and allows for a degree of relativity in moral judgment. This underscores Gadamer's point that it must be a different kind of understanding, or a distinct rational faculty, that is brought to bear on questions of interpretation or human history and activity. Differently put, both Aristotle and Gadamer maintain that the kind o f objectivity that is possible in ethics or hermeneutics cannot be the same as what one would expect from science, insofar as their respective objects o f inquiry differ fundamentally. To expect ethics to conform to a Greek or Cartesian mathematical ideal o f knowledge is to misunderstand the nature o f the object (human character and action), and it is the object which dictates the method appropriate to it, according to Aristotle. This is why Gadamer looks to Aristotle's concept o f phronesis for a model of understanding that is appropriate for dealing with objects which have a distinctly human flavor -namely, works of art or literature, historical events, etc. In contrast, Kant, who also distinguished practical reason and knowledge of the moral law from speculative reason and science, continued to hold to a scientific or Cartesian ideal o f objectivity as have so many o f his predecessors and successors. Gadamer's hermeneutics rejects this ideal of scientific objectivity and the possibility of discovering an overarching method suitable for any type of inquiry and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74 instead, following Aristotle, assumes that a method must properly correspond to the object o f interpretation - i.e., historical texts or human artifacts. Thus, the kind o f rigor and clarity one might expect from science and mathematics cannot be counted on in literary or historical interpretation any more than it can be hoped for in ethics.18 For human artifacts and affairs, like moral choice and action, are neither clear nor distinct nor are they subject to principles of necessity and universality. Rather, they are most often ambiguous and can be understood only in a relative or contextual sense. Nonetheless, the aim towards objective truth and certainty, that has been handed down from Bacon to Descartes to Kant to Schleiermacher to Dilthey, is not easily given up. But, it would reflect a gross misunderstanding of our capacities as finite historical beings to expect the truths o f ethics or hermeneutics to conform to this traditional Enlightenment ideal. This is why, for a new paradigm of knowledge, Gadamer looks to Aristotle despite the latter's own lack of historical consciousness. For it is he who says that, 'jDrecision cannot be expected in the treatment o f all subjects alike;" and, one who is sensitive to this will only seek the degree of precision which the nature of the subject will allow (Aristotle, 1962, p.5). Thus, unlike Descartes or his forefathers and heirs, Aristotle does not presume that understanding is uniform, that there is only one kind truth or method for discovering it; nor does he limit his investigations to only those things which can be clearly and distinctly known a priori. 18 I am well aware that this paradigm of objectivity has been criticized as chimerical even for science, for example by Kuhn and Feyerabcnd. However, it is an ideal that remains compelling nonetheless, and is often insisted upon not only by professional scientists and mathematicians but is also regarded as a "common scnsical" notion or as a basic principle o f objectivity by non- academics. This is why I will insist that Gadamer is not wasting his time, or merely setting up a "straw man." when he examines and critiques this model o f understanding in detail as he does in Truth and Method. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75 A second claim that Aristotle makes at the beginning o f his ethics sounds somewhat contradictory or, perhaps, paradoxical. Specifically, he maintains that before one can even begin to inquire into the nature o f the good, or benefit at all from ethical theory, one must first have received a 'proper upbringing in moral conduct" (Aristotle, 1962, p.7). What does he mean by this? What would constitute a proper upbringing, and who decides this? It appears as if he is saying that in order to become good, it is necessary to already be good in some sense. And, wouldn't this state o f affairs then render the study o f ethics superfluous at best, meaningless at worst? In other words, if one must already know or have been taught what goodness consists in, then it appears that there would be no need to inquire any further. But things are not so simple for Aristotle because for him, as opposed to Plato, knowledge of the good is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral conduct and character. So, then, what must be added to it? Again, it must be noted that an account o f the good can only be given in outline, so any investigation into it can never be complete or exhaustive of all concrete possibilities -we will always need to fill in the blanks, so to speak, and thus our understanding o f what it might entail in any particular situation will be forever provisional. (Gadamer too, it has been noted, makes this claim for hermeneutic interpretation. A point I will develop further in subsequent chapters.) Moreover, acting on the basis o f such knowledge cannot depend merely on intellectual motivation, as will be discussed below. In other words, phronesis presupposes a particular kind o f knowledge which cannot be taught or learnt the way a skill can, and also depends upon a certain disposition or attitude. In the former respect, it is distinguishable from techne. For techne is also a form of practical knowledge, as it too Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76 involves 'doing" in the sense o f producing or making something. But, it can be taught as is made evident in cases of apprenticeships -one can learn how to photograph a landscape or train horses, for example. In addition, technical skills can be forgotten, as I can no longer remember how to play the clarinet or solve quadratic equations. Phronesis, on the other hand, can neither be learnt nor forgotten. It is not a matter of being taught some basic principles or formulas (like the axioms of geometry or the rules of chess), and then consistently applying them in particular cases. If that were true, then why do we not have child prodigies, or geniuses o f any age for that matter, in ethics as we do in mathematics and chess? Far from being the mechanical application of universal principles, ethical understanding already presupposes some sense of what goodness entails which, in turn, presupposes a sufficient amount o f life experience to draw from. I use the term 'Sense" here quite deliberately. For Aristotle himself suggests that practical wisdom is a form of 'perception" - specifically, the ability to 'See" what kind of action is called for under particular circumstances, or to discern what the good would consist in when faced with an actual situation in which a moral choice must be made. In other words, one requires some knowledge or, perhaps, 'pre-understanding" o f the good as universal in order to discern how may be manifested in a particular case. But, again, this is a good which can only be roughly given or outlined beforehand. In Book VI, Chapter 5, Aristotle speaks o f Pericles as one who has the capacity o f seeing what is good for himself and mankind in general. Still, this is not the kind of seeing where one already knows exactly what he is looking for; rather, it is indicative of a sort of pre-understanding in which one has a general idea, although he is not entirely certain, of what he is seeking but is capable Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77 o f recognizing I t" when he finds it.19 Gadamer too emphasizes the importance of this type o f 'fethical peiception," and also asserts that 'justice" is the not the opposite of 'tnoral error or illusion but o f blindness." 20 This form of perception can only be cultivated over time rather than learnt in a strictly academic sense. Since, practical wisdom is, as Aristotle says, concerned with particulars as well as with universals and knowledge of particulars comes from experience. However, he argues, this kind of knowledge must be 'the product of a long time" which is what makes it inaccessible to the young (Aristotle, 1962, p. 160). Moreover, life experience is not something that can be gotten secondhandedly , it is not something that one can learn from another nor is it attainable through study alone. Here we find a circular relation between wisdom and experience -one needs experience in order to become wise, yet it takes one who is already wise to make sense of her experience or determine its significance. The question is, is this necesarily a 'Vicious" circle or one which we should try to avoid? Or, is it simply a fundamental and unavoidable paradox of human existence? Aristotle suggests that the latter is the case, and I think that Gadamer would concur. To act virtuously, one must possess, in addition to practical knowledge, the corresponding hexis (moral disposition or characteristic attitude). And this requires both experience, in order to be able to discern the good (or what is 'Universal') in particular cases, as well as 'fight" desire - i.e., the desire to become a virtuous individual and the willingness to cultivate the kind of habitual actions that will make this possible. It also presumes that one *9 I have in mind here the anecdote of a Supreme Court Justice who once said o f pornography in an obscenity case, "I can't define it. but I know it when I see it." 20 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Problem of Historical Consciousness," Interpretive Social Science, eds. Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan. (Los .Angeles: University o f California Press, 1987), p. 41. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. has had a variety o f experiences and has, in fact, become accustomed to acting virtuously. This is why ethical dispositions must be nurtured over time, preferably from childhood onward. Thus, phronesis involves the cultivation not only of one's reason or practical intellectual faculties but one's desires and appetites too. For character involves both the rational and irrational parts of the soul, according to Aristotle (NE Book I, Chapter 13). In this respect, Aristotle sounds quite contemporary and seems to be validating a popular assumption of many present day psychologists - namely, that individuals are affected by their environment, culture, and history, and are especially impressionable when they are young. What might constitute a 'proper upbringing" is certainly debatable, and I would not assume that there can be only one paradigm for it or one kind o f authority on it. However, the idea that it is necessary to instill some kind of moral sensibility and sensitivity in children at an early age, which they can reinforce or critique for themselves as they mature and reflect on throughout their lives, is rarely a matter of contention. So too should it be evident that if someone has no basic desire to act ethically or avoid wrongdoing, then no amount of education or intellectual argument will ever be sufficient to inspire moral activity or minimize its opposite. If I cannot assume, at least, that others care about morality in general, and want to become good or develop the right attitude, then there will be no means of opening up a dialogue nor any possibility for inquiring further into what might constitute virtuous action in any particular case. Again, the same may be said of interpretation. Specifically, if one does not approach the text in good faith - namely, with a predisposition or openness to finding some truth in it -then no amount of argument will be sufficient to convince her otherwise. In other words, the right hexis is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79 a condition for the possibility o f hermeneutic understanding too. The interpreter must want, and be willing, to learn something from the text in order to remain open to the truth claims that it makes upon her or to ensure that there is a space for dialogue. It should be evident by now that Aristotle is not speaking to everybody. He is addressing an audience that is already '£ood," insofar as he is speaking only to those who already possess the proper hexis. He himself says as much when he quotes Hesiod: 'That man is all-best who himself works out every problem....That man, too, is admirable who follows one who speaks well. He who cannot see the truth for himself, nor, hearing it from others, store it away in his mind, that man is utterly useless (Aristotle, 1962, pp. 7-8). Again, this example points to an attitude or sensibility which cannot be taught, though it can be cultivated over time given an adequate amount o f experience. Gadamer too seems to be addressing a similar sort o f audience, though he does not say so as explicitly. However, when he refers to the 'fclassical" as a normative concept, he does say that 'Works regarded as classical present tasks of historical understanding to a developed historical consciousness'1'' (Gadamer, 1994, p.290, italics mine). This is also indicated when he speaks o f what it means to respect the authority o f another - i.e., that it is a wise person who knows when to concede to the authority of a Superior," not automatically or in a submissive sense, but because she knows that the other 'has a wider view o f things or is better informed" (Gadamer, 1994, p.280). This kind of consciousnes or wisdom of one's own ignorance presupposes a degree of intellectual sophistication, which is only possible given a sufficient amount o f life experience and the cultivation o f our rational as well as affective or irrational capacities. This means that a formal education alone is not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80 enough. One must also have the right disposition towards the text or object of interpretation and a sense of her own limitations, and this is usually acquired only on the trial-and-error basis o f lived experience. Still, what are we to make o f this appeal to 'fexperience'? How is it instrumental in forming the proper hexisl What does Aristotle mean when he invokes this term, and how does Gadamer appropriate it? For we cannot assume that it includes experience of any or every kind. Besides being constituted by both desire and reason, phronesis is concerned both with universals (general principles, rules, or 'the good" which can only be outlined) as well as particulars (i.e., the unique and irreducible features o f a concrete situation). The question remains, however, how does practical wisdom mediate between these two9 Since it represents the essence o f moral deliberation, then it is something which needs to be cultivated. And, since Gadamer finds hermeneutic reason to be analogous to phronesis, then it would follow that one's interpretive skills must be similarly developed. Yet, if this cannot be done through study alone, then how can we acquire a facility for such and how does 'fexperience" assist us in doing so? Martha Nussbaum helps illuminate these questions in The Fragility o f Goodness. In Chapter 10, Nussbaum says that one first needs to ask "What Aristotelian general rules and accounts [of the good] are and are not, and how the person of practical wisdom uses them."21 Further, she states that, 'to]ne possibility is that the rules and universal principles are guidelines or rules of thumb: summaries of particular decisions, useful for purposes o f economy and aids in identifying the salient features of the particular case." 21 Martha Nussbaum. The Fragility o f Goodness. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). p. 299. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81 This claim of hers is faithful to Aristotle's admonition that the good can only be roughly outlined, and that practical wisdom must ultimately take its cue from, or be responsive to, the particulars of the matter at hand. According to Nussbaum, Aristotle is critical o f previous accounts o f the good, or general rules, both for their lack of concreteness and lack of flexibility. Thus, good deliberation must be able to adapt itself to the intricacies and paradoxical nature of the concrete, responding to specific needs and demands, while simultaneously searching for the universal appropriate to the particular situation. In other words, the practically wise person does not assume that a rule literally "rules" the particulars, but instead allows these peculiarites to govern themselves and determine the correctness of the rule. Specifically, good deliberation accommodates itself to what it finds, 'responsively and with respect for complexity." Another way of looking at this is to say that in ethical deliberation means and ends are co-determined. Or, as Richard Bernstein states in an account of Gadamer's interpretion of Aristotle, 'the end itself is only concretely specified in deliberating about the means appropriate to a particular situation."22 This implies that one cannot have any assurance beforehand what will follow from the choices that she makes, or what the 'tight" rule would be for any and all concrete possibilities. Rather, to some degree, ends are indeterminate at the beginning of the reasoning process. Thus, their appropriateness or lack thereof can only be determined in a particular context or for a concrete set of circumstances which calls for interpretation. For this reason, human beings are always vulnerable, to some extent, to what Nussbaum calls 'frioral luck." And, given the complexity and indeterminacy of human actions and 22 Richard Bernstein. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 147. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82 relations, are we really justified in expecting much more? How can we be assured in all cases ahead of time which will be the 'fight" choice? Even if we crave or yearn for the kind of guarantees that we have come to expect in science or from so-called rational thought in general, such will continue to elude us at every turn when it comes to interpreting human artifacts and affairs. However, what we cannot do is not choose - for even that is simply a choice o f a passive sort. It may turn out that, after making a particular decision, new information is revealed or consequences ensue which confirm or validate the correctness of the general principle acted upon. But, how much o f this is merely 'dumb" luck? And, if the reverse were to occur -one regrets her choice and finds a rule to be invalid in a specific case - could the blame be placed entirely on 'bad" deliberation? To this, I would respond negatively. In essence, while it is certainly important to cultivate the capacity for good deliberation and strive to be conscientious in the decision- making process, human beings will always remain subject to the contingencies and disorderly aspects o f human existence which, for the same reason, is why phronesis and 'the good" can only be roughly given or accounted for and not systematized into a mathematical science. The same types o f questions and responses could be applied to hermeneutic inquiry. Namely, how can one know beforehand that her interpretation o f a text will be the correct one? First, it is a mistake to assume that there can only be one legitimate interpretation. Nonetheless, we must still ask, how can I avoid being influenced by prejudices which will inhibit my understanding, and instead be guided only by those which will be conducive to disclosing truth? In other words, how can I distinguish Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83 between illegitimate or disabling prejudices, which may lead me to misunderstand a work, and those which are enabling and facilitate understanding? Again, according to Gadamer, there is no precise method or ultimate criterion for such as those which may preclude understanding cannot be weeded out unless there is a specific context in which to do so. Thus, we cannot know beforehand which of our prejudices will be enabling or disabling, any more than we can know beforehand which rules will culminate in a proper moral decision. One may not even be aware of what her particular prejudices are or whether they are operative until she is actually engaged in a dialogue with a specific text. The questions above reek of Cartesianism - the assumption being that one can 'foot out" prejudices in advance, according to some distinct criterion or set of criteria, and then follow a consistent method which will lead to definitive truths. There is a presumption here that truth in understanding is something self-evident and simply remains to be revealed once one has made the proper preparations, but this is not the kind of ideal to which Gadamer holds. Rather, he insists that truths emerge in a process of mediation, and it is in and through this process that prejudices are first disclosed and can only then be discarded or embraced. Under these circumstances, when the interpreter finds herself confronted with disabling prejudices, it becomes possible to rid oneself of that which inhibits understanding. Still, one might ask, specifically what is it about hermeneutic objects of inquiry that makes them so resistant to a systematic method of interpretation? In order to answer or clarify this further, I will now turn again to Aristotle's concept o f phronesis and Nussbaum's account of it. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84 Nussbaum distinguishes three features o f moral choice which demonstrate why we will always remain vulnerable to life's various uncertainties and dependent, to some degree, on 'inoral luck." 'First, there is the mutability or lack of fixity o f the practical. A system o f rules set up in advance can encompass only what has been seen before" (Nussbaum, 1987, p.302) As much as we may wish for and seek the kind of stability provided by universal and necessary laws, we live in a world that is inherently unstable and constantly subject to change. Human history is not predictable or governable in accordance with mathematical laws of physics. One is always confronted with new situations and events which go beyond one's previous experiences. Thus, practical wisdom must remain responsive and flexible as well as creative in order to meet the exigencies of a dynamic world. To consult a set o f fixed rules in order to be able to respond to what is ever-changing or in process could never be adequate. However, this does not mean that there are no laws of human action or history at all. For if this were so, human affairs and historical events would be unintelligible. Rather, as said above, it must be a different conception o f law or rule that is brought to bear on such matters. Again, this aspect of deliberation and the object of moral choice (the 'feood') may be applied to hermeneutical understanding and its respective objects. For texts, insofar as they are 'living" human artifacts and, therefore, subject to change, are not static objects. Instead, they are constituted by a dynamic manifold -i.e., a history or network of traditions or interpretations that is also continually changing. Just as the good itself may be manifested in various ways over time, and is dependent upon particular circumstances, so too are the truth claims of a text open to various interpretations and diverse applications. Still, to reiterate, these changes are intelligible, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85 not arbitrary; so that, even within such ever-flowing occurrences, there can be regularities. Thus, there may still be laws of history and of interpretation but, again, they are not analogous to the mathematical laws of physics nor do they possess absolute authority. Again, also following Aristotle, Gadamer argues that if we can speak at all of interpretive 'laws," they are best construed in the way 'hatural laws" are, for such is still changeble. Specifically, Aristotle 'Explains that the best state 'is everywhere one and the same,' but it is the same in a different way". Thus, 'the idea of law has only a critical function" (Gadamer, 1994, p.320). Aristotle, Gadamer and Nussbaum are all attempting to mediate between the universal and the particular in such a way that avoids reducing or denying one at the expense of the other. Notions of law, method, rules or principles, whether ethical or hermeneutical, are neither capricious nor absolute. As Gadamer states: All these concepts are not just arbitrary ideals conditioned by convention, but despite all the variety of moral ideas in the most different times and peoples, in this sphere there is still something like the nature o f the thing. This is not to say that the nature of the thinge .g.. the ideal of bravery--is a fixed standard that we could recognize an apply by ourselves. Rather. Aristotle affirms as true o f the teacher of ethics precisely what is true, in his view, of all men: that he too is always already involved in a moral and political context and acquires his image o f the thing from that standpoint (Gadamer. 1994. p. 320). Second, Nussbaum discusses the indeterminacy o f the practical. To illustrate her point, she appeals to an example Aristotle himself uses where he claims that there can be no comprehensive definition of good joke-telling (Aristotle, 1962, p. 108). Just as it should be clear that there can be no science of humor, nor is it merely a skill that one could learn, so too should ethical deliberation be seen in a different light or as belonging to a distinct kind of reasoning capacity. For instance, to become a good comedian not only does one require a "good" sense o f humor (which, like moral sensibility or a good disposition, is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 86 neither uniform nor universal yet must be antecedently present if one is to actually become good); but a certain kind of openness is also necessary. Specifically, any good comic must be capable of tailoring her jokes or adapting them to the interests and attitude of a particular audience in the same manner by which the practically wise person of good character must be able to be responsive to the different demands of a particular situation. Just as these interests or the spirit o f a comedian's audience are initially indeterminate, so too are the moral or ethical circumstances with which one is confronted. In the same sense, there is no calculus for how to become a good philosopher or interpreter, though there may be general rules, a basic disposition, or types o f reasoning capacities which are necessary conditions for becoming so. For something to be said to possess meaning, it must be meaningful to someone - to a self-conscious subject or group o f subjects. This kind of self-consciousness or intelligence requires more than mere intellectual apprehension to understand the meaning of something -it must be sensitive to the influences of cultural, historical and personal prejudices or pre-understandings as well. This sensitivity would be evident in one's disposition, hexis, or attitude toward the object o f interpretation. Since truth as meaning can only be determined in a dialectic o f subject and object, and because this object or text, though a iiving" document, is neither conscious nor sentient, how could this kind of dialogue take place without an intepreter who is? Differently put, how could the work effectively 'Speak" to us if the interpreter also has no voice o f her own? At least one of the partners in such a dialogue must be able to really speak, and to allow the 'Voice" of the other (i.e., text) to be heard, if a conversation, in any sense o f the term, is to genuinely take place. Again, there are no strict Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 rules for how an interpreter may legitimately give determinate meaning to an object which is largely indeterminate. One can merely say, in general, that any good interpreter must be willing to remain open and responsive to the truth-claims o f the text and towards the various possibilities for their application. Lastly, according to Nussbaum, there is the feature o f non-repeatability in the realm of practice. In other words, we must acknowledge the existence o f 'ultimate particulars/' 'This is in part a function of the complexity and variety already mentioned, the occurrence of properties that are, taken singly, repeatable in an endless variety o f combinations makes the complex whole situation a non-repeatable particular" (Nussbaum, 1987, p. 304) Thus, we cannot apply general rules in a dogmatic fashion -imposing them upon concrete situations without first "seeing" what the relevant issues are in each and every case. This is tantamount to saying that moral reasoning does not involve acts of subsumption -namely, subsuming individual cases under one all-encompassing principle or set of rules. Nor can this be an intuitive or deductive process like that described by Descartes. More specifically, application in ethics or interpretation is not simply a matter o f drawing consistent conclusions from already intuited universals. Rather, we can determine the fitness of a principle only after identifying what the salient features of the case at hand are and what in particular is at stake. This means that consistency is not necessarily a criterion for right action or good interpretation, as appeals to such presume that situations are repeatable. For example, ethically speaking, one may generally value honesty over lying and yet find that in certain cases not telling the truth would be the best thing to do; or, in interpretation, one may generally concede that Aristotle's criticisms of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88 Plato are correct, but still find that in certain cases they do not hold. This is what leads Gadamer to conclude that understanding always implies understanding differently to some extent. In sum, we cannot expect the kind of dubious comfort which is afforded to those who would rigidly apply basic principles when confronted with a moral choice or an object of interpretation. Instead, we should note that rules have a limited usefulness, and should be regarded as guiding instead of binding. Nussbaum refers to them as 'tentative guides" or 'Summaries" which enable us 'to be flexible, ready for surprise, prepared to see, resourceful at improvisation" (Nussbaum, 1987, pp.304-305). They may point in some general direction towards the good (whether ethical or hermeneutic), but cannot do so immediately or in a restrictive manner. This underscores why Aristotle insists that the person of practical wisdom must have a wealth o f lived experience to draw from. For how else could one be adept at deliberation unless she has had various opportunities to cultivate her responsiveness, her capacity for accomodating surprises, her 'Sight" and her improvisational skills? It is this life history which allows the wise person to 'See" the principle or principles which are disclosed in a particular case, and determine whether a specific rule "fits" or not. For thought it is true that, on the one hand, individual cases are non-repeatable; on the other, these would be unintelligible without what Nussbaum calls 'the guiding and sorting power o f the universal" (Nussbaum, 1987, p. 306). For one is not dealing with 'tiifference" alone here, for this term only makes sense in relation to some norm, general rule or universal principle, even if such is not understood as absolute or ultimate. Since the role of the particular has taken precedence so far, it will now be necessary to consider more closely what is meant by the universal and its 'guiding" power. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 For Nussbaum argues that the relationship between the two goes both ways with each illuminating the other. What then would constitute a universal on this Aristotelian model of understanding and moral deliberation? Who decides this and on what basis can it be defended? How can universals act as guides in specific cases if every situation bears the mark of non-repeatability? Finally, how do universals and particulars depend on each other, and what kind o f experience or experiences are essential for effectively mediating between them? It is the phronimos or experienced person of practical wisdom who acts as the standard of good deliberation and judgment, according to Aristotle. He would be, according to Nussbaum, the 'thoroughly human being" who 'does not attempt to take up a stand outside o f the conditions o f human life, but bases his or her judgment on long and broad experience of these conditions."23 Moreover, this is not an individual who seeks to suppress desires and passions, as a Kantian moral subject is expected to do, but one who has cultivated and continues to cultivate them in the 'right" manner. As Nussbaum asserts, '{h]e or she will be concerned about friendship, justice, courage, moderation, generosity; his desires will be formed in accordance with these concerns; and he will derive from this internalized conception o f value many ongoing guidelines for action, pointers as to what to look for in a particular situation" (Nussbaum, 1987, p.306). This underscores the point that, for Aristotle, desires and inclinations are not merely irrational animal impulses which are problematic for moral deliberation. Rather, they are 'Responsive intentional elements which are capable o f flexible ethical development" (Nussbaum, 1987, p.307). In other 23 Martha Nussbaum. The Fragility o f Goodness. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 290. I am using the male pronoun here since, for .Aristotle, the phronimos must be a man. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90 words, they can be cultivated, nurtured, sublimated or restrained. Moreover, feelings constitute the condition for the possibility of acquiring an ethical disposition or proper hexis. Since choice is defined by Aristotle as 'deliberate desire" (Aristotle, 1962, p.63), it is necessarily situated between appetite and reason where it remains subject to both yet is reducible to neither. For moral choices are both rationally and irrationally determined - what we think and how we feel is constitutive of what we do and who we are. It is only through such choices that values or universals can be made manifest concretely in the realm of human action and relations. Just as our intellectual faculties can be cultivated or neglected so too can the affective aspects o f our characters be molded along ethical lines or distorted in various ways. This evinces why Aristotle is so concerned with bringing up children in such a way that they are sensitized to moral issues early on, since it makes a great deal of difference what kind o f character one develops if human beings are to live together, as he assumes we must. It is this person of practical wisdom who, in effect, brings a universal element to as well as finds it in a particular context. The phronimos is someone who has developed a harmonious relationship between his passions and reasoning faculties who is able to make appropriate choices based upon a variable conception of the good. In other words, he is one who can 'See" what an appropriate response would be in distinct situations. Further, this is a paradigm which can be extended to hermeneutics, since the same may be said of the good interpreter. He too must have a sufficient degree of life experience and cultivation, and must exhibit a respect for and sensitivity to his own historicity as well as that of the text's. The good interpreter will want to be open to the truth claims of the text, thereby manifesting his commitment to a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. principle o f charity or generosity which cannot be reduced merely to an intellectual stance but is indicative o f a particular kind of disposition or affective attitude. Still, one might ask, how can we be assured that this is not merely an empty ideal? Does the good interpreter or phronimos represent a form o f subjectivity that is unattainable? More specifically, how can a being who is contingent and finite bring something universal to, or discover it in, a particular situation? Nussbaum speaks of him or her as possessing an Internalized conception of value," being 'footed" in a community, and also identifies particular values or 'Universals" such as friendship, justice, etc. Like Aristotle, some moral consciousness is already being presupposed on Nussbaums' part, insofar as becoming good entails already being good which implies having some general sense or understanding of what justice or friendship means. However, it seems to me, that one of the problems here is precisely how to determine what constitutes these goods or ends. One cannot merely presuppose universal agreement as to what these moral terms refer to any more than one can assume a uniform means as to how they may be realized as ends. The circular nature o f Aristotelian ethics and Gadamerian hermeneutics arises at this juncture. For one needs to both bring the universal to as well as fin d it in any particular situation. In other words, the good itself, in the form of a proper disposition and commitment to basic, though ultimately indeterminate values, must be brought to bear on the specific circumstances which call for deliberation or interpretation. Only then, in a specific context, can those values be c :ven concrete content or actually applied, so any possibility o f such universal agreement is precluded at the outset and, perhaps, altogether. One may also discover in this same context whether or not her disposition is appropriate to the situation Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. at hand - i.e., whether it is effective in enabling her to understand the text or ethical question before her or whether it is inhibiting in some manner. This is analogous to the prejudices which one brings with her when confronting a particular text -namely, certain attitudes, values, assumptions, questions, and so forth are already acting as guiding principles, and it is these which will be constitutive o f understanding or misunderstanding. However, prior to any actual deliberation, there is no way to distinguish between those which might facilitate the former and those which may promote the latter. All that can be said beforehand is that openness as well as commitment (to the advancement of certain moral values or to the truth of the text) must be present to some degree if understanding is to be possible in ethics or hermeneutics. What one should be able to determine antecedently is whether she is genuinely committed to uncovering what is true in the text or merely to advancing her own interests. In other words, what needs to be overcome, in moral as well as hermeneutic inquiry, is any tendencies towards egoistic reasoning. Just as the ethical person must struggle to avoid reducing the good to simply whatever it is that he or she desires, by keeping the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate prejudices in mind and striving to mediate between them and the demands of the situation, so should the good interpreter do the same with respect to her own concerns and the questions raised by the text. But, is this precisely what Nussbaum is claiming here? What exactly does it mean when she speaks o f the virtuous person as one who is rooted in a community, and is committed tc< a conception o f the good life which is expressed in and includes the values mentioned above? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93 Nussbaum does not make this entirely clear, though she does suggest that when one makes ethical choices he stands in a very different relationship to them than he does when making choices based on technical facts. This is because when one makes ethical choices he is not creating something independent or separable from himself. Rather, he is constructing this self in a very fundamental sense - he is making manifest who he is and what he will be. He is thereby demonstrating to himself and others what he values, what his inclinations are, what his basic disposition involves, and is contributing to the history which has constituted who he is thus far. This is possible because, to some extent, history is determined by one's choices and actions as well as the meaning that those have for him and his future projects. In other words, not only do things happen to us which may be beyond our control or design, we can also effectively act in such a way as to change historical conditions. Here lies the paradox of Aristotelian ethics - we become what we already are, and what we are is constituted by our history and the traditions to which we belong or lay claim to through our actions. But this is also apparently the problem, for how can I find a space for criticizing that which constitutes my very being or essence? If I am someone for whom the good (or what is of 'Universal" value) is antecedently determined by a history and set of traditions into which I am thrown, then how can I maintain the kind of openness necessary to 'fcee" what it should be in a particular case? How can I maintain a critical stance towards that which I already bring to the situation and over which I have no freedom of choice? For merely contributing to history is not all that matters, as the good person wants to do so in a positive sense. So, where are we to look for guidance? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Aristotle, Nussbaum and Gadamer all seem to vacillate here between the claims that, on the one hand, ends are initially indeterminate and can only be derived in concrete contexts; and, on the other, maintaining that the person o f practical wisdom, good interpreter or historically effected consciousness, who is immersed in a community and committed to certain fundamental values and practices beforehand, provides the ultimate standard of moral action or correct interpretation. In other words, the good is both 'ftiine" and constituted by me, as well as 'bther" and dependent upon circumstances beyond my control. This means that goodness is, indeed, Subjective" though not in the traditional or crude sense of the term. (For more on this see part 2 on Heidegger's reconstruction of human subjectivity which includes his account of the fore-structure of understanding, and the ways in which Gadamer has appropriated it to support his concept of historically effected consciouness and the role he ascribes to prejudice.) Moreover, it is worth recalling that a virtuous person or interpreter is not someone who is infallible. He or she is someone who might often require a bit o f luck, as Nussbaum calls it. For, at times, it may be the case that evidence or information is not immediately available that would enable one to make better choices or interpretations. We must never forget that truths are only discernible in a dialogue between interpreter and other, which suggests that there must be some difference or possibility o f distantiation between the two in addition to a point o f connection, which means that ultimate truths are not possible. This is not only because there is no possibility o f achieving it as in the form o f a correspondence or complete identification between subject and object, but also because any genuine conversation about Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95 the good or right interpretation will be unending. (See chapter 3 in which I attempt to construct a positive Gadamerian conception o f tradition.) Finally, it also possible that values or truthful interpretations might, on occasion, be incommensurable due to this feature o f non-repeatability that Nussbaum discusses. And, that one can never avoid the possibility of what Alasdair MacIntyre calls a 'tragic confrontation of good with good," whether she is committed to truth and openness or not.24 In such situations when one must choose between the good of friendship and the good of justice, for example, there may be better or worse choices but no absolute or ultimately correct response. Even the very notions o f better or worse may be subject to infinite interpretations, presumably because, both of the alternative courses of action which confront the individual have to be recognized as leading to some authentic and substantial good. By choosing one I do nothing to diminish or derogate from the claim upon me of the other: and therefore, whatever I do. I shall have left undone what I ought to have done (MacIntyre. 1984. p.224). What this essentially amounts to is that the certitude and comfort that is so often yearned for and sought in specific universais or absolute principles cannot be had in matters of ethics or other areas where human experience and relations are concerned. Perhaps this is why Descartes tried to limit his search for truth exclusively to those objects which already demonstrated a sufficient degree of clarity and distinctness. All o f the features of moral choice noted by Nussbaum above -namely, mutability, indeterminacy and non-repeatability -would surely render an object unclear, and ultimately unintelligible if one accepts Cartesian assumptions and rules of method. In contrast, Gadamer maintains that the good, in general, is not static but develops. Its being or reality is the ongoing 24 AJasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1984). p. 224. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 open-ended history of its interpretations, not something that stands alone or is separate from them. Moreover, he insists that ethical instruction is not the result of inference but of dialogue -i.e., it proceeds by question and answer. Let me conclude here by showing further how Gadamer appropriates Aristotle's conception o fphronesis as a model for the interpretation of texts and the kind of understanding that is proper to human artifacts and affairs. Like practical wisdom, what Gadamer calls 'historically effected consciousness" is neither a technical nor a scientific form o f understanding, but it is not necessarily moral either as we do not stand in the same relationship to a text as we do towards other human beings or sentient creatures. Still, both interpretation as well as ethical choice and deliberation are concerned with 'Application" or the relation between universals and particulars, and both require self-reflection or introspection to some degree. In the case of hermeneutic inquiry the question is, how can one and the same text be understood in different ways over time? How can I, as an historical and finite being, understand an object which was written for a different audience in a different place and time as meaningful for me here and now9 For Aristotle, the issue at hand was how to discern the good or universal in distinct and particular contexts and how to become a virtuous person; while Gadamer's concerns involve the possibility of a fusion of horizons between an historical work (which, as 'fclassical," makes a universal manifest) and a particular, historical subject. What Aristotle says about deliberation and the person of practical wisdom, Gadamer maintains is true of hermeneutic understanding and the interpreter. But what does this mean? What specifically does this entail? In other words, what does Gadamer Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 mean by these terms and concepts -i.e., self-understanding and application - and how do they function in hermeneutic inquiry? According to Gadamer, understanding always involves application. Namely, to truly understand is to apply the text to the interpreter's present situation (Gadamer, 1994, p.308). For a text to be understood, it must '£peak" to me in a way that is meaningful for a current set of circumstances or for some specific purpose. In order to determine what the text is trying to say, what its claims to truth involve, or how it might be o f 'Universal" value, I must see how it applies to the exigencies o f present, or to my particular questions, despite its historical distance. Moreover, my historical situation is not something that must be overcome in order for me to understand, as Schleirmacher et al would have it. On the contrary, Gadamer says that 'Understanding, as it occurs in the human sciences, is essentially historical -i.e., that in them a text is understood only if it is understood in a different way as the occasion requires" (Gadamer, 1994, p.309, italics mine). What this also implies is that I must have some awareness of my current conditions, and of what is at stake for me, which would require an adequate amount o f life experience and a capacity for self-reflection. It also entails possessing the proper attitude (or hexis) toward the object of interpretation. For, as stated above, another necessary if not entirely sufficient condition for understanding is the desire to learn something from the text and the willingness to be challenged by its claims to truth or univerality. According to Gadamer, application does not mean applying some self-evident principle (gleaned from rational intuition as Descartes or Kant might argue) to the object in question any more than it does for Aristotle. The meaning o f a text is neither fixed nor immediately obvious to any Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 reasonable being, as it too is a historical object insofar as it has a history o f interpretations and tradition oe its own. And, although these prior interpretations must be taken into account, they do not determine the meaning of the text in any final sense or definitive manner. These previous readings may function authoritatively as tentative guides (like those described by Nussbaum above), but not in an absolute manner. Rather, what occurs in interpretation is a dialectic or dialogue between an historical object and an historical subject. David Couzens Hoy, following Gadamer, claims that the literary interpreter is analogous to a director staging a play or a judge in a court o f law. As he puts it: The literary text, the drama, and the law code all stem from earlier periods, and there are usually precedents for their interpretation. Since the present situation is never exactly the same as the situations of the previous interpretations, however, even the judge cannot merely repeat a precedent. In order to be just he. like the others, has to reinterpret the history of precedents in terms of the new factors in the present context.25 This concept o f precedents can be very illuminating here. For both the judge and director must serve their own interests and those of the community as well as remain faithful to the law code and its precedents or the play and its previous renditions. In other words, the judge and director, like the interpreter and phronintos, not only discerns the universal in the particular but brings it to the activity o f interpretation in the form of his own prejudices - i.e., one's own questions or concerns as well as those of the text or law code will be constitutive o f understanding. And, even if they depan from precedent or present an iconoclastic version o f the drama, or deviate from the claims of a tradition, they must be able to justify this somehow. Likewise, not only does the interpreter pose her own questions to the text, but she must also remain open to 'hearing" the truth claims or 25 David Couzens Hoy. The Critical Circle. (Berkeley: University o f California Press. 1978). p. 54. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99 questions which the text puts to her. Specifically, she must seek to understand the questions that the work is attempting to answer in light of her own particular concerns or with reference to what is at stake for her. This means that, for Gadamer, interpretation is neither a matter of imposing one's own meanings on the text, nor does it entail being passively receptive to the meanings intended by the author, previous interpreters, or some inherent meaning of the 'text itself." There is, however, a tension between the horizon of the work and the horizon o f the interpreter, as each holds a distinct place in history and relationship to a tradition. But it is precisely because o f this distance that mediation can occur, it as is within just such a space that a dialogue may ensue. Moreover, in both cases, these distinct horizons are ever-shifting and changing; and, one of the sources for this change may be this very encounter o f one with the other. Thus, understanding 'proves to be an event" (Gadamer, 1994, p.309). An event made possible in and through the dialectic o f subject and object or interpreter and text. This essential quality of dialogicality can be further illustrated by turning to Mikhail Bakhtin's discussion of Dostoevsky's novels. What makes Dostoevsky's work unique, even radical according to Bakhtin, is its polyphonic" character. Such is constituted by '[a] plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices."26 However, despite this multiplicity and difference, a whole is formed. Specifically, 'h whole formed by the interaction of several consciousnesses, none of which entirely becomes an object for the other" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 18). With Gadamer's account o f interpretation, the matter is no less complex. For not only do we have the two 'Voices" of the text and interpreter 26 Mikhail Bakhtin. Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1984), p. 6. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100 engaged in dialogue, we also have the background 'tnusic" of each's tradition affecting how this conversation is played out in such a way that is constitutive o f the entire 'bpera," so to speak. And, as with the distinct characters o f the polyphonic novel, none may be ultimately reducible to or interpreted through the perspective of another. Bakhtin goes on to claim that this kind of 'dialogical relationship" is 'hn almost universal phenomenon, permeating all human speech and all relationships and manifestations o f human life - in general, everything that has meaning and significance" (Bakhtin, 1984, p.40). What I find particularly striking about this is that it seems that Gadamer could have written these words himself, and almost does so when he speaks o f language as the 'Vnedium o f human experience" and the 'Universal aspect of hermeneutics." 27 In addition, Bakhtin's discussion of the hero's self-consciousness and the role it plays in Dostoevsky's novels also resonates with some of Gadamer's claims, but I will save this for the section on Heidegger and his reconstruction of human subjectivity. As shown above, hermeneutic understanding is analogous to phronesis, as neither are reducible to a technique or scientific method, and both require taking account not only of an indeterminate and changing object but of a dynamic subject as well. In other words, the three elements of moral choice distinguished by Nussbaum in her interpretation of Aristotelian phronesis and the phronimos could also be applied to Gadamer's concept of understanding and hermeneutic consciousness. Specifically, both the text and the interpreter are mutable and indeterminate beings, and each and every interpretative act or situation is non-repeatable in one way or another. Not only is the interpreter herself a 27 See Part III o f Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and VIethod. trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. (New York: Continuum. 1994) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101 work-in-progress, but so too is the truth o f a text inexhaustible - as it too is, in effect, a living historical document. Like the US Constitution or any code of law, it must be subject to various interpretations or applications if it is to remain valid and relevant over time. Further, the dialogue between a work and any individual interpreter is ultimately nonrepeatable -repeatability being an ideal o f the scientific empirical method. This ideal which, as I've demonstrated above, was inspired and promoted by Bacon and Descartes, among others, is not appropriate here. Rather, what is called for is some form of cautious creativity in each and every singular encounter. Interpretation, for Gadamer, is always a creative act though not one in which such inventiveness is arbitrary or without limits. And, although these boundaries are not absolute nor ultimately determinable prior to specific acts o f understanding, some general presecriptive claims can be made as to what would constitute a good interpretation or a good interpreter. Who, then, is the ideal interpreter according to Gadamer? Does he too have a standard, like Aristotle's person of practical wisdom, by which all may be judged to be better or worse at interpreting texts? In order to shed some light on this question, I will need to turn to Gadamer's concept o f selfunderstanding . For Gadamer, understanding always includes self-understanding. And, like a good Hegelian, he states that, '[s]elf-understanding always occurs through understanding something other than the self' (Gadamer, 1994, p.97). Moreover, self-knowledge is acquired only through experience and one's reflection upon it and this is an on-going and unending process. Self-understanding, like interpretation and moral deliberation, is inherently practical; and, one could say that, all three are inextricably linked. Since the way Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102 a person lives her life, what she chooses to do or which kinds of activities she engages in, and the way she understands these things cannot be separated. But, once more, the concept of experience has been appealed to, and with it the question o f what kinds of experience would be conducive to authentic self-understanding. Also, how can the 'fexperienced" person act as a standard o f good judgment or interpretation? Although Aristotle too discusses the importance o f experience for the phronimos, he does not thematize it in the manner that Gadamer does. Gadamer sees the concept o f experience as, paradoxically, 'bne o f the most obscure we have" (Gadamer, 1994, p. 346). After distinguishing between two kinds o f experience - Erlebnis and Erfahrimg - he argues that Erfahrung, or experience in the authentic sense, is always negative. If a new experience of an object occurs to us. this means that hitherto we have not seen the thing correctly and now know it better. Thus, the negativity of experience has a curiously productive meaning. It must be of such a nature that we gain better knowledge through it. not only of itself, but of what we thought we knew before -i.e.. o f a universal (Gadamer. 1994. p.353). Thus, genuine experience is always mediated and dialectical, and entails learning something about the object of experience as well as about oneself and one's claims to have understood something universal. In this repect, Gadamer is following Hegel whose concept of experience 'has the structure o f a reversal o f consciousness" (Gadamer, 1994, p.3 54). Ultimately, what one obtains through such experience is not an increase in some storehouse of knowledge, Erfahrung does not reflect an increase in the possession of facts and information. Instead, what one gains from this kind of experience is an openness to further experiences. For experiences of this sort cause one to doubt many o f her Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 previously held assumptions and prejudices which can lead to reflection, revision and increased experience. This is possible because 'Something is not what we supposed it to be. In view of the experience that we have of another object, both things change -our knowledge and its object" (Gadamer, 1994, p.354). In other words, both the subject and the object are changed by this encouter. Moreover, according to Gadamer, the same experience can never be had twice which is tantamount to saying that experiences are nonrepeatable , irreducible, or 'Ultimate" in their particularity. Even reading the same novel more than once will entail a 'hovel" experience each time, provided that one is willing to risk her previous understanding of it. A good interpreter is therefore one who retains her openness. She is an 'Experienced person" who has become so not only through or because o f her various experiences reading and interpreting texts, but also because of her openness to new experiences. This kind of individual proves to be someone who is 'Radically undogmatic" because she does not have such an investment in the answers she has discovered that she cannot continue to challenge these and remain committed to questioning (Gadamer, 1994, p.355). However, this appeal to openness does not represent an ideal or standard which can be defined abstractly or explained without reference to some concrete context. Just as the person of practical wisdom must stay flexible and responsive to the exigencies of the situation, so too should the experienced interpreter retain an awareness of her own particular prejudices or interests while remaining receptive to the claims of the text. Gadamer suggests that if one continues to take her finitude and facticity as an historical subject into account, she will always be ready for and responsive to new experiences, whether these are the claims o f a text or unique encounters with other Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104 human beings and states of affairs. Again, this is more properly indicative of one's basic disposition or hexis than of a rationally grounded position. Or, as Foucault puts it, "[t|he critical ontology' of ourselves has to be considered not. certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating: it has to be considered as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.28 All along it has been my contention that this is not entirely an intellectual exercise, and Foucault's use of tne term 'Attitude" indicates likewise, for we are not utterly rational beings. Thus, there seems to be an affective element here that Gadamer only briefly refers to explicitly, but which is nonetheless implied by his appeal to phronesis as a paradigm for understanding. Nussbaum, too, provides another example of this insight when she maintains that buffering" is constitutive of knowing, particularly of self-knowledge. For there is a degree of '£ain" which is necessary for me to be able to 'See" the inadequacy o f one of my prejudgments or prejudices.29 For instance, when I encounter a written work with certain questions I expect it to answer and I find that it fails to do so, this is frustrating or psychologically painful. However, it is this experience which compels me to reflect back upon the questions that I have put to the text and revise them before I return to examine it again in the light of new information. This 'to and fro" can go on indefinitely, and illustrates the dialectical nature o f experience and self-understanding - i.e., in the encounter with another I discover something about myself, and in understanding myself I am brought back to the claims of the other. Nussbaum goes on to claim that this Foucault. MicheL, "What is Enlightenment?." Interpretive Social Science, eds. Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan. (Los •Angeles: University o f California Press. 1987). p. 174. 29 Martha Nussbaum. Love's Knowledge. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1990), p.254. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105 kind of knowledge is not 'Scientific." It is not to be understood as the 'Vevealing o f some truth behind an appearance," but rather as the 'hew and entirely unique knowledge of something other" (Nussbaum, 1990, p.256). Again, this is something that can only be experienced insofar as it is 'felt" by the interpreter, it cannot be thematized or systematically explained, and thus cannot be formally taught or directly handed down from one person to another. Perhaps this is why interpretive skills, like moral sensibility, may be tied more to character (which includes this irrational element) and must be cultivated, than to intellect or the land of analytical reasonings which are subject to demonstration and may be learnt in the strict sense. Still, how does one develop a 'feel" for interpretation then? And, why doesn't this emphasis on human affectivity simply manifest yet another form of Romantic subjectivism? Turning to the concept o f experience, Georgia Wamke argues that 'fexperienced" people 'have learned because they were open to the possible refutation o f their beliefs and prejudices and could therefore revise or supplement them in a productive way."30 She ties this to Gadamer's account o f BiIdung as well as to Aristotle's account o f practical reason. Specifically, Bildnng, or the kind o f self-formation that involves edification, is a process by which an individual not only learns about facts and events but, more significantly, learns how these may be effectively integrated into one's life and self-understanding (Wamke, 1987, p. 160). Gadamer calls this process a 'Vising to the universal" and, in this sense, seems to construe the cultivated interpreter as analogous to Aristotle's person o f practical wisdom. But this is a universal subject which is merely a formal and regulative ideal. This 30 Georgia Wamke. Gadamer: Hermeneutics. Tradition and Reason. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1987). p.157. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106 cultivation of oneself and one's interpretive capacities is not like technical construction, nor does it involve grasping unchanging principles. Rather, Bildung, like the cultivation of a moral disposition, is the means by which human persons become what they are - namely, historically effected beings in the sense in which we are not only affected by history but recognize this facticity in ourselves - and this is a task which never ends or for which there can be no complete realization. What this indicates is that there can be no ultimate criterion by which to measure who is most human, in the sense of most experienced, rational, or sensitive to this facticity. However, we can make judgements of 'tnore" or 'less" - i.e., we can say that someone is more or less open to the claims of the text, or more or less dogmatic with regards to her own prejudices and assumptions. Like Foucault, who claimed to be satisfied with merely 'partial transformations," Gadamer also insists that his hermeneutics was designed to act as a 'fcorrective." Insofar as his 'hiethod" is meant to enlighten the modem viewpoint with respect to certain human limitations as well as possibilities, it does not attempt to present any final criteria as to what would constitute correct understanding in any definitive sense. Thus, Gadamer proposes to follow the assumptions of human historicity and finitude to their logical conclusions (whereas Dilthey apparently could not), and resists the compelling temptation for "something firm" to protect against, what he calls, 'the frightful realities of life" (Gadamer, 1994, p.239). The whole point o f Truth and Method\ Wamke argues, is to show that imposing scientific ideals of objectivity, repeatability, consistency, and so forth upon dialogic forms of inquiry obscures the kinds o f insights that they can achieve even though they are bound Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107 by history and tradition. And, the same may be said o f Aristotle's account of the good. If we expect the good to conform to some kind o f understanding other than that provided by phronesis and seek to account for it in universal and necessary terms, then we will preclude the possibility of any insight into how it might be manifested in particular cases. The unique character of ethical deliberation is not only attributable to the nature of the object o f inquiry (the good), but to the nature of the subject (the human as an historical creature) as well. Although, much ink has been spent here already on the issues o f human subjectivity and self-understanding, Gadamer's account of this has deeper roots in Heidegger's analytic o f 'Dasein." Specifically, I have often referred to the historicity of human existence and that most certainly cannnot be found in Aristotle's phronimos. If one wants to construe the person of practical wisdom or the good interpreter as an historical being, as Gadamer does, then we must next look to Heidegger. In many respects, the Heideggerian subject has already been further anticipated here with my references to Foucault and criticisms of the Enlightenment attitude. So, without further ado, I will now turn to an examination of Heidegger's Dasein. (2) Heidegger's Critique and Reconstruction of Subjectivity It has been said that without a Heidegger there could not have been a Gadamer.31 It has also been said that what is missing from the discussion of Gadamer, Aristotle and phronesis is the Heideggerian element.32 Since I agree with both of these claims and think 31 Richard Bernstein. Seminar entitled "The Hermeneutics o f Hans-Georg Gadamer." The Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research, New York. Spring. 1994 32 Gail Soffer, commenting on my paper "Gadamer's Appropriation of Aristole's Phronesis." presented at the Philosophy Department Workshop. The Graduate Faculty. New School for Social Research. New York, Vlav 2 . 1996. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108 that it is only because of Heidegger's reconstruction of the concept of subjectivity that Gadamer's hermeneutics can be defended, it must now be shown specifically what Gadamer has appropriated from him. While Aristotle deals with the objective aspect of understanding insofar as it he elucidates the relationship between universals and particulars and discusses the nature of the good, which is the primary object of moral deliberation; Heidegger reconstrues or transforms received metaphysical notions of Being and human existence. For Aristotle phronesis reflects a particular kind of ethical understanding that is distinct from scientific or technical wisdom (as shown above). Since the ways in which we understand are, to some degree, determined by the nature of the object in question and objects differ, one must presume that there will be different forms o f understanding. But, what also plays a role in determining what is involved in understanding or interpretation is the nature o f subjectivity and the kind of existence that is unique to human beings. For not only must one take into account what it is that is being understood or interpreted, but some account of who it is that understands or interprets must be given as well. Thus, both the nature of the subject and the nature of the object must be made explicit if any clear explanation as to what understanding consists in is to be offered or if Gadamer's model of hermeneutics is to be defended. To the extent that Gadamer accepts Heidegger's analytic o f Dasein, and takes seriously the finitude and historicity of the human subject, his account of hermeneutical understanding will be affected accordingly. In addition, Gadamer takes over certain concepts from Heidegger which are directly involved in any act o f interpretation - namely, Gadamer accepts Heidegger's 'fore-structure" o f understanding and shows how it Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109 functions in textual interpretation. So, since it has already been shown how Aristotle indicates the contextuality o f understanding -in as much as phronesis always involves the apprehension and application o f universals with respect to particular cases - what is needed here is some explication o f how Heidegger's fore-structure reveals the 'projective" nature o f understanding. In other words, he maintains that understanding is achieved only to the extent that some meaning is always already projected, or to the extent that there are 'prejudices" {Vorurteile) which are constitutive o f understanding. Both of these thinkers (Aristotle and Heidegger) allow Gadamer to show that interpretation does not, and ultimately cannot, occur in a vacuum and that tradition is a necessary condition o f the interpretive process, insofar as it provides content for this fore-structure as well as a context for application. Thus, the questions to be faced now are: what is Heidegger's analytic of Dasein and how does Gadamer appropriate it for his model o f hermeneutic reflection? Throughout the Western tradition, Being and human nature have typically been construed as unchanging, distinct, and not subject to historical conditions. For example, Plato's theory of forms and defense of the immortal soul, Aristotle's concept of substance, Descartes' clear and distinct ideas (whether of self or God, etc.) and Kant's categories all presuppose a universal subject who is capable o f transcending existential or empirical conditions, and also assume that objects o f knowledge reflect truths which are similarly enduring and necessary.33 What Heidegger says, on the other hand, is that both subjects I am well aware that there are significant exceptions to these ahistoricai, immutable models o f subjectivity and objectivity (e.g.s. Heraclitus, Vico, and Hegel, among others). However, as it is arguably the dominant paradigm in the Western world and the specific one to which Heidegger is addressing his objections, it will remain my primary focus here. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110 and objects are dynamic, historically determined and to understand one presupposes some understanding, or 'pre-understanding," o f the other. In order to retrieve the question of Being, which he claims has been forgotten or obscured by his predecessors, Heidegger introduces us to 'Dasein" -that unique entity 'Which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it."34 (italics his) Because traditional terms like subject, soul, or mind have historical connotations which have been difficult to erase, Heidegger chooses to use this new designation for the kind of existence that is peculiar to human beings. In other words, since traditional talk of a spiritual soul (Plato), thinking thing or mind (Descartes), transcendental ego or subject (Kant) has distorted our understanding of what it means to be human, by positing it as an essence or substance that is ahistorical or a priori, another way of speaking about human existence is needed if we are to understand the Being of this kind of being in its most fundamental sense. Moreover, according to Heidegger, Being is to be understood as finite transcendence which represents a kind of process or movement - -i.e., the way in which we comport or go beyond ourselves into the world on a daily basis. Being is not something that is immutable or substantial, in the way the Ancients supposed, nor is it determined subjectively as Modem thinkers presume. Instead, Heidegger shows that Being and Dasein have no ultimate or objective essence but neither are they constituted strictly in accordance with the subject's own conceptual apparatus. Rather, these terms (i.e., subjective and objective) serve merely to obscure our understanding of beings as dynamic and always in process. The primary aims of Being and Time are to de34 Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I l l substantialize the subject by retrieving it from its thing-like status and overcome the subjectivism of Modernity, so it makes sense that a novel term like Dasein might assist Heidegger in this endeavor. And, it is through this de-reification of the human being that subjectivity itself can be seen as something essentially finite and temporal. Only then can finitude be seen as most basic or originally constitutive of Being. Previously, the finite was understood merely >n relation to or as a derivation of the infinite. For example, Descartes understands himself as an imperfect being to the extent that he grasps the nature of God as a supremely perfect being. Thus, for Descartes, our way of being was taken to be derivative; whereas, for Heidegger, it is human existence that is regarded as fundamental since it is first and foremost our ownmost being that is an issue for us. Moreover, Dasein is exemplary insofar as it is the only being that transcends itself, which is to say that it is the only being that literally exists in this sense. So, to understand Dasein involves understanding how finite transcendence functions which is how the question of Being itself can be accessed. Heidegger emphasizes the need to understand Dasein as a whole - as a complex relation of existential structures, like thrownness and projection, or attunement and understanding (as I will demonstrate below) - and that it is radically misunderstood if it is regarded as merely one entity among others or as some kind of atemporal and substantial thing-in-itself. Yet, it is usually in one of these two senses, or both, that philosophers have defined human existence and subjectivity - i.e., as Vorhanden, or as something objectively present. In other words, the human being is conceived as something quantifiable or consisting o f qualities and capacities like those which one might attribute to any other Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112 object. For instance, it is Descartes who, in describing himself, purports to have offered up an account of subjectivity in general: 'I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists entirely in thinking," or 'h thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, abstains from willing, that also can be aware o f images and sensations."35 Further, Descartes claims that in order to exist he 'has no need o f place, and is not dependent on any material thing" (Descartes, 1958, p. 119). Thus, consciousness is objectified and virtually deified simultaneously. In other words, certain qualities are attributed to it in such a way that it appears to be subject to description like any other thing or object yet, at the same time, it is regarded an almost god-like transcendent substance which 'has no need o f place." This 'jjlace" can be construed in either a temporal or spatial sense, thereby suggesting that consciousness is independent of any or all empirical conditions. Kant, too, holds to this conception o f subjectivity in the first Critique when he distinguishes between the empirical subject and the transcendental subject. The former being an object o f intuition, like any other phenomenal or sensible thing, and the latter referring to the pure '1 think" which attends every act o f cognition though it cannot be known as it is in itself. Moreover, this 'transcendental unity o f apperception" provides the condition for our intuitions of space and time but is not conditioned by them. Therefore, both of these philosophers end up with a dualistic conception of subjectivity - a dualism that appears to be either inconsistent or impossible to reconcile. Again, both Descartes' thinking thing and Kant's empirical subject seem to be firmly planted in a world among other objects; yet their '1" is simultaneously described as a substantial being, 35 Rene Descartes, " Discourse on Method Part IV" and "Meditation II," Philosophical Writings, transl. by Norman Kempt Smith. (New York: The Modem Library. 1958), pp. 119 and 186 respectively. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 existing in no particular place or time, with the capacity to transcend this objective world. In either case, Heidegger believes this conception o f subjectivity reflects a 'logic of things," or a way o f thinking about Being that has led philosophers to misconstrue the nature of human existence and to fall victim to false dichotomies -whether between mind and matter (reflecting a Cartesian dualism) or phenomena and things-in-themselves (indicating the Kantian distinction). This is why an analytic of Dasein considered both in terms of its totality and temporal facticity is indispensable. Lastly, in their quest for scientific objectivity, both Kant and Descartes (who may be deemed quintessential^ Modem in their orientations and attitudes) are led, though perhaps unintentionally, to radically subjectivistic conclusions. This too is what Heidegger seeks to overcome through his analysis o f Dasein. Kant does so by making the knowledge of objects entirely dependent on the conceptual apparatus of a transcendental subject; whereas Descartes falls into this trap when he makes truth a function o f his own clear and distinct ideas. How then does Heidegger avoid these kinds of subjectivistic implications, especially considering that he too gives human existence a privileged ontological and epistemological status and deems Dasein unique among other entitites? And, does he also succeed in giving an account of the subject that is not dualistic? In section 10 of Being and Time, Heidegger himself responds to the historical influence of Descartes and his emphasis on method. Descartes begins by describing the activity of his consciousness, taking the thought o f the T ' as basic and self-evident. What follows from this is the existence o f the subject as a thinking thing. 'From this I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists entirely in thinking" (Descartes, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114 1958, p. 119). Thus, the activity of thought (Cogito) is regarded as a self-evident given while the the existence of the subject (sum) is taken as that which simply follows from the activity o f thinking alone. However, for Heidegger, the '1 think" is as problematic as the 'I exist," as thought itself presupposes certain conditions and does not occur by itself outside any spatio-temporal context or world. For Descartes, the being of the T" in the Cogito is merely given. But, according to Heidegger, unless the conditions o f its possibility are ontologically demonstrated (as he intends to do in the analytic), one is in no position to say what this T ' refers to or what might be attributable to it. Again, this Cartesian approach reflects the very logic of things that Heidegger finds objectionable, for it has obscured the nature of both Being itself and the being of Dasein. For example, in 'The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger delineates the three ways in which a 'thing" has traditionally been understood. One, as a substance to which various capacities or qualities are attributed -e.g., Descartes' 'thinking thing." Secondly, there is that which unifies a manifold of sense impressions - e.g., Kant's transcendental subject; and lastly, a thing may be understood as the synthesis of form and matter (a conception which can be traced back to Aristotle's Metaphysics). In contrast, Heidegger will attempt to provide a phenomenological account of Dasein which does not conceal its nature as these interpretations do, but instead reveals its fundamental structure as Being-in-the-world. So, what specifically does this entail? And, how does his explication of human existence significantly differ from those of his predecessors? According to Heidegger, Being-in-the-world represents the first and the broadest guiding concept for finite transcendence. But, what does this mean, and why is it Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 significant? It is important for at least two reasons: One, it undermines the dichotomization of subject and object -namely, that human beings are distinct or separate from other beings or stand outside a world. For Heidegger, Dasein is a unique entity but this need not imply that it is separable from an objective world, or even that its particular mode of being could be understood if it were so detached. Instead, one of the ways in which Dasein is fundamentally constituted can be seen in terms of how its comports itself in its everyday manner of being. Secondly, to speak o f Dasein as Being-in-the-world reflects an anti-rationalistic starting point. That is not to say an Irrational" one but, rather, that our most fundamental mode of being precedes any rational explication of it. In other words, to understand human existence or Being rationally, as has traditionally been done in Western philosophy, is derivative. But, derivative of what? According to Heidegger, any rational explanation one might offer is derived from a more ordinary or primordial mode of understanding which is operative in everydayness. So, Being-in-the-world manifests our involvement with things that are most familiar to us or which already matter to us in some way. Specifically, we can only find ourselves in relation to a finite world of other beings to which we are Attuned" - we are always already 'there" in some sense. This facticity or attunement reveals 'Where one is at," so to speak.36 Still, although one's facticity cannot be overcome, one does not simply find herself 'there" in an entirely passive sense as is the case with objects or things which are 'present-at-hand." Rather, Dasein actively constitutes its 'thereness," which is to say that the existential structures of 'projection" as well as 'thrownness" are equally constitutive of Dasein's primordial being. 36 Hubert L. Dreyfus. Be-tie-in-the-World. (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1992). p. 168. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116 For we project ourselves into the world by seizing upon actual possibilities and making them our own. In order to discern what Heidegger means by projection and thrownness, one must understand them in relation to one another. In other words, both are equioriginary aspects o f Dasein insofar as it is conceived as a structural whole. These elements cannot effectively be understood separately or in oppostional terms. Moreover, through thrownness and projection, we can see how an understanding of Being as finite transcendence is always already operative in everyday living. We live in this manner on a daily basis whether or not one has explicitly or self-consciously reflected upon his own existence. In Section 29, Heidegger states that, '[t]he expression 'thrownness' is meant to suggest the facticity o f its being delivered over. The 'that it is and has to be' which is disclosed in Dasein's state of mind is not the same 'that it is' which expresses ontologicocategorically the factuality belonging to presence-at-hand" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 174). That human beings find themselves in a world, or some set o f circumstances and relations, is an ontological constituent of their being. Though the particulars may be incidental (whether I am biologically male or female, live in Iraq or Bolivia, etc.), what is not accidental is that our existence is always subject to, and to some extent determined by, these contingent conditions. This means that we experience ourselves most fundamentally as being part o f a world that is not o f our own making, but upon which we depend for our sense o f self and understanding. Dasein is thus an historical being or, to some extent, subject to and dependent upon its particular historical conditions. Yet, it is precisely this facticity or thrownness that provides the very grounds for, or represents the condition of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117 the possibility of, any action or activity one might perform. Once again, Being-there does not represent the passive sort of being of objects or that which is merely present-at-hand. For Dasein is equally constituted by its projection insofar as it is conceived as a structural whole, rather than as a thing or substance to which qualities are attributed. What then does projection specifically entail? Projection, according to Heidegger, involves the appropriation of possibilities and refers to the ways in which Dasein comports itself into the world. Possibility is that which is ahead to be grasped - that towards which I project myself - but not in the sense o f any notion o f potentiality that has been inherited from the past. Projection implies a form o f transcendence. But, because Dasein is not understood as something which is distinct or separate from an objective world, transcendence, for Heidegger, does not imply some other-worldly or god-like form o f existence as it does for Descartes and Kant. On the contrary, because Dasein is always already embedded or enmeshed in a world, transcendence must be construed in a finite or immanent sense. Again, we transcend or go beyond ourselves by appropriating possibilities, but these are actual concrete (in a word, 'finite') possibilities and they are not unlimited. To use an example from hermeneutics, one may say that when interpreting a text one makes it his own by uncovering what it contains that is meaningful or significant for him. There may be many possible meanings or ways of interpreting a particular work, but these possibilities can only be projected to the degree that they can be appropriated by oneself or applied to one's own situation. Differently put, we can only project possibilities insofar as we are thrown, and what we are thrown into is a finite world o f possibilities or set o f concrete conditions. However, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 'tpjrojecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting (Heidegger, 1962, p. 185). In other words, there is no method for how projection should proceed as every Dasein is faced with a particular set of possibilities which call for interpretation or appropriation. And, although one cannot avoid projecting himself on an everyday basis throughout his life, he can be more or less aware o f this constitutive element of his being and thus more or less conscientious in how he projects himself. We could say, with Heidegger, that human beings qua human are always already interpreting and understanding their world, or that we are fundamentally 'hermeneutical" beings. Projection is thus the active counterpart o f our passive facticity. Moreover, Heidegger's conception of Dasein as Being-in-the-world can now be seen as a rearticulation of the inherited opposition between 'potentiality" and 'Actuality"; or, as revealing the condition of the possibility o f the traditional categories o f 'freedom" and 'determinism." Using this terminology, one may be said to be free to the degree that she self-consciously and deliberately chooses to project herself towards certain possibilities that are open to her, but her choices are also determined to the extent that they are limited by her thrownness; or, who I am actually is affected by who I am potentially and vice-versa. This is analogous to the paradox which is central to Aristotle's ethics, for Heidegger too is saying that we, as Daseins, must become what we already are and that we already are what we will become. I am not free, for example, to be a professional football player due to certain physical and psychological conditions and limitations. But many other possibilities remain Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 open to me, and it is within these parameters that I can continue to transcend myself. For instance, I am a philosopher and will continue to project myself towards the possibility o f becoming one further or more completely. However, in projecting, what prompts or motivates me and serves as the ultimate 'fend" o f my continued projection is some notion of myself as a whole. In other words, the above examples (football player, philosopher) indicate certain particulars -namely, those 'things" which represent possible 'bbjects" of appropriation. But, what is ultimately being disclosed here is my very Being as Dasein insofar as every Dasein seeks to disclose itself as a whole. And, although there may be movement towards some final aim or goal in every act of projection, it is a process which continues on, without end until, death. In sum, the kind of transcendence which is possible for human beings is finite or immanent -i.e., ours is a conditional freedom only, not that of an entirely indeterminate or unlimited sort. But, it is a purposeful not arbitrary kind of free existence which projects itself towards the totality of Being, in spite o f the fact that this 'totality" is not actually attainable during one's lifetime. (This will be important to remember later when I consider the extent to which we are constituted by tradition, and our capacity for going beyond it despite the impossibility of one's ever getting outside o f it completely.) For a more concrete depiction of this unique mode of human existence, it may be worth taking another look at Mikhail Bakhtin's work. Bakhtin has a conception of subjectivity which is similar to Heidegger's and is made apparent through his description o f the hero in Dostoevsky's work. According to Bakhtin, an author of 'tiialogical" novels, such as Dostoevsky, does not so much construct a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120 character as he allows one to emerge or reveal himself. The hero himself or his selfconsciousness is not something that can be objectified, reified, or "personified" . In a monological design, the hero is closed and his semantic boundaries strictly defined: he acts, experiences, thinks, and is conscious within the limits o f what he is. that is, within the limits of his image defined as reality; he cannot cease to be himself, that is. he cannot exceed the limits o f his own character, typicality of temperament without violating the author's monologic design concerning him. Such an image is constructed in the objective authorial world, objective in relation to the hero's consciousness: the construction of that authorial world with its points o f view and finalizing definitions presupposes a fixed external position, a fixed authorial vision (Bakhtin. 1984. p.52). Thus, monological works reflect the kind o f 'logic of things" or metaphysics o f presence that Heidegger rejects. On the other hand, in dialogical novels, '& living human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object o f some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process" (Bakhtin, 1984, p.58). This is tantamount to what Heidegger is claiming o f Dasein, and why he is critical o f traditional accounts of human subjectivity which tend to be 'monological" in nature. For it is these which presume some 'Authorial voice" which presents us with a singular and fixed position as to what the subject essentially and always is. I would also argue that this is true o f Gadamer's conception o f the text and why he, too, stresses the dialogical nature o f understanding. As a peculiarly human artifact, insofar as it too is an expression of human consciousness, it cannot and should not be reduced to the status of a thing or object - nor should the interpreter attempt to relate to it in such a manner. Interpretation does not mean merely 'listening" to what the author tells us or seeking out his or her intended meaning, as one would in the case o f a monological form o f understanding. Rather, according to Gadamer, it requires an act o f engagement with the object o f interpretation that is analogous to a conversation. Further, he claims that this is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121 true not only of the interpreter who is attempting to understand a work but also o f the author engaged in writing it - that is, writing too is a creative act but not an entirely independent one, in as much as it involves mediation within a realm o f specific conditions. T o r the writer, free invention is only one side o f a mediation conditioned by values already given. He does not freely invent his plot, however much he imagines he does" (Gadamer, 1994, p. 133). In other words, authors as well as interpreters are limited by historical and existential circumstances but are also capable of remaining open to various possibilities of meaning. To consider only one side or the other is to define subjects in either a static or arbitrary way. Bakhtin tends to emphasize the element o f freedom over determination when he appeals to Dostoevsky's basic idea that, 'tnan is not a final and defined quantity upon which firm calculations can be made; man is free, and can therefore violate any regulating norms which might be thrust upon him" (Bakhtin, 1984, p.59). Heidegger and Gadamer say essentially the same of Dasein or the interpreter but in a more mitigated sense - namely, that although one is thrown into a determinate set of norms, beliefs, values, etc. or is constituted by the traditions to which she belongs, she is still free to accept or reject them and this is only made possible through a dialogical encounter. Thus, although there must always be something already 'given," this need not imply that we are deprived of our capacity to criticize or evaluate that which has defined us or our world. We can only become what we are but what we are is not something fixed, final, or complete. 'The genuine life o f the personality is made available only through a dialogic penetration of that personality, during which it freely and reciprocally reveals itself' (Bakhtin, 1984, p.59, italics his). Again, this rings true to Gadamer's claim that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 understanding occurs when there is a "fusion o f horizons," in which a truth that is both subjectively and objectively determined is disclosed or in which both subject and object come to an agreement and are changed through this engagement. Because of the dialogicality of his work and his respect for the autonomy of his characters, Bakhtin says that Dostoevsky called himself a Realist." Not in the 'Subjective romantic sense" of one who is 'trapped in the world of his own consciousness;" but rather, because he has escaped 'tnonological realism," or what Heidegger would call a 'tnetaphysics o f presence," in order to approach the " man in man,' that is, a 'realism in the higher sense'" (Bakhtin, 1984, p.61). In other words, like Heidegger's Dasein, Dostoevsky's hero is not some static character already conceived and created according to the author's plan or vision, but a being who is constantly revealing himself through his projects and manner of comportment in the world of the novel. Still, Bakhtin does not make it clear what this realism in a 'higher sense" is specifically, or what in particular makes it 'higher." However, he does continue to say that Dostoevsky saw a monological approach to understanding human beings manifested in the psychology of his day and found it to be 'h degrading reification of a person's soul, a discounting o f its freedom and its unfinalizability" (Bakhtin, 1984, p.61, italics his). This is something which also concerned Heidegger, as he too not only criticized the traditional philosophical accounts of human existence but also the psychological methods used to understand it and discerned a need to promote a different model o f human subjectivity - specifically, one in which any singular human existence can be construed as a work-in-progress that is only finalized in death, or when it ceases to become what it always already is through its projects. Perhaps this is the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123 reason why Gadamer is similarly dissatisfied with 'psychological" approaches to interpretation u hich posit 'fempathy" as the condition o f the possibility o f undertanding (see Schleiermacher above and Hirsch below), and argues that conversations which are conducted simply 'to get to know" the other -- 'i.e., to discover where he is coming from and his horizon" - are not genuine dialogues (Gadamer, 1994, p.303). For even attempting to understand another from his point o f view, or merely presuming that this is possible, objectifies or reduces the other to the status of a thing. Certainly, there are cases where this may be necessary (as, he explains, in oral examinations or conversations between a doctor and patient) but these are not conducted in the spirit o f hermeneutical inquiry insofar as we have given up the claim to find 'hny truth that is valid and intelligible for ourselves" (Gadamer, 1994, p.303). As Daseins, we always find ourselves 'there" in a finite world which constitutes what we are and, at the same time, by projecting possibilities we continue to disclose or reveal this mode of being and what it means to be 'ln-the-world." But, there are other equiprimordial terms that Heidegger uses in his analytic which are significant here - namely, attunement and understanding - the former being analogous, though not identical, to thrownness, and the latter paralleling his concept of projection. However, to speak of Dasein's Being-there as attunement is to indicate something further: specifically, insofar as we find ourselves in a world to which we are attuned, or by which we are always already affected, we manifest a pre-rational openness to it. It indicates a fundamental attitude or disposition that tends to color any situation in which one may find herself. In other words, attunement (Befmdlichkeit) and mood (Stimmung) reveal that we are unavoidably affected Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124 -that, fundamentally, tilings matter to us in some particular way. Mood functions as a mode o f disclosedness that can never be overcome, regardless o f the fact that many philosophers, especially Descartes, insist otherwise. This is because attunement and mood, like thrownness, provide the background within which experience is possible - they represent the very condition of the possibility o f experience whatsoever. Specifically, it is our affectedness that reveals certain possibilities to us while, at the same time, rules out others. Again, it is because o f our moods and attunement that a world opens up for us, not in spite o f them. Yet, according to Heidegger, this is what has traditionally been overlooked. Most philosophers have construed feelings in particular, or human affectivity in general, as inherently individualistic and subjective which explains why reason (according to Descartes, Kant, et al.) must be regarded as "pure" if they wish to achieve the kind of objectivity or universality for which they strive. But, how could such indifference be expected to yield any kind o f insight whatsoever? In other words, if things didn't matter to us in some basic way, then how could anything at all be disclosed to us? On the other hand, Heidegger's conception of affectedness makes manifest the impossibility of detached inquiry, and denies that truths are the result o f disinterested investigation, for only moods can actually move us. And, although we can never get behind or beyond them, any more than we can overcome our facticity or thrownness, we can become aware of them and reflect upon them in a critical manner. Of course this means that we are, to a great degree, passive with respect to our moods. Heidegger says quite clearly, 'h mood assails us," and means this in the same sense in which we are determined or constituted by our thrownness (Heidegger, 1962, p. 176). But, this is not the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125 whole story. For affectedness, too, reflects only one element of Dasein's original constitution. The second equi-originary element of our being is 'Understanding" which, like projection, refers to the more active dimension of human existence. As Heidegger puts it, '[a] state-of-mind always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has a mood" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 182). What then does Heidegger mean by understanding, and how is it related to attunement? Understanding, for Heidegger, is similar to Aristotle'sphronesis insofar as it manifests a kind of know-how. To understand one's world is to be able to find one's way about in it. It reflects our capacity for projection, as how we comport ourselves in the world depends upon how we understand it and appropriate those possibilities into which we are thrown. Again, like Aristotle, to understand implies some type of competence or skill, not unlike techne which also has some affinities with phronesis. However, Heidegger's conception of understanding is distinct in a very significant sense. For him, understanding reflects a mode o f Dasein's beir.g - it is thus part o f its fundamental ontological structure, not merely one activity or attribute among others. Moreover, '[i]n understanding, as an existentiale, that which we have such competence over is not a 'what,' but Being as existing" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 183). So, when one understands in the most primordial sense, she is not simply apprehending this or that entity, as that is understanding in a derivative or secondary sense; rather, it implies that she knows how to find her way about a world, or that she understands in a very fundamental manner what it means to exist. Just as attunement reveals the ways in which things or possibilities may or may not matter to me, so too does understanding disclose how these possibilities may or may not be realizable, whether Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126 certain actions do or do not make sense to me, etc. Thus, understanding is always already attuned. While the active determination of projection may be more evident in understanding, and our thrownness is most obvious insofar as our Being-in-the-world is characterized by how we are affected, these ontological constituents can only be grasped together as they reflect two sides o f the same coin, so to speak. In as much as we understand the world in various practical ways, we understand it as our own - that is, as Daseins we appropriate possibilities because we previously know our way around it to some extent. Again, it is because we always already find ourself in a certain state-of-mind or mood - i.e., as affected in some particular manner - that a field of other possibilities will be revealed to us. Or, differently put, it is only by virtue o f our affectedness or thrownness that experience itself is possible and a potential space for understanding or projection is disclosed. These existential structures, which are said to constitute Dasein as a whole, may be seen as analogous to the categories o f freedom and determinism although they have been understood as mutually exclusive by most Modem philosophers. In other words, we might say that 'freedom" refers to the activity of projection or understanding; while our conditionedness, as represented by our being always already thrown or attuned, is made evident in the term 'determinism.''However, it is precisely because they have traditionally been construed as distinct and separate that they are radically distinct from throwness and projection or attunement and understanding. For Hedegger's existentialia represent the very conditions of the possibility o f freedom and determinism. Specifically, my being as a Dasein is determined by my moods and attunement; while my freedom is made manifest to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127 the degree that I seize upon the various possibilities presented to me and appropriate them as my own. Moreover, these structures avoid the kind of dualism that is endemic to Modernity. For understanding and projection are not equated with some impossible form of infinite transcendence as 'freedom" tends to be, nor is one entrapped by the conditions into which she is thrown or by the manner in which she is affected as the term 'determined" implies. To be free or to be conditioned are seen as necessarily opposed or mutually exclusive states o f being; whereas one is always already both attuned and understanding, or thrown and projecting, for that is what it means to exist as a Dasein. Again, thrownness and projection are interdependent and mutually determining existential structures that manifest Dasein in its totality. In other words, one could not appropriate possibilities by understanding or projecting oneself unless he were already thrown into a world to which he is attuned or by which he is affected. One might also say that it would be impossible to act, freely or otherwise, unless one could find his way around some determinate world. For unless we understand ourselves as both presently thrown as well as projecting into the future, we could not understand what it would mean to be either free or conditioned with respect to the past. Still, what does all this have to do with Gadamer's conception of tradition, and the extent to which we are either conditioned by it or free to criticize it? First, to speak in terms o f an either/or here is misleading. For we cannot choose between two fundamental aspects o f our very being. Rather, we might say that when one responds to the truth claims o f tradition, she is both conditioned by it and free to critique it in some manner. Appropriation need not automatically entail acceptance. To make Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128 something our own - that which already is in a sense 'bur own" - does not necessarily mean uncritically swallowing it whole. To be more specific here: if we are constituted by tradition, then this must imply some degree o f passivity insofar as it is something into which we are thrown - like a mood, it unavoidably 'hssails" us. However, because we also have the capacity for projecting and the possibilities open to us are manifold (though not infinite), we are not entirely passive with regards to what is handed down or passed on to us. In other words, to be free to the extent that one is capable o f criticizing a traditional norm or belief or practice, for instance, does not mean that one is not already constituted by it in some way. We are affected by traditions or attuned to the conditions into which we are thrown, whether we acknowledge it or not. In fact, if one remained completely indifferent or unaffected by something that presented itself (presuming for the moment that this is even possible), there would be no motivation to accept or reject it in any manner. Traditions too, like anything else, must matter to us in some way or else we would not even be in a position to care enough to question or interrogate them or continue to be affected by them. As a Dasein, I clearly have a history and a horizon but these are constantly in process whether we self-consciously appropriate what is presented to us through them or not. This is the paradox inherent in Heidegger's saying that we are always already in advance of ourselves or, again, the sense of irony that is evident when Aristotle admonishes to become what we are in his ethics. In sum, according to Heidegger, a logic o f things will never be able to address the question of the Being of Dasein. For this uniquely human mode of existence cannot be accounted for by simply adding up the attributes or qualities which belong to a substance, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129 nor can it be analyzed or broken down and explained in terms of its constituent parts as one might do for things which are Vorhanden. Whether one is computing and adding up or analyzing and breaking down, some whole is already being presupposed; and it is precisely this kind of thinking that will only serve to obscure the fundamental ontology o f Dasein in its totality. However, as Heidegger understands it, this 'Whole" is dynamic and thus can never be concretely grasped in its totality. For this reason too a logic o f things is insufficient, insofar as the ways in which Dasein comports itself or the moods in which it finds itself will always remain subject to change. So far we have seen how Heidegger has rearticulated traditional conceptions o f human existence and subjectivity through in his analytic of Dasein as well as how he has brought the Modem categories of freedom and determinism together by regarding them as derivative of the existential structure of Dasein as a whole. But, what remains to be shown now is how Heidegger's hermeneutics of finitude allows Gadamer to make tradition a condition o f the possibility of understanding in interpretation. For this we must turn to Heidegger's discussion of what is involved in the interpretive process and how a 'fore-structure" reveals the fundamentally projective nature of understanding. In section 32, Heidegger lays out the three aspects o f this fore-structure which reveal an emphasis on futurity in understanding: Tore-having" (Vorhabe), 'fore-sight" (Vorsicht) and 'fore-conception" (V'orgriff). 'In every case...interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance - in a jore-having...in something we see in advance - in a foresight. ..in something we grasp in advance - in a fore-conception" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 191, italics his). What this indicates is that meaning is something which always must be Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130 projected in advance, and that the interpreter is actively involved in any interpretive process. The reasons for this are as follows: First, interpretation can only take place against a given background, for we are always already involved in the world and are affected by things in some manner, whether or not we acknowledge this explicity or consciously reflect upon it. This is what Heidegger means by attunement or mood and its significance is manifested in any interpretive activity through this fore-having. Second, interpretation can only proceed from some perspective or point o f view - what Heidegger calls a fore-sight. For example, the types of questions we ask or basic attitude we have towards an object of interpretation will, to some extent, determine in advance how it is to be understood or what kinds of truths will emerge in and through the interpretive process. Again, one can be more or less conscientious or reflective about the questions he asks or the assumptions he holds about the work and his attitude towards it may change during the course of this encounter, but he cannot approach the object of understanding from nowhere. This is because one is always already involved in a world of possible meanings, and such truths can only be revealed in relation to some '£lace" or perspective as understanding, for Heidegger, is necessarily finite. As indicated above, he rejects any conception of human understanding which would regard it as infinite or capable of transcending Dasein's existential conditionedness. (This finite notion of truth, as that which is meaningful, will be developed in chapter 3.) Last, there is the element o f fore- conception, which means that the interpreter brings certain expectations as to what she will discover or what will be disclosed to her. In other words, there is always some anticipation of meaning or 'h definite way of conceiving [the object], either with finality or Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 131 with reservations" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 191). These expectations do not one-sidedly determine the meaning or truth o f the thing in question, but they do provide some sense of direction. Like fore-having and fore-sight, one's fore-conceptions will be constitutive of whatever truths are disclosed and, again, such will always be finite or limited in very specific ways if meaning is to emerge. Because Dasein is essentially 'thrown potentiality," and objects too must be circumscribed in a particular manner and to a certain degree, everything is not possible -interpretation is not an 'Anything goes" or arbitrary enterprise. Therefore, certain meanings or possibilities must be closed off if others are to come to the fore. We do not find ourselves alone in a vacuum or surrounded by objects to which we are entirely indifferent any more than we find ourselves immersed in a world of indeterminate or unintelligible beings. Still, Heidegger is careful to qualify that our fore- conceptions need not be accepted without 'Reservations," which indicates, in general, that the fore-structure or grounds o f interpretation can never be fixed. In other words, our fore-havings, fore-sights, and fore-conceptions must be constantly put to the test - i.e., examined and reexamined in relation to the object itself - even though they serve as the ground from which understanding may proceed. Unlike a Cartesian or Kantian, 'grounds" for Heidegger are not static categories, nor are they clear and distinct ideas or rules of method. The main point here is that, '[a]n interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 192). For there is always this dynamic threefold structure that any interpreter brings to any act of understanding, regardless of whether or not they acknowledge it explicitly. This is tantamount to saying that meaning is fundamentally projective in nature according to Heidegger. Nonetheless, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132 once again, projection has nothing to do with drafting a plan and then acting accordingly. Such a position would imply that understanding or interpretation is systematic or methodical in a linear sense which both Heidegger and Gadamer clearly deny. More specifically, Heidegger is not saying that we, as subjects, unilaterally project truth or render an object meaningful according to our own standards, concepts or interests. Rather, what we have in this fore-structure are guiding ideas (not unlike Nussbaum's 'hiles of thumb" or Aristotelian principles) -namely, an estimation or 'feel" for what is at stake, and some anticipation or sense o f the possible meanings or truths that remain to be disclosed in our encounter with the object. This is because Heidegger looks to the 'things themselves," not only to the subject. It is in this respect that he preserves the objective side o f meaning, though not in the Modem sense -i.e., understanding is both subjective and objective, not one or the other as Positivism declares. Nor is the objective element determined solely by a transcendent, rational subject as Kant and Descartes maintain. Like Schleirmacher, Heidegger and Gadamer see truth as dialectical - i.e., meanings emerge in and through a dialogue of subject and object. In other words, truth in interpretation depends on what I bring to the work, as a Dasein, as well as on the 'thing itself." Again, Dasein is that being for whom Being itself is an issue -i.e., one who is constituted by her historicity and whose very existence is determined by how she understands her world and herself. So far it is clear that this Dasein represents what Heidegger sees as the fundamental human condition, which is that o f finitude or conditionedness, but what does he mean when he speaks o f these 'things themselves" or the 'bbject itself? Is he too not guilty of reification or hypostatization here? How is it possible for him to retain any Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133 objective notion of truth without appealing to some independent, definitive object or Kantian thing-in-itself? This is especially problematic for Heidegger given his claim that what is projected is some 'Whole" - more specifically, that what is projected in interpretation is "a whole of significance." When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein-that is, when they have come to be understood-we say that they have meaning [Sinn). Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility [Verstandlichkeit] o f something maintains itself. Meaning is the "upon-which " o f a projection in terms o f which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception" (Heidegger. 1962. pp. 192-193). What begins to be revealed here is the circular nature o f interpretation, or Heidegger's version of the hermeneutical circle. In other words, in order to truly understand something there is always some sense of a whole or 'Referential totality" ( I erweisungsganzeit) which is projected, which implies that what is to be understood is already understood. More concretely, for example, I expect this object or work of literature to have some cohesive and coherent meaning, and this meaning is then worked out in terms how I make sense of its constitutent 'parts'' in the interpretive process. But why is this not sheer nonsense? How does this avoid the trap of a merely vicious circle in which I alone actively project meaning upon a passive object or determine the truth in accordance with my own preconceptions? Moreover, what exactly does Heidegger mean by this 'Whole," and what relation does it have to its "parts"? First, it may be argued that the circle is not a vicious one because it is neither arbitrary nor static and closed. '[I]t is the expression o f the existential fore-stmcture o f Dasein itself. [And in it] is hidden a positive possibility o f the most primodial kind o f knowing." In interpretation, the meaning of things is worked out in terms o f 'the things themselves" and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 134 Dasein's own ' otentiality-for-Being" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 195). That which the interpreter brings to an object o f interpretation is not some random and fixed set of presuppositions, but those which reveal Dasein's own ontological structure as Being-inthe -world. In other words, what I bring to a work discloses my own engagement with things in the world in terms o f what already matters or is meaningful to me. However, this is not an entirely subjective operation, nor is it a simple issue of choosing to impose my own expectations or anticipated meanings upon a passive object. For I can only project meaning upon something to the extent that it "fits" with the whole. For example, in textual interpretation the object has an integrity of its own, so that any partial understandings that I attribute to it will only cohere with the whole to the degree that my projected meanings reflect something true about it. Still, such finite and particular truths cannot be determined prior to this process. Provisional truths may obtain at the beginning, but their legitimacy or illegitimacy must be tested in the actual activity of understanding an 'bther." Moreover, Heidegger's "whole" is not to be understood as something which is merely present-athand and static; rather, he is referring to completeness in the sense of a "whole of possible interconnections" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 184). In other words, Dasein always projects itself toward possibilities that are its own, or toward some totality that he can appropriate or make his own. But, clearly, this whole set of possibilities will never be reached by a finite being. Specifically, I cannot expect to ever understand something completely or perfectly, especially something as complex as a work o f art or literature, the mind, the course of human history, a political party, a community, or even myself. Thus, there is no access to things-in-themselves in any ultimate or final sense. There will always be more to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. understand or more to be revealed about any object o f interpretation. What this implies is that there may be some notion of a genuine" object o f interpretation operative here - namely, those kinds o f things which are distinctly human and are neither merely Zuhartden or Vorhanden. Even, or perhaps especially, something as intimate as self-understanding is open-ended. In other words, as a finite yet dynamic being, I cannot expect to realize all of the possibilities into which I have been thrown, which means that I cannot expect to ever understand myself as a whole either for I too, like any other human 'hrtifact," am a workin -progress. It is this quality o f movement or 'becoming" which characterizes virtually all of Heidegger's thought. Dasein, and the form o f understanding proper to it, is always already on-the-move. This is why a logic of things, construed in a static sense, remains insufficient if one is going to account for the dynamic yet finite nature o f human existence, and the activity o f interpretation which characterizes this ontological structure. Nonetheless, it is this notion of a referential totality which we project ourselves towards, whether that represents an apprehension of oneself as a whole or a complete grasp o f the truth of another entity. This is not simply an asymptotic ideal which is, by definition, impossible. For, as indicated above, when we are actually interpreting something, the object is circumscribed by this fore-structure o f understanding. Thus, the 'Whole" which is actually encountered is not something ultimate or the entire array o f possible meanings, as this type of thing-in-itself would be inaccessible for Daseins. Rather, it represents a finite whole which is circumscribed in very particular ways according to the fore-structural elements that the interpreter brings to dialogue. But, because this is a dynamic configuration o f questions, attitudes, concerns, etc., Heidegger's hermeneutical circle Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136 remains open and ever subject to change. In other words, the parts'' or my own partial pre-understandings o f the object may be altered in and through this dialectical encounter. For the integrity o f the work itself, as evinced in the intepreter's anticipation of completeness, may serve as a check on the interpreter's own unchecked prejudices. Again, so long as one prescinds from the assumption that the work will cohere, and wants truths to be revealed, the object can cause the interpreter to examine and perhaps alter her questions and attitude when this end is thwarted. However, provided that one is properly attuned to the object and is asking the 'fight" questions (i.e., those which facilitate rather than inhibit understanding), meanings can and will emerge. Still, though there is an anticipation of completeness - i.e., a presumption that the object constitutes a cohesive whole - this can never be grasped in any final or ultimate sense, though my particular interpretation must also constitute a whole in the sense of being coherent and intelligible. In other words, it is to the things-themselves which one must look but these 'things" are not infinite ideals (like Descartes' God or a Kantian noumenal world); rather, the object itself is limited by what will be true or meaningful to me. Thus, my understanding whether o f myself or other entities is unfinalizable and open-ended but, at the same time, represents an intelligible whole o f meaning. Another way of explaining this is to return to Aristotle's concept of phronesis or to Nussbaum's account of the relationship between the particular and the general: The background conception [read: Heidegger's forestructure] contributes preparation and valuable illumination; but the seeing [read: disclosure of meaning] is in the particular, and is not legislated in advance. It has the power to enrich or change the general conception (Nussbaum. 1987. p.316). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137 In sum, it appears that Heidegger has avoided the charges o f circularity in a vicious sense as well as the reification of Dasein and other entities. For interpretation or understanding, on his view, is never exhaustive since objects cannot be reduced to what is strictly present-at-hand and the fore-structure of one's understanding is always subject to alteration or enhancement. As already indicated briefly, this is crucial for Gadamer's account of textual interpretation, as I will show more explicitly in the next chapter. Moreover, as also alluded to above, Heidegger's account of Dasein and his notion o f truth as disclosure can serve as a means o f defending Gadamer's claims regarding the provisional nature of understanding, the constitutive dimension of prejudices, and, ironically, his retrieval of tradition as a source o f authority. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138 Chapter IV: Gadamer's Concept of Tradition (1) Introduction What I will be arguing in this chapter follows the track Gerald L. Bruns set in his essay 'What is Tradition?" Specifically, I too will be satisfied if I can simply 'hiake it harder for people to speak o f tradition in the usual way," instead of developing any final or ultimate definition of it.37 However, as I've indicated above, I do think that some light can be shed upon what Gadamer means by tradition, and that a positive conception of it can be defended along Heideggerian and Aristotelian lines. In other words, although I will be attempting to avoid any temptation to reify what is essentially a dynamic structure, I will also insist that tradition be understood in a way that is consistent with Dasein (or the Heideggerian subject), phronesis (or the Aristotelian model of practical wisdom), and Heidegger's notion of truth as disclosure. Since the former two aspects have already been developed above, it now remains for me to explain what this conception of truth consists in and how Gadamer appropriates it or makes use of it in a hermeneutics which takes tradition as a condition of the possibility o f understanding. 37 Gerald L. Bruns. Hermeneutics: .Ancient and Modem. (New Haven: Vale University Press, 1992), p.94. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139 As David Couzens Hoy puts it, 'Heidegger's reformulation o f the notion of essence allows for a way of thinking o f humans as beings that are essentially historical rather than defined by an unchanging essence."38 This is why Gadamer claims that if understanding a text is possible it will be different for different historical ages or epochs, for it too reflects a uniquely human mode of being. As Daseins, we are consituted by our histories and so it follows that our way of understanding will also be historically conditioned by the traditions in which we find ourselves and, perhaps as well, by the tradition of the text itself. However, when Heidegger speaks o f interpretation he is not referring primarily to human artifacts, such as works o f art or literary texts, but to what it means to understand in the most primordial sense. According to Heidegger, any possible object of understanding is immersed in a world and is constituted by its relation to it. Thus, interpretation always makes something evident as something and this 'fcs" structure is fundamental. In other words, an object is understood only in the sense that it is understood as something in particular against the background of a world or in relation to some meaningful 'Whole."'That which is disclosed in understanding -that which is understood - is already accessible in such a way that its 'as which' can be made to stand out explicitly."39 But, Gadamer is primarily concerned with texts, works o f art, and other human constructs, when he talks about interpretation. So, in as much as he accepts Heidegger's circular conception o f understanding, whereby parts are understood in terms of the whole and vice-versa, what might constitute this 'Whole" for Gadamer? What 38 David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle. (Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 1978), p. 41. Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. (San Francisco: Harper & Row. 1962), p. 89. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 140 provides the background or world in which an object of interpretation can be rendered meaningful, or can be understood as something in particular? Differently put, how is our interpretation of written works similar to that o f things in the world, presuming that Heidegger's model of understanding is applicable here? And, most importantly, how does this reveal Gadamer's positive conception of tradition and its role in the interpretation of human artifacts? To reiterate: Understanding can only occur in a context as Aristotle, Heidegger and Gadamer all argue. Even that which is 'Universal," in phronesis, can only be discerned in and through a particular situation. However, according to Heidegger and Gadamer, in distinction to Aristotle, this particular context must be understood historically. More specifically, for Gadamer, it is tradition that provides the condition o f the possbility of understanding texts or works of art. For it is tradition that provides a context within which these objects can be rendered meaningful, and gives some concrete content to those kinds o f truths which emerge in the interpretive process. This non-Cartesian, non-propositional, non-absolute theory of truth as meaning will be examined below but, for now, let it suffice to say that Gadamer's notion of truth is essentially Heideggerian as well as dialectical. Still, what precisely is he referring to when he appeals to tradition as both constitutive and authoritative for understanding? Whose tradition is he talking about here? And, isn't he effectively saying not only that tradition is a condition for the possibility o f interpretation, but that it also a necessary condition for any true interpretation? Lastly, how are the truths which emerge in interpretation different or distinguishable from other kinds? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 141 I will examine this last question first by considering how Heidegger criticizes traditional claims about the nature o f truth, insofar as he reveals and rejects the fundamental presuppositions upon which they rest, and then explicates his own conception o f it by showing how it follows from his account o f Dasein. However, Gadamer does not simply take over Heidegger's definition but adds to it - for example, when he conflates understanding and application and appeals to the possibility o f a "fusion of horizons" as the ultimate aim of interpretation. I will then take up the issue of tradition directly by showing that there are at least two ways to respond to the above questions concerning a positive conception of it: Specifically, there is the tradition o f the text itself or its own history o f interpretations ( Wirkungsgeschichte); and second, there is the interpreter's own horizon, as it is made manifest by an historically effected consciousness or the traditions to which she herself belongs. However, the two are not necessarily separable for in some respects they overlap. Last, I will illustrate how conceptions o f tradition and history which are similar to Gadamer's have been defended by others (e.g., Brun, Nietzsche, and MacIntyre). (2) Gadamer's Concept of Truth Before turning directly to Gadamer's conception of truth, as that which is meaningful or relevant and is therefore inherently particular, the Heideggerian notion of truth must first be considered. For it, along with Gadamer's conflation of understanding and application and the possibility o f a fusion o f horizons, provides the basis of his own ideal of truth in interpretation. Because Gadamer does not explicitly offer a definition of truth it, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 142 like tradition, is primarily determined in a negative fashion. In other words, truth in interpretation is most often represented in terms of what it is not - it is not something repeatable or verifiable in a scientific sense; it is not transcendent, trans-historical or prejudice free; and, it is not revealed to us as the product o f a specific method or in accordance with universal principles or canons. Nonetheless, it is not entirely arbitrary , despite its relativity or plurality, for that would make a mockery of the very notion by rendering the term itself trivial at best, meaningless at worst. So, what is truth for Gadamer and how is it developed along Heideggerian lines? Heidegger openly claims to be following tradition to the extent that he sees a rightful, primordial connection between truth and Being. Thus, he states that, '[o]ur investigation will make it plain that to the question o f the 'essence' of truth, there belongs necessarily the question of the kind o f Being which truth possesses" (Heidegger, 1962, p.257). Like Dasein's most primordial form o f understanding, truth is conceived ontologically. In other words, it too manifests a mode o f Being and the previous ways in which it has been traditionally characterized are merely derived from this. As he did in chapter two, where he distinguished three traditional and derivative conceptions o f a 'thing," Heidegger then continues on here by reflecting upon the three basic theses that have attempted to characterize truth: (1) that the iocus" of truth is assertion (judgment); (2) that the essence of truth lies in the 'agreement" o f the judgment with its object; (3) that Aristotle, the father of logic, not only has assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial locus but has set going the definition of "truth" as "agreement" (Heidegger. 1962. p.257). What this amounts to is a 'torrespondence" theory of truth in which something is true to the extent that it is in accord or 'hgrees" with the object in question. But what is this Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 143 something? What kinds o f things can be said to be true, what types o f objects are capable o f possessing truth-value? In his article "On the Essence o f Truth," Heidegger says: A statement is true if what it means and says is in accordance with the matter about which the statement is made. Here too we say. 'It is in accord." Now, though, it is not the matter that is in accord but rather the proposition. The true, whether it be a matter or a proposition, is what accords, the accordant [das Stimmende|. Being true and truth here signify accord, aid that in a double sense: on the one hand, the consonance [Einstimmigkeit] of a matter with what is supposed in advance regarding it and. on the other hand, the accordance o f what is meant in the statement with the matter.40 In either case, what is being assumed is that some correspondence obtains, whether this is understood as the matter at hand being 'Us it should be" -i.e., in accordance with 'the actual" - or the agreement of what is meant with what is said. What is also presupposed here is that truth can be characterized in terms o f its opposite, which is 'Untruth." An untruth which may be made manifest in the lack of such correspondence. Again, truth appears wherever there is an agreement of knowledge with its object, which is tantamount to saying that only judgments have truth-value. Whether these judgments are manifested in propositions and communicated to others or are simple acknowledgments that the thing in question is 'Us it should be," truth is always a matter of correspondence. Accordingly, what is true is, by definition, correct. Or, given the necessary connection between Being and truth, 'Whatever is, is right." 41 But, for Heidegger, this simple equation will not suffice as he insists that we must inquire further into the foundation o f this relation and examine what, in general, 'bne [has] in view when 40 Martin Heidegger. "On the essence of Truth," Basic Writings, ed. by David Farrell Krell. (San Francisco: HarperCollins. 1977). p. 119. 41 See Alexander Pope's "An Essay on Man." edited by Maynard Mack. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1951) Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 144 one uses the term "agreement"? (Heidegger, 1962, p.258). In other words, if this correspondence theory of truth is merely derivative, then what is truth in its most originary sense according to Heidegger? According to Heidegger, all we can do is clarify the kind of Being which belongs to knowledge itself. For the question o f truth is already obscured when a separation, like that demonstrated above, is presupposed. In other words, '[i]n judgment one must distinguish between the judging as a Real psychical process [namely, an act of assertion], and that which is judged, as an idea! content [see 'the matter" itseif or what is 'Actually" meant]" (Heidegger, 1962, p.259). However, no justification or clarification is offered here as to why we must accept this separation o f form and content or how this distinction is to be made. Thus, instead of asking, does my judgment correspond to or agree with the object in question?; Heidegger claims that we should ask, '[w]hen does truth become phenomenally explicit in knowledge itself? And, the short answer is, 'When such knowing demonstrates itself as true" (Heidegger, 1962, p.260, italics his). What then does this 'demonstration" consist in? And, how can we recognize it as true or distinguish it from what is not true? First o f all, Heidegger explicitly rejects any position which would assume that a clear distinction between truth and untruth can be made. Rather, he insists that Dasein is always already both 'In" truth and untruth -that Dasein both uncovers as well as covers up phenomena. However, before turning to this point regarding the primordial relation between truth and untruth, I must begin by explaining his ontological conception o f truth as disclosure. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 145 Something is true in as much as it is allowed to be what it is, which means that Dasein is 'In the truth" insofar as it uncovers or allows entities to reveal themselves as they are. Thus, true assertions let the object 'be seen" in its uncoveredness, which means that 'Being-true" is to be understood as 'Being-uncovering" and this is only possible on the basis of Being-in-the-World (Heidegger, 1962, p.261). However, that which reveals itself, or is uncovered 'hs it is in itself," is not something 'behind" or beyond experience. Again, Heidegger begins by rejecting any such real vs. ideal, phenomenal vs. noumenal, subjective vs. objective dichotomy. Rather, the matter at hand or object in question is that which is actually presented to us in experience. 'The state of affairs as it is itself is the state o f affairs as it manifests itself when it is itself given to us."42 Differently put, one might say that truth is an 'fevenf ' -a specific happening which presupposes some particular context or situation. This is because truth as disclosure involves the opening up of a space, place, or 'World" in which specific things may be pointed to or uncovered. Clearly, this notion o f truth is quite different from one which regards it merely as a relation -i.e., as an agreement between subject and object, or the real and the ideal, which is made manifest in judgment. However, what this also implies is that the conditions which must obtain for truth, or for entities to be disclosed, are precisely the same as those which allow for falsehoods to emerge, or for phenomena to be covered up, obscured, or concealed. And this can be a frightening prospect! Especially for those who hold to Cartesian or Kantian ideals of certainty and correctness in interpretation. Does this mean that any distinction between truth and untruth is chimerical? And if it is, then how can it make sense to speak 42 Ernst Tugendhat. "Heidegger's Idea o f Truth," Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. Brice R. Wachterhauser. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994), p. 86. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 146 of 'truth" or 'Untruth" at all? It now sounds as though one no longer has any means of distinguishing between what is true and what is false in any respect. Heidegger insists that he has not simply 'Shaken off' the tradition by proposing a new definition of truth. Rather, he says 'We have appropriated it primordially (italics his)", and hopes to demonstrate how this derivative conception came about. In order to do so, we must again look to Dasein for whom disclosedness represents its basic character o f Beingthere or Being-in-a-world. Moreover, 'fdjisclosedness is constituted by state-of-mind [attunement], understanding, and discourse, and pertains equiprimordially to the world, to Being-in, and to the Self' (Heidegger, 1962, p.263). Simply put, Dasein is its disclosedness and thus is always already in the truth." But, once again, does this not altogether preclude the possibility o f error or falling in to" untruth? The short answer here is, no. And, my use o f the term 'falling" into untruth is significant. For it is because Dasein is constituted not only by disclosedness, in addition to thrownness and projection, but also by 'fallenness" that error or untruth is inevitable. This fallenness refers to the way in which Dasein does not merely find itself in a world but is also "lost" in it to some extent. Its absorption in the "they" signifies that it is dominated by the way things are publicly interpreted. That which has been uncovered and disclosed stands in a mode in which it has been disguised and closed off by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity...Entities have not been completely hidden: they are precisely the sort of thing that has been uncovered, but at the same time they have been disguised. They show themselves, but in the mode of semblance (Heidegger. 1962. p.264). Although Heidegger argues that this fallenness and the susequent covering up of entities is not to be construed in a negative sense, it seems hard to avoid coming to that conclusion - especially, when it appears that he has merely substituted an ideal/real or phenomenal/noumenal dichotomy for that o f disclosedness vs. hiddenness and speaks in Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 147 terms o f 'disguise" and 'Semblance." But perhaps this is not the case if we consider Heidegger's argument concerning the relationship between concealment and unconcealment: [0]nly in so far as Dasein has been disclosed has it also been closed off; and only in so far as entities within-the-world have been uncovered along with Dasein. have such entities, as possibly encounterable within-the-world. been covered up (hidden) or disguised (Heidegger. 1962. p.265). In this sense, one might say that truth and untruth or disclosedness and hiddenness are related dialectically. Specifically, there can be no uncovering if something is not already covered up, just as one cannot disguise something unless it has already been revealed. Of course, this will always involve questions o f degree -i.e., to what extent has the object been disclosed and in what respects has it been obscured -rather than questions of absolute truth or falsity. If we apply this more primordial notion of truth to the activity o f judging, one can say that judgments or assertions will always be partly true and partly false. What must be given up as chimerical then is not truth itself, but the hope of attaining the 'Whole truth" or the absolute truth of something. Moreover, Heidegger is careful to point out that the kinds of truths which are disclosed must be constantly put to the test. 'It is therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered" (Heidegger, 1962, p.265) - even if this uncovering has come about through Dasein's immersion in the 'they" or as a result o f id le talk." For it is only dialectically that semblance and disguise can be distinguished from the ihing-itself." If truth is a particular kind o f event, then it must happen again and again - it must get played out in a dialectic of concealment and unconcealment. Moreover, [t]he uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 148 uncoveredness in the mode of semblance. Entities look as i f . . . That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised (Heidegger, 1962, p.265). In other words, uncovering the whole truth of something is impossible which implies that, in general, truths are inherently particular and understanding can only be provisional, for there is always some play between truth and untruth or uncovering and covering. Still, it remains to be said how this definition is appropriated by Gadamer. What then does he say about the nature of truth, and how is it related to his conception of tradition? In his essay, 'What is Truth?," Gadamer himself examines Heidegger's definition and also insists that there is '& fundamental relationship between truth and falsehood." 43 In other words, because concealment and unconcealment must be understood dialectically the scientific ideal o f truth, as the verifiability of propositions, is not sufficient for hermeneutics. Moreover, it is not only the case that when we recognize truth we always simultaneously cover over and forget truth, rather it is the case that we are of necessity caught within the limits of our hermeneutical situation when we inquire into truth. That means, however, that there are many things that are true that we are not capable of recognizing because vve are. without being cognizant of it. limited by prejudices.44 In other words, whatever truths may be revealed in any particular interpretation will always be partial and provisional due to our finite, historical conditionedness. - However, despite this limited access to the 'Whole" truth of something, prejudices also, paradoxically, serve as the very condition of the possibility of such truths emerging at all. For even these 'limiting" prejudices facilitate understanding insofar as they circumscribe a 43 Hans-Georg Gadamer. "What is Truth?," Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. Brice Wachterhauser. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1994). p. 40. 44 Ibid.. p.40 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 149 manageable range of possible interpretations. Some limit must be introduced into what might be a potentially unlimited set o f true interpretations. This is because the 'Whole" truth represents an infinite ideal which would be intelligible or inaccessible to us as finite historical beings. Again, we can see the dialectical nature o f truth manifesting itself here - i.e., truth in interpretation depends upon a dialectic between the limitations set by one's prejudices and one's capacity for maintaining the kind of openness that would allow him to examine these critically and, perhaps, move beyond them. In Heideggerian language, the projection of any particular truth necessarily entails the closing off o f others which is precisely why human transcendence is finite. In other words, we can only transcend ourselves and uncover the truth of something in the context of a specific situation or in response to some particular question which means that other questions will be precluded or occluded. But, this not only leads us back to Gadamer and his conception o f 'truth as answer" - namely, that all propositions should be understood as responses to implicit questions. And, these responses are only true to the extent that they are meaningful to the interpreter herself and the conditions in which she lives. In other words, if there are to be any genuine 'answers" which come to light in a dialogue between text and interpreter, they must be relevant or capable of acting as responses to the questions and concerns she brings to this an encounter. Certainly, she must remain open to the questions which the text puts to her, but the text too must be flexible enough to appeal to her in a meaningful way. This general notion, of truth as meaning, now raises another set o f issues regarding the nature of 'bpenness" as well as what Gadamer's claims regarding 'the hermeneutic priority of the question" involve. Therefore, in the next section, I will explore how these Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150 terms are employed in a Gadamerian hermeneutics as well as how they are related to his conceptions of truth and tradition. (3) Experience, Openness and the Priority of the Question Genuine understanding, for Gadamer, always involves some play between the interpreter's own questions and prejudices and those of the text. In other words, when I engage in dialogue with the text I bring my own set of interests, prejudices, anticipations o f meaning, etc. to the table, but I am also moved by questions which the text puts to me or which arise in this encounter. Any truths which may emerge in this process will thus be characterized in terms o f a "fusion of horizons" between the two, and so are not determined independently either by myself or the text itself. When an assertion is supposed to be true, 'bne must test it itself with the question for which it intends to be [an] answer. [However,] even the question is not in turn a simple first that we can shift to at will. For every question is itself an answer."45 What makes this dialectic of question and answer, question as answer and answer as question possible, is what Gadamer calls openness. But, what is it that we must remain open to? Simply put, I would say one must remain open to the potential 'Untruth" of her prejudices. For it is only by allowing oneself to be 'tested" by the truth claims o f the text that one's own prejudices may be revealed and evaluated. Like Aristotle's phronimos who, by virtue of experience, is able to 'See" what is called for in a particular situation, what is involved here is also a kind of perception based on experience - namely, the ability to 'See" what those questions are that the text is 45 Ibid.. p.42. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151 proposing to answer. 'Seeing questions means, however, to be able to break through that which controls our entire thinking and knowing like a closed and impermeable layer of smoothed-over opinions."46 In this sense the text acts authoritatively or functions as a kind of formal 'Universal" that, to some degree, regulates understanding. For, once again, interpretation is not a matter o f the interpreter imposing meaning upon the work. However, doesn't the interpreting subject also bring something universal to this encounter? Aren't her prejudices also constitutive o f understanding, as Heidegger and his fore-structure have indicated above? Remaining open, or making this 'break," cannot mean simply becoming an empty vessel by completely overcoming one's own interests, questions or previously held beliefs (as Descartes attempted to do), but neither does the risking of one's prejudices mean submitting entirely to "the text itself." As we've already seen with Aristotle, it is the experienced person who brings the universal element to, as well as finds it in, the particular situation with which he is confronted or, in th:s case, in the text. Nonetheless, this is not the kind of universality that is sought for in scientific investigation and expressed propositionally. For it is not subject to the principle o f non-contradiction, nor is it consistent with any criterion o f repeatability. What kind of universality is this then? Gadamer insists that universals must be a posteriori or dependent upon 'Experience" in a way that is similar to the universals of Aristotelian reasoning. However, it is then necessary to ask what Gadamer means by experience. The traditional and essentially atomistic model o f experience, as Erlebnis, will not suffice for hermeneutical inquiry. For 46 Ibid.. p.42 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152 Erlebnis refers to primary data that are immediately given as an experiential unity. On the positive side, Gadamer appreciates that this does not imply an act o f mere 'Sensation" and that these 'htoms" of knowledge 'hre not data of experiment and measurement but unities of meaning" (Gadamer, 1994, p.65). Nevertheless, such meanings are still atomized and objectified so that, '[a]n experience is no longer just something that flows past quickly in the stream of conscious life; it is meant as a unity and thus attains a new mode o f being one (Gadamer, 1994, p.66, italics his). This would imply that the truth of a work as a whole is to be sought in the sum of its parts - the parts being constituted by one's experiences of it. But Gadamer denies that meaning can be reduced to a discrete unit of immediate experience in the same way that he denies that a proposition can be true or false in itself without reference to some context. Certainly propositions provide a context for individual words which would otherwise lack meaning, and so too is some unity of experience preferable to singular or discrete sense impressions. But, without a larger existential context or actual situation, even these unities o f meaning remain rather trivial just as any particular sentence or proposition possesses a relatively insignificant truthvalue if not understood in the context o f the written work as a whole. Moreover, there is an assumed immediacy and permanency manifest in the concept of Erlebnis that Gadamer objects to -- 'Something becomes an 'experience' not only insofar as [something real] is experienced, but insofar as its being experienced makes a special impression that gives it lasting importance" (Gadamer, 1994, p.61). However, this is a notion o f experience that Gadamer has already rejected, for it depends upon the possibility of 'jjure" perception in which a worldless subject encounters the object simply as it is in itself. Instead, Gadamer Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153 argues that because meaning requires concrete content and is always contextual an experience will always be unique. Specifically, something is revealed to us that we had not noticed before, for example, or one discovers that what once seemed familiar is now foreign and this is better expressed as an Erfahrung. Moreover, experience in this respect can only be acquired by openness as, according to Gadamer, it is essentially negative: If a new experience of an object occurs to us. this means that hitherto we have not seen the thing correctly and now know it better. Thus the negativity of experience has a curiously productive meaning. It is not simply that we see through a deception and hence make a correction, but we acquire a comprehensive knowledge. We cannot, therefore, have a new experience of any object at random, but it must be of such a nature that we gain better knowledge through it. not only of itself, but of what we thought we knew before-i.e.. of a universal (Gadamer. 1994. p.353). This is dialectical experience, and reflects a logic of question and answer not a logic of things or individual propositions. It is a conception of experience that is traceable to Hegel wherein 'fexperience has the structure of a reversal of consciousness" (Gadamer, 1994, p.354). Again, like Aristotle's phronimos, being experienced 'does not consist in the fact that someone already knows everything and knows better than anyone else. The dialectic o f experience has its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself' (Gadamer, 1994, p.355). Thus, what makes experience and understanding possible is firstly the recognition that one does not know something, or that one's pre-understandings are limited or in some way inadequate. This shows how important questioning is for understanding - what Gadamer calls the hermeneutic priority of the question. For it is the act o f questioning which opens up possibilities, and allows truths to emerge. 'Only a person who has questions can have knowledge, but questions include the antithesis of yes and no, o f being Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 154 like this and being like that" (Gadamer, 1994, p.365). Again, on the one hand, a question opens up a horizon of possibilities; yet, on the other, it limits us to the extent that it places parameters on what will count as a sufficient response. In other words, the question preserves openness by bringing the object o f interpretation into a 'State o f indeterminacy;" and, at the same time circumscribes this indeterminate state o f being or brings it 'down" to a manageable level. 'To ask a question means to bring into the open. The openness of what is in question consists in the fact that the answer is not settled" (Gadamer, 1994, p.363). Still, Gadamer also insists that this openness is not without bounds. Rather, the question 'implies the explicit establishing o f presuppositions, in terms o f which can be seen what still remains open" (Gadamer, 1994, p.363). Questions, therefore, exist within the tension between what is determinate and what is indeterminate and facilitate the mediative process o f understanding. It is due to the very nature o f experience, openness and questioning that Gadamer once more emphasizes the impossibility o f finding a method for this kind of interpretation, as the art of questioning and remaining open is not conducive to formulation. Instead, it is indicative of a basic attitude -a willingness, perhaps, that enables one to live with uncertainty or in a state o f wonder. However, this is not some passive form of awe or trivial curiosity. Indeed, it reflects a genuine desire for understanding, manifest in one's openness to experience or her willingness to risk her own prejudices, and requires a sense o f direction which is determined or limited by the horizon o f her questions. Moreover, according to Gadamer, questioning i s more passion than action. A question presses itself on us; we can no longer avoid it and persist in our accustomed opinion" (Gadamer, 1994, p.366). To allow this to occur and to be able to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 155 live with the attendant anxiety of knowing that, in many cases, one does not know is the essence of openness and a condition for the possibility o f critical reflection. Such openness indicates the essential negativity o f experience as Erfahnmg, out o f which understanding or the disclosure of meaning may arise. The irony here is that while this negative dimension is what makes understanding possible, it can also precipitate what MacIntyre calls an 'fepistemological crisis." 47 For it is under circumstances like these that one becomes painfully aware of the occasionally disjunctive relationship between Weems'' and Is ." In other words, when one discovers that what she had once believed to be true is not the case, or is no longer so, it usually gives her pause and causes her to question many other prejudices or fundamental assumptions. Gadamer, too, discusses this relation between opinion and knowledge claiming that '[i]t is opinion that suppresses questions" (Gadamer, 1994, p.366). This means that, for him, it is opinion that precludes understanding not prejudice -it is only when our prejudices become sedimented, hardened or 'fcmoothed-over" opinions that they inhibit understanding. Still, we might ask, why is this not merely a difference o f semantics? What constitutes a disabling opinion, and how is opinion distinguishable from enabling prejudices or pre-understanding? Perhaps Gadamer is alluding to Plato's concept of doxa here, or the 'they" which is endemic to Heidegger's concept of fallenness. In either case, having an opinion or being opinionated seems to be at odds with retaining the kind of openness that is essential to experience as Erfahnmg, and indicates an unreflective type o f thinking. (This may be similar to what critical theorists, like Habermas, are referring to when they condemn 47 Alasdair MacIntyre, " Epistemological Crises. Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science." (T he MonistVol. 60. No. 4. October. 1977), pp. 453-471. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 156 ideology or ideological forms o f thinking, see chapter 4.) According to Gadamer, then, it is opinion that conflicts with reason, not prejudice. Specifically, it is the person who holds fast to her opinions, even when faced with contrary evidence or rational argument, that does not manifest the openness that is so essential to experience and understanding. This is someone who cannot or will not engage in dialogue. The interpreter who remains open, on the other hand, is one who is willing to risk those prejudices. She is not without her particular interests or orientation, and may regard them as authoritative, but she is also open to other unforeseen possibilities or claims to truth that may differ from her own. She, like any Dasein, is constituted by her own history but not to the degree that it precludes an openness to critical reflection or results in an irrational dogmatism. For the text's tradition possesses an authority of its own as well. Tradition furnishes the stream of conceptions within which we stand, and we must be prepared to distinguish between fruitful presuppositions and those that imprison and prevent us from thinking and seeing. In any event, there is no intrinsic opposition between the claims of reason and those of tradition, reason stands always within tradition. Tradition even supplies reason with the aspect of reality and history with which it will work.48 How can one make this distinction then? Again, how can we distinguish between the prejudices which really are mere 'bpinion" or which run the danger of becoming such, and those which are genuinely productive or conducive to understanding? How might we retrieve tradition as a legitimate source of truth without lapsing into a form of dogmatic conservatism? Differently put, is there a relationship between claims o f reason and those of tradition? Answers to these questions depend upon the two ways in which tradition JO Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiemiacher. Dilthev. Heidegger and QaAfanvr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969). p. 183 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157 itself is understood in Gadamer's hermeneutics. Specifically, not only does the interpreter belong to a tradition or network of traditions but so too does the text have a horizon and history o f its own, and both o f these may be regarded authoritatively. Therefore, in the next two sections I will attempt to explain what is involved in Gadamer's concepts of the object as "classic" and the subject as an "historically-effected consciousness." (4) The Wirkung of the Text and the Normative Concept of the Classic According to Gadamer, the effect ( Wirkimg) o f a work is not merely a derivative or incidental feature, but is constitutive o f its meaning. As a living historical document, a text has a whole history of previous interpretations which define it as something in particular, or as having some unique significance. Thus, in order to understand a work, and in order to take the claims that it makes upon me seriously, as an interpreter, I should be acquainted with how it has been understood previously by other interpreters. But, this need not imply that I must remain submissive to the authority o f those who have preceded me, nor does if imply that I cannot discover something true in it without reference to secondary sources. This is what distinguishes hermeneutic truths from those in the natural sciences - i.e., 'that the researcher sometimes can learn more from the book o f the dilettante than from the books of other reasearchers."49 Thus, even the authority o f the expert cannot be taken as absolute. 'O f course," he continues, 'this is confined to exceptional cases, but that such cases exist indicates that a relationship between recognition o f the truth and effability (Sagbarkeit) discloses itself that cannot be measured 49 Hans-Georg Gadamer. "What is Truth?." Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. Brice Wachterhauser. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1994). p. 40. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158 in terms o f the verifiability o f propositions."50 Further, despite the fact that the text may have a history of its own, one cannot be expected to entirely suspend her own pre- understandings, for that would be impossible as long as one accepts the constitutive function of Heidegger's fore-structure as Gadamer does. 'Risking" one's prejudices means being willing to challenge or critique them, not transcending them completely. The Cartesian attitude toward tradition, which does regard it as something to be overcome, represents an extremely narrow and static point of view - one which many, besides Gadamer, have objected to: '{I]f the only form o f tradition, of handing down, consisted in following the ways o f the immediate generation before us in a blind or timid adherence to its successes, 'tradition' should positively be discouraged."51 We need not limit this exclusively to the Immediate generation" either, or to temporal distance alone. For any kind o f credulous submission to authority or interpretations o f a text that entails the suppression of one's own critical capacities should be avoided, as Descartes and Enlightenment thinkers have argued. However, we need not go as far as they did by seeking some means of transcending historical and personal prejudices. Respect for tradition, which is what its authoritative value essentially consists in, cannot simply be replaced with the 'jjure" inquiry of an autonomous rational subject. Rather, in the case of a text's own history, this kind o f respect involves an appreciation for, and sensitivity to, the ways in which the work has been understood and applied in the past. It reflects the kind of sensibility which will enable me to apply traditional truth-claims to the present, and 50 Ibid.. p.40 51 T. S. Eliot. "Tradition and The Individual Talent." Selected Prose o f T.S. Eliot, cd. Frank Kennode. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1975), p. 3S. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159 allows Gadamer to conflate the two concepts of understanding and application. For 'Understanding always involves applying the text to be understood to the interpreter's present situation" (Gadamer, 1994, p.308). And, this object o f interpretation not only includes the written text itself but its history of previous interpretations and "effects" or Wirkimgsgeschichte. Thus, '[tjradition is a matter of much wider significance." And, according to Eliot, requires an 'historical sense" -i.e., some 'Sense" o f history as well as its present significance. (See below, and the section which follows with regards to the historically-effected consciousness of the interpreter.) Another important feature o f tradition that should be acknowledged here is that a text's own history is often composed o f rival interpretations. In other words, although there may be some continuity to a text's history, it is not necessarily one of concord or agreement -a point to which I will turn below. However, for now, let it suffice to say that Gadamer's conception o f tradition and its continuity is not one which is constituted by a continuous chain of causal links; rather, the Wirkimgsgeschichte o f any particular work manifests a whole network of distinct and sometimes conflicting interpretations or applications of the same written material. Still, it remains to be seen what Eliot means by an historical sense and how it relates to the tradition of the text. Again, according to Eliot, '{tradition] cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It involves, in the first place, the historical sense . . . and the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence . . . [itj is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together" (Eliot. 1975. p.38). Understanding is a laborious historical process for two reasons. One, because it involves the appropriation o f meaning by a living being via a dialectical process of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160 understanding; and two, because human artifacts have their own history which can be kept alive only through interpretation and reinterpretation. This form of mediation, between a subject and object that are both dynamic or In-process" and are constituted by their own prejudices or the traditions to which they belong, is no simple matter. For texts too are living beings, not something merely present-at-hand. Neither are they documents which are frozen in time whose meaning is 'Already out there" or given, and it is the very tradition or 'feffects'o f a work which keeps it alive. Thus, to understand a text requires an appropriation of its tradition as well as some appreciation for the traditions to which the interpreter belongs. Understanding or applying the questions which the text puts to us does not imply some kind of passive assimilation of the written material, nor does it mean blindly accepting the truth-claims of another interpreter merely because his interpretation has preceded one's own or is based on his greater expertise. Nonetheless, there is something to be said for an established precedent in law as well as in human works of art, literature and philosophy, and these must be seriously addressed by any conscientious interpreter. But, because a work's effective history often entails conflicting truth-claims, as there are always a myriad of ways in which a question can be appropriated or differently applied in different situations, no single interpreter can be ultimately authoritative. Moreover, if one accepts the Heideggerian dialectic of concealment and unconcealment, there will always be an element of untruth within every true interpretation, so that in no single instance can any legitimate allegations to have uncovered the whole truth be maintained. Thus, an interpreter who manifests a historical sense, and attends to the interpretations of those who have preceded her, is capable of critically appropriating the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161 claims that have been handed down. This is evident in Gadamer's use of dialogue and play as metaphors for what occurs in hermeneutical understanding, for these already presuppose a space for critique. Specifically, the prejudices o f previous interpreters are not just handed over in their entirety, swallowed whole so to speak by those who succeed them, for each subsequent interpreter brings her own particular questions and concerns to the material. The historically aware intepreter should engage in dialogue not only with the text as it applies to her situation but with those interpreters who have preceded her, as their prior interpretations also constitute 'the work itself." The questions that others have put to the text and the respective truths that have been uncovered by another interpreter are not deemed legitimate simply because one blindly accepts the authority of that person, but because 'they effect the same disposition to believe something that can be brought about in other ways - e.g., by good reasons" (Gadamer, 1994, p.280). In other words, I must have reasons for accepting or rejecting previous interpretations. I must explicitly confront those meanings that have been handed down in order to determine whether they have any validity for me here and now in the same manner in which I must consider the questions that arise in my encounter with the written material. Thus, to say that traditions function dogmatically, or are normative for understanding, does not mean that they are not rationally grounded as well: However problematical the conscious restoration o f old or the creation of new traditions may be, the romantic faith in the 'growth of tradition," before which all reason must remain silent, is fundamentally like the Enlightenment, and just as prejudiced. The fact is that in tradition there is always an element o f freedom and of history itself. Even the most genuine and pure tradition does not persists because of the inertia of what once existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is, essentially, preservation, and it is active in all historical change. But preservation is an act o f reason, though an inconspicuous one. [Plreservation is as much a freely chosen actions as are revolution and renewal. That is why both the Enlightenment's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162 critique o f tradition and the romantic rehabilitation of it lag behind their true historical being" (Gadamer, 1994, p.281). Because preservation or appropriation, in this sense, is a creative act it always maintains an element o f freedom and itself belongs to the history o f the text. However, reasons are discoverable if and only if one take the truth-claims of others seriously in the context of a dialogue. This is also true of game-playing, for one and the same game is played differently each and every time. Specifically, the players change, the moves that are made or the order they follow, are distinct in each and every instance, but there are elements that endure. Something must be preserved over time, otherwise there would be no way of identifying something as 'the game o f tennis." The size o f the tennis court, for instance, stays the same and so too does the method of scoring or rules o f engagement. If this were not the case, then there would be no possibility for saying that tennis is one particular kind of game, or noting how it differs from one match to another. Thus, continuity must be present to some degree despite the diversity of play, for difference can only make sense in terms of something which endures. It is the historically sensitive intepreter who strives for this kind of awareness of the timeless and the temporal together. But, how does this apply to one's understanding of a text0 And, how is it possible to evaluate an object o f interpretation? In other words, what allows me to say that one game of tennis is better than another, or that there are or are not "good reasons" for accepting one interpretation as opposed to another? To illustrate, let me consider an example from my own experience with one specific philosophical work. Each and every time I have read Plato's Phaedo, I discover something new that I had not noticed on previous occasions. And, after reading Gadamer's interpretation o f it, I find Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163 that I understand this work differently yet again. But, this does not necessarily imply that I accept or agree with everything that he says about it. And, if I do agree with him, it is not because of who he is personally or because he represents some powerful voice of authority that has spoken prior to me. Rather, it is because what he reveals to me is applicable to my own situation, and I can now "see" a relevance in this work that I had not previously. Moreover, I find his claims compelling to the extent that his interpretation of each part coheres with his understanding of the work as a whole. In other words, there is an internal consistency to his interpretation that enables me to understand the interrelatedness of whole to parts and parts to whole. It is in this respect that a text's own history may be said to be constitutive of its meaning and has some authoritative value as well, in as much as to understand entails confronting what has been handed down from elsewhere. Of course, if I am unfamiliar with the work's tradition, my interpretation of it will be affected accordingly. But, will that mean that I understand it 'better" in any sense? Am I in a better position to interpret a text as a 'dilettante" who knows nothing of its effective history or earlier interpretations? Would this kind of ignorance necessarily yield greater understanding? Is the tennis player who knows nothing of the history o f his sport more likely to be a better player because he is less informed or 'Unprejudiced" about it? As indicated above, the more one knows about a particular work or the less one knows is not always a factor when it comes to finding something true in it. Certainly, some basic aptitude, attitude or interest must be present, whether one plays tennis or interprets philosophical works, and this is precisely the point which will be developed in the next section. For the interpreter too belongs to a tradition and brings her own set o f pre- Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164 understandings to the encounter. It is merely an illegitimate prejudice o f Cartesian thinking to presume otherwise -namely, that the less one already understands something, the better she will understand it; or, that the one who is most likely to reach the truth is the one who knows the least. But this assumes, firstly, that all prejudices are disabling and does not reflect the productive kind o f openness described above. Moreover, such a position implies that one can, in fact, start from ground zero by erasing anything which is based on something other than independent reflection, and this form o f "Self-fathering" has already been rejected by Gadamer as impossible.52 Returning to Eliot's quote above, it is necessary to further examine what could be meant by the timeless, for Gadamer too speaks in this way when he refers to the 'timelessness" of a work of art, or to that which endures in all games. And, it is here that we find a degree of normativity in his supposedly descriptive hermeneutics. This is especially evident when he refers to the 'fclassic" as something that is Independent o f all the circumstances of time - a kind o f timeless present that is contemporaneous with every other present" (Gadamer, 1994, p.288). How is this possible?! How can Gadamer maintain the fundamental historicity of understanding and the temporal conditionedness of all human works yet, at the same time, suggest that there is something which transcends this or is fraised above the vicissitudes of changing times and changing tastes?" Either human artifacts are temporally conditioned or constituted by their effective history or they are not. And, if he insists on these points, then must he not give up any appeal to that 52 See chapter 1. The term ''self-fathering" has been borrowed from Gerald Bruns. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165 which is timeless and the appeal to normativity that is implied therein? Or, have we simply stumbled upon another paradox of hermeneutics? According to Gadamer, who follows the path set by Heidegger's hermeneutics of finitude, 'timelessness has to be thought o f together with the temporality to which it essentially belongs" (Gadamer, 1994, p. 121). Thus, timelessness can only be understood in terms o f the temporal. In other words, it is our experience of time and our awareness o f its passage that provides the condition o f the possibility o f a 'Sense" of timelessness. In many respects, this notion is analogous to the 'Unlimited" or an infinite whole." For we can have no experience o f an unlimited or an infinite whole (despite Descartes' proof for the existence o f God which depends upon just such an idea) any more than we can apprehend the notion of timelessness itself. Such notions, however, can be loosely grasped in a negative sense -i.e., the unlimited is that which is without limit, the infinite is not finite, and the timeless represents something which transcends temporal conditions. Thus, terms like these can only be understood dialectically, if one accepts Heidegger's ontology and his phenomenological method as Gadamer does. Again, applying his example o f a game: On the one hand, a game is different each and every time it is played but, on the other, there must always be something present which remains the same. Whether this sameness is timeless in an ultimate sense and can be thought of as eternally enduring, one could never say with any degree of assurance since we are strictly finite creatures. Still, without a timeless element, there would be no constant against which one could discern any differences or evaluate them as such. However, it is worth asking why should this term stand for anything more than a hollow abstraction? And, how is it applicable when it Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166 comes to interpreting texts? Specifically, what must be present in a particular work that would justify our calling it a 'timeless classic?" Once again, if we turn to Gadamer's interpretation o f the Phaedo, it may become clearer how this might be understood. Gadamer argues that what makes the Phaedo a classical work is not that the arguments or demonstrations for the immortality o f the soul provide us with ultimate 'Answers" to allay our fears o f death.53 In other words, it isn't so much the substance or material content o f what is said that matters, but the basic question that this dialogue puts to its readers that renders it meaningful. When it is said that the search for the right reassurance should go bey ond the community of those who speak the same language, is that not an indication that the question being asked transcends the community o f any language and what can be conceived in it (Gadamer. 1980. p.37. italics mine). Thus, the 'timeless" or enduring element in this instance is the eternal question of death. All human creatures, or Dasein's if we use Heidegger's term, are confronted with the question of death insofar as we are beings for whom being itself is an issue. Even science cannot evade this question or the task of seeking an answer to it -i.e., 'the task which our human existence and our urge to think beyond the perceptible and proximate world assign to us" (Gadamer, 1980, p.38). Does this mean, then, that each and every single human subject consciously faces this question? Does it mean that everyone inevitably asks him or her self what death means and comes up with a satisfactory answer? Not necessarily. But, if one reads the Phaedo, he or she cannot help being confronted with this timeless question and this is what makes the work a 'fclassic," in the normative sense of 53 Hans-Georg Gadamer. Dialogue and Dialectic, trans. P. Christopher Smith. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). chapter 2. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167 the term. To say that someone has understood this work without allowing herself to be challenged by this question would be absurd. Ultimate answers cannot legitimately be expected, and should not even be attempted (unless one is engaged in theological justification rather than interpretation). Still, the question o f whether there is a life after death, and the very meaning of life and death themselves, spring eternal. This is what makes a work a classic - i.e., it provokes and challenges the reader to reflect upon universal questions or issues and see how they might apply to or affect her specifically. In the case above, anyone who is not prompted to ask such questions, pertaining to the nature of existence and the possibility o f non-existence, would have failed to understand Plato's dialogue. This is because, as Heidegger reminds us, Dasein is a being for whom being itself is an issue. Differences o f space and time, personality, culture, historical periods, and so forth do not alter the fact that human beings must face death and cannot help looking beyond it in some manner. And, when confronted with this particular word, one cannot avoid speculating about the possibility of immortality. In every age this has been the case - questions of mortality and immortality have been raised and various answers have been offered. Moreover, I would insist, that any individual who reads this text, regardless of her place in history or society, will be compelled to reflect upon her own mortal nature and the possibility o f an existence beyond the present one. What is culturally relative here are the particular kinds of answers given or the specific ways in which humans have confronted death and attempted to cope with its inevitability, but questions o f the meaning o f life and death are universal and ageless. Yet again, one may say that it is towards the primacy of the question that we must look for this timeless Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168 dimension that occurs in and through the temporal. Like Aristotelian universals, timeless questions have no meaning independent of some particular context. In other words, questions are heuristic structures which allow for something substantive to be said. They open up a sphere o f potential meaning but they have no inherent truth-value of their own, as they can be deemed neither true nor false in themselves or acontextually. To paraphrase Gadamer, classical questions reflect 'h mode of being historical" that allow 'Something true to come into being" (Gadamer, 1994, p.287). Differently stated, a classical work allows for the disclosure of something meaningful -in this case, the revelation that I am the kind of being for whom my own being is at stake. Thus, what is universal in each and every particular intepretation are the fundamental questions that the text puts to the interpreter. Again, in the example o f the Phaedo, the truth that emerges in any encounter with the text, is the universal experience of this confrontation with the meaning of existence and the mystery o f death. Despite the fact that every event o f understanding will be different, in as much as each and every time the question must be raised anew in accordance with a specific context or under distinct conditions and that the mortality with which one is faced is inevitably her own, if there is to be any truth in interpretation, it must be essentially the same question that arises. Just as universals have no content of their own, so too do questions lack substantive meaning if they are not raised time and time again in concrete situations. Questions have no pure and simple truth-value of their own, any more than propositions do when considered singly or in isolation. They are only understood to the extent that they are found to be meaningful or relevant to some present situation or concrete set of concerns. Still, if anything is to remain deserving of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169 normative attribute 'fclassical," if we are at all justified in insisting that 'fclassic" works must be read, then there must be some enduring elements to it despite the fact that these will be differently manifest each and every time such texts are understood. However, this universal dimension is not only 'found in" every particular encounter with a classic, it is also 'brought to" this meeting by the interpreter. In other words, so too does the reader require a 'Sense" of history and time as well as that of the timeless if hermeneutic understanding is to be achieved in a fusion of horizons. So, having considered in this section what the timeless itself consists in and does not consist in, it remains to be seen what it means to have a 'Sense" for it. This brings us to Gadamer's concept o f the historically effected consciousness. How then does this notion apply to his conception of tradition? We might say, with Schleirmacher, that in Gadamer too there is both an objective (or grammatical) as well as a subjective (or psychological) side to understanding. The former being constituted by the written material as well as the traditional effects of the text itself, while the latter refers to the interpreter's own consciousness and the prejudices, attitudes, etc. which belong to it. (5) The Vorurteile of the Interpreter and Gadamer's Concept of Historically Effected Consciousness A recent article, defending our "backward looking" ways, concludes that, we need to take nostalgia seriously as an energizing impulse, maybe even a form of knowledge. The effort to revalue what has been lost can motivate serious historical inquiry; it can also cast a powerful light on tne present. Visions o f the good society can come from recollections of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 the past, not only from fantasies of the future. Maybe it's time to use nostalgia as something more than a mere pejorative.54 The same may be said for the authoritative value of the traditions to which one belongs - though not necessarily in all cases as there are always bound to be some elements which are not worth preserving in kind. Gadamer himself employs the term 'historically-effected consciousness" to refer to the state-of-mind which is proper to the interpreter. However, this expression is not unambiguous. On the one hand, it refers to the way in which consciousness is imbued with the effects o f history. But, on another level, it implies an awareness of, or sensitivity to, those effects and the significance of their impact on one's own life. While the former is always the case for any human subject, insofar as one cannot avoid being affected by history to one degree or another, the latter is not. It is in reference to this second sense then that Gadamer is really making a prescriptive claim here: 'However much we emphasize that historically effected consciousness itself belongs to the effect, what is essential to it as consciousness is that it can rise above that o f which it is conscious" (Gadamer, 1994, p.341). In other words, despite the fact that the interpreter is constituted by her prejudices (Vonirteile) and the traditions to which she belongs, she must also confront not only the historical effect of the text --i.e., 'the trace a work leaves behind" - but her own effective history in as much as she places her prejudices at risk. Only by risking one's prejudices is there a possibility of transcending them in the interpretive encounter. What cannot be forgotten, however, is that transcendence for Gadamer, like Heidegger, is always finite. Previously, the concept o f transcendence was based on the assumption that one's historical horizon is limitless, culminating in an ideal o f 54 Jackson Lears. "Looking Backwards: In Defense of Nostalgia." (Lingua Franca. Volume 7. No. 10. Dec. Jan. 1998), p. 66. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171 'perfect enlightenment" or infinite consciousness" (Gadamer, 1994, pp.341-342). Specifically, it was assumed, by Schleiermacher for example, that understanding required one to rise above her own historical conditions by placing herself in the same context as the text itself, either by identifying with the author or with the original reader. In many respects, this ideal o f the 'bmnipresence of the historically knowing spirit" or the possibility of a totalizing grasp of history can be traced back to Hegel. T or Hegel's whole philosophy of mind claims to achieve the total fusion of history with the present" (Gadamer, 1994, p.346). But Gadamer denies that we, as fundamentally finite historical beings, could ever attain any such perspective and refuses to posit the possibility of any such telos. Moreover, he continues to insist that understanding simply cannot be reduced to self-consciousness overcoming itself in this manner. For 'historically effected consciousness [itself].. has the structure of experience" (Gadamer, 1994, p.346, italics his). But, once again, we must recall what he means by experience here. To reiterate: Experience (Erfahrung) is dialectical. And, in this respect, Gadamer remains faithful to Hegel who 'fconceives experience as skepticism in action [whereby] ...ones's experience changes one's whole knowledge" (Gadamer, 1994, p.353). Moreover, it is characterized by the kind of openness that will allow for this type of self- transcendence. In other words, to uncover the truth of something through experience manifests an important element of freedom in the historically effected consciousness. 'To appropriately tend to things or 'pay heed' presumably requires the transformation of the self."55 Specifically, the kind o f transformation that occurs through openness (discussed 55 Robert Dostal. "The Experience o f Truth," Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. by Brice Wachterhauser. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1994), p. 57. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 172 above) or the willingness to risk one's prejudieces and let questions arise naturally in the conversation between interpreter and text. Again, this is the kind of experience that builds upon itself insofar as remaining open to experiences and the "Reversal" of consciousness that they effect results in greater openness to further experience. This is because 'Experience is initially always experience o f negation: something is not what we supposed it to be. In view of the experience that we have of another object, both things change~our knowledge and its object" (Gadamer, 1994, p.354). Therefore, the same experience can never be had more than once and the person who is called experienced is so, like Aristotle's phronimos, 'hot only through experiences but is also open to new experiences" (Gadamer, 1994, p.355). If we recall Nussbaum's argument regarding the non-repeatable element of moral reasoning and the suffering that knowing entails, as well as MacIntyre's admonition concerning the incommensurability of goods, we can more clearly what Gadamer's point is here: Namely, that experiences are unique and irreducible 'htoms" of meaning. However, what allows for these to emerge is a fundamental openness or willingness to suffer the pain and disappointment that inevitably attends any act of understanding or insight. For yet another 'Witness" to this aspect o f experience, Gadamer looks to Aeschylus who, long before Nussbaum, noted that we learn through suffering. But this not only implies that 'bur knowledge of things must first be corrected through deception and undeception," it also means that we gain Insight into the limitations of humanity, into the absoluteness of the barrier that separates man from the divine" (Gadamer, 1994, pp.356-357). Thus, through the particular, we grasp a universal. Differently put, it is only by risking a prejudice and seeing the untruth which it contains Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 173 that further truths may be revealed and, moreover, I affirm what it means to be a human being. Ultimately, 'experience is experience o f human finitude. The truly experienced person is one who has taken this to heart, who knows that he is master neither o f time nor the future. The experienced man knows that all foresight is limited and all plans uncertain" (Gadamer, 1994, p.357). The free consciousness cannot expect to 'See as God might see," but it can anticipate some degree of self-transcendence as long as one is willing to take the risks that that entails.56 Still, how far does this freedom or openness extend? Since we've already seen above that freedom cannot be absolute, culminating in a complete reversal of consciousness a la Hegel, and transcendence is always finite if we follow Heidegger, what is it that limits it? One could say that Gadamer, like Heraclitus, emphasizes the singularity and natural "flow" o f experience. But, Heraclitus had the logos which brought order to an otherwise unconnected or unintelligible array o f events; while Kant appealed to pure apperception as the ground of unity - i.e., a transcendental 'I think" which unifies the manifold of sense impressions and without which experience would be impossible. So, we might ask, where is Gadamer's logos or transcendental unity of apperception to be found? This is where tradition again displays its authoritative function. For the traditions to which the interpreter belongs (her language, customary beliefs, habitual actions, etc.) may play a positive role in delimiting the sphere o f experience. Unlike Kant's apperception which is supposed to be a priori or independent o f any empirical elements, Gadamer's historically effected consciousness is empirically determined. Specifically, although I must 56 Bertrand Russell explicitly uses this phrase, "as God might see," to distinguish between the "free intellect" engaged in "unalloyed philosophic contemplation" into which '•the accidents o f private history do not enter" and the activity o f "selfassertion " which •'views the world as a means to its own ends." See "The Value o f Philosophy," Fifty B ead ing in Philosophy. ed. Donald C. .Abel. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1994). p. 22. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174 remain open and willing to risk my prejudices, it is neither possible nor useful to be completely so any more than it is possible or practically conducive to understanding to be entirely free from my historical conditionedness. I too, like Aristotle's phronimos, have certain intellectual and practical commitments to myself as well as to professional, political, personal, and perhaps even religious communities, which must be maintained. I have a history which constitutes who I am and circumscribes my interests, aims and concerns. Therefore, if any truths at all are going to be revealed to me, they must occur in such a way that they matter or make sense to me as an individual or somehow apply to the particularities of my situation. Specifically, if I am to understand anything about a text, what I understand will be true only insofar as it means something to me. This most certainly need not imply that my interpretation, or anyone's interpretation on any particular occasion, will exhaust all possibilities o f meaning; nor does it suggest that the truths I discover will be meaningful for everyone else. Lastly, this does not mean that the understanding that is entailed in this 'homing to an agreement," or in the fusion of horizons that occurs between myself and text, means that I necessarily agree with what is explicitly written. For example, in the myriad times that I have read Kant's Grounding for the Metaphysics o f Morals, I have always found this work meaningfully provocative despite the fact that I do not at all agree with Kant's deontological views. Moreover, during the innumerable times that I have taught his work, he has never failed to disappoint - i.e., students time and time again ask questions regarding the nature o f the good, the significance of motive for moral action, why lying conflicts with duty, and what reason requires, among other things. What is important here is that students find his claims Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 175 meaningful or valuable to the extent that the text compels them to ask questions and think about such matters in ways which they otherwise would not have. For this reason, Kant's ethics is well worth studying even if one does not at all agree with his position. Thus, even though I have not become a convert to deontological ethics, I can still claim to have been transformed through this encounter and continue to remain open to further insights which this work might facilitate. In this instance, what has superseded the truth claims of the text are my own particular concerns and interests which are, most likely, entirely different from those of the author In this respect and in this case, then, my prejudices and the traditions to which I belong can be said to have some authority. And, how could it be otherwise if the words of another are to have any meaning or significance for me? It is therefore tradition, in this second sense, that provides the space within which understanding can occur and experiences can be brought together. In other words, it is the traditions to which the interpreter belongs which furnish the content for an historically effected consciousness. Differently put, this is where we find the substance for what Heidegger calls the fore-structure of understanding. Without these empirical elements, experience {Erfahnmg) would be impossible and understanding would be rendered impotent, purely formal, meaningless, precluding the possibility o f any concrete application. Lastly, while looking at this second way in which tradition can be understood in Gadamer's hermeneutics, it should also be noted that, to some extent, the tradition o f the text may overlap with that of my own. Specifically, if I am committed to the study of the history of ideas, acquainting myself with various philosophical texts and accept that this history is constituted by a kind of dialogue between human beings throughout the ages, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176 then the Wirkungsgeschichte o f Plato's Republic, for instance, will be coextensive with some of the prejudices which constitute my own effective history. In other words, having read or re-read this particular work and examined others' interpretations o f it, it can be said to have had an effect on my own life. Most o f the time, Gadamer seems to be appealing to tradition in the first sense -i.e., with regard to the effects of previous interpretations on the text itself. Especially when he speaks o f the significance o f classical works and the authoritative claims that they make upon the interpreter. But, to the extent that these claims cause the interpreter to reflect upon his own historical conditionedness or ask eternal questions, the effect is felt by the subject as well. However, when he refers to the prejudices o f the interpreter, it appears that another notion o f tradition is operative - one in which effects are more directly related to the interpreter himself irrespective o f any relation to written works. Again, every interpreter has her own history and identifies herself as belonging to a complex network of traditions - her native language, social class, ethnic heritage, cultural or religious practices, intellectual or political commitments and interests, etc. And, these two senses of tradition are not necessarily separate or mutually exclusive though they are distinguishable. This may be what Gadamer is referring to when he says, [olur historical consciousness is always filled with a variety of voices in which the echo of the past is heard. Only in the multifariousness of such .oices does it exist: this constitutes the nature of the tradition in which we want to share and have a part. Modem historical research itself is not only research, but the handing down o f tradition. We do not see it in terms of progress and verified results; in it we have, as it were, a new experience of history whenever the past resounds in a new voice (Gadamer, 1994. p.284). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 177 These echoes o f the past can be given a voice in a text or work o f art, or they can be passed on in other ways - through the habits or practices in which one has been immersed, for instance. For Gadamer, uncovering the truth o f a text implies a distinct type of understanding -distinct, that is, from the kind of investigative research process akin to natural science - and so too is the truth o f self-understanding a matter o f disclosure. Like Bakhtin's hero, the subject here is not a finished product but a project in the making. Like Aristotle's phronesis, this type o f understanding cannot be characterized as "Scientific," in which the object is conceived as something determinate or quantifiable and the results of an hypothesis can be empirically verified or an experiment repeated by any other inquirer. Nor is hermeneutical understanding akin or analogous to a criminal investigation, in which one seeks merely to reconstruct the 'facts" of a case. For history, in this sense, would utterly lack meaning. It is not objective fact that the historically conscious interpreter seeks to uncover, nor is it a psychological fact, like what the original author intended, that renders a text significant. These things are inaccessible as such. 'Facts" are understood only to the degree that they have significance or mean something to the interpreter. However, this does not imply that the meaning or truth of a written work is subjectively determined by the interpreter's own particular desires, hopes, etc. For I cannot force an object of interpretation to entirely conform to my own prejudices any more than I can constrain myself to consider just the facts, as facts in themselves have no inherent meaning. This is true for self-understanding as well, as I cannot be anything I wish to be but can only seize those possibilities that are open to me. That is to say, once again paradoxically, that I can only become what I already am, and it is only by remaining open Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 178 that I can discern what those are or might be. Both human beings and artifacts, like texts, are living and dynamic constructions, yet they are not completely malleable. Hermeneutic understanding is an unending or open-ended historical process, though not an arbitrary one. I cannot, for example, unilaterally declare that Plato's Republic is really about love, the Symposium asks questions about justice and the ideal state, or that the Phaedo is actually about the death of God. If I were to do so, I would have to provide very compelling reasons to justify these iconoclastic interpretations in order to be taken seriously - as 'Anything" does not '£o." Despite Russell's distinction, philosophic contemplation as much as hermeneutic inquiry is not simply a matter of 'Seeing" something objectively, as God presumably would, as opposed to asserting oneself in an entirely subjective maimer. Rather, as Heidegger tells us, we are always already ahead of ourselves or projecting our own prejudices in any act of understanding regardless o f the object in question or our longings for complete self-transcendence. And, even when it comes to understanding myself, although I am not a completed 'Work," I am similarly limited. Specifically, I cannot claim to be anything I may wish to be as I am bound by the traditions to which I belong and am constituted by their corresponding prejudices. What this suggests then is that understanding is relative in not one but two senses - to the subject matter and to the interpreter - but, again, it is not entirely so. One can speak of degrees of truth, which depends upon the interpreter's level o f awareness o f her own historical conditions, but there can be no guarantees of absolute or 'the whole" truth here; but neither can we expect completely random claims to be taken seriously. Both avenues ('Subjective" or 'bbjective" approaches) o f interpretation are insufficient, if not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 179 impossible, for an historical being attempting to understand historical phenomena -whether this is the interpreter herself or a text. Specifically, the interpreter does not simply appropriate tradition in a passive sense, as though the meaning o f something can be objectively given and handed down; nor does she actively constitute it by herself alone or simply in accordance with her own prejudices, desires and interests. If one were to do so, this would constitute dogmatic opinion mongering not genuine understanding. Rather, in the case of interpreting a text, she must enter into a dialogue with the truth-claims that are put to her by the work allowing her prejudices to be brought into 'j)Iay" and disking" or testing them against its historical effects. This manifest what Gadamer calls 'the art of questioning" which is not [merely] the art of resisting the pressure o f opinion; it already presupposed this freedom" (Gadamer, 1994, p. 3 66). The traditions with which an interpreter indentifies may be approached in this manner as well - namely, we can interrogate or engage in conversation with ourselves and the prejudices which constitute us - for they are also human phenomena not static 'things" or that which is objectively present. This is because interpreters are dynamic beings who are always actively constructing and reconstructing themselves, whether they are conscious of this or not. History not only makes us what we are but we, too, can make history. In other words, the interpretive encounter changes both the subject and the object if genuine understanding is achieved. By understanding another, we understand ourselves thereby projecting ourselves beyond ourselves and so, too, is 'the other" altered by this encounter. But, again, I do not become something completely other, for I am still constituted by my thrownness just as the text I interpret has been altered yet in another sense stays the same. Meaning is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 180 projected upon it in accordance with my own prejudices, but these cannot be arbitrary for they are also risked or checked by those of the work which, in turn, causes me to reconsider who I am and whether my projections are defensible in this particular context. Thus, both the object o f interpretation in addition to that which constitutes the subject are historical beings or share in this historicity. Therefore, truth as meaning is something that emerges in a dialogue, in a 'fusion o f horizons" between the two. The appropriation of tradition is therefore neither subjective or objective in nature or, rather, it is both. Gerald Bruns illuminates this point further through a discussion of two traditional conceptions o f tradition - 'Classicist" and 'Modernist" -and shows how 'both are products o f the same deep anxiety about historicality" (Bruns, 1992, p. 197). (6) Bruns and Petrarch on the Concept of Tradition Ironically, it seems that Heidegger shared the same distrust o f tradition as his Modem predecessors. This is evident in his claims that the history of philosophy has obscured the question of Being which he seeks to retrieve through an analytic o f Dasein and that Dasein's fallenness is due to its immersion in the 'they." However, Heidegger's fundamental ontology would not even have been possible without all o f the contributions of the thinkers that came before him. And, although he admits that we have not completely 'Shaken off the tradition," he, like the Modernist, tends to privilege the future over the past. Bruns writes that, everything comes down to us from the future. For the Modernist the museum of cultural prison is the prototype of the institution. Its function is to objectifyor reify the past, maintain possession of it, or hold it in place so that it won't disappear or grow disruptive; which is to say that its function is also exclusionary (Bruns, 1992. p. 196). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 181 This Modernist view o f tradition manifests a 'horror of the Same" and those who hold to such a position, like Descartes for instance, try to escape it by seeking to transcend historical contingencies. 'For the Modernist, history is always in a state of ending or say, a repetition of crisis and exhaustion. We are always in the post position, primed and impatient to start history over again in an endless recuperation of the Cartesian moment o f self-fathering" (Bruns, 1992, p. 199). A similar attitude was identified by Foucault, in the first chapter, as characteristic o f Enlightenment thought. Specifically, Enlightenment thinkers tend to be sensitive to the discontinuity of time, seeing themselves as breaking with tradition. They do this, according to Foucault, by 'heroizing the present" and striving for a means of beginning anew, 'free" from the encumbrances o f the past. Again, this tendency is also evinced in Heidegger, despite his criticism o f Modernity and its subjectivistic implications, insofar as he seeks to retrieve or rescue Being from its sedimented misrepresentations. But, how does it even make sense to speak o f iconoclastic interpretations or radical breaks with tradition except in reference to that which is has already been deemed traditional? Whether one is criticizing and rejecting what has been handed down or accepting and embracing it, this remains an act of appropriation in which the claims of tradition must be confronted. On the other hand, according to Bruns, there is the 'Classicist" conception of tradition which reflects a "horror o f the Other." It is a repressed fear that time moves, after all, in the other direction, toward strangeness and difference, and that what lies ahead will be full of primitive rage and incoherence. Tradition here is a category of inheritance. It is a deposit o f faith that needs to be preserved against false claimants in behalf o f rightful heirs. It is this picture that arouses most people against the idea of tradition (Bruns. 1992, pp. 196-197). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 182 This is the version of tradition that is most often attributed to Gadamer by critics who label him a 'fconservative" thinker, or one who is naive as to the power dynamics involved in determining what belongs to tradition and whether its authority is rightful (These claims will be considered in chapter 4.) This is a view which conceives o f tradition as something static and omnipresent, inert and rigid - a force of repetition, perhaps, which moves through history and cannot or should not be resisted. But is this plausible in light o f what Gadamer maintains? Again, this view of tradition, like the Modernist's, turns it into something objectively present. It represents a mode of 'translation," where such is understood as mere repetition. Yet, even translation, Gadamer claims, is more than reiteration as it too involves an act of appropriation. This is because 'the translator must translate the meaning to be understood into the context in which the other speaker lives" (Gadamer, 1994, p.384). Thus, there can be no such thing as simple repetition or redundancies in interpretation due to the fact that the activity o f uncovering meaning, like Aristotle's moral deliberation, is non-repeatable. Bruns illustrates this point by quoting Petrarch's own defense of quotations: 'I may well forget the author, since by long usage and possession I may adopt them and regard them as my own" (Bruns, 1992, p. 199). But, again, this does not mean imposing one's own prejudices onto works written by others, or appropriating them as 'tny own" in a willful or arbitrary way. For quotations are a medium o f interpretation - 'h mode o f dialogue with antiquity." 'The dead live in their texts, which constitute an ongoing discourse in which one's own writing can participate. Appropriation in this sense is what keeps tradition from turning into a museum" (Bruns, 1992, pp. 198, 199, and 200 respectively). This dialogical kind of understanding as Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 183 'participation" is unending and for this reason keeps traditions alive. Alive in the fullest sense, for it orly in this manner that they are not reified or objectified. What is also preserved here is the sense of tradition as something both strange and familiar, something to which we belong and yet, at the same time, are alienated from. It is the 'Subject's mode of being historical" (Bruns, 1992, p.200). In other words, through the appropriation and reappropriation of our own traditions or that o f the text, one gains a sense of oneself as an historical being. This is what Gadamer means by historically effected consciousness, insofar as one is explicitly aware of the effects o f history, in its relation to tradition. According to both Heidegger and Gadamer, all understanding contains a moment o f selfunderstanding. In interpreting something other, one makes it his own, and this would hold, too, for one traditions and his own sense o f self. For although my prejudices and the traditions to which I belong constitute who I am, this is not something immediately accessible. I must face or be confronted by my own prejudices in order to understand them and myself, and this can only be done in relation to another who possesses prejudices o f its own. And, I can only understand myself to the extent that I understand what has been handed down to me, and find that this is something both other and yet not wholly other. According to Gadamer, this constitutes the 'highest" type of hermeneutic experience: 'the openness to tradition characteristic o f historically effected consciousness" (Gadamer, 1994, p.361). According to Bruns, Petrarch's retrieval of tradition reflects the 'Subject's mode o f being historical" (Bruns, 1992, p.200). Where the Modernist is terrified by sameness and the Classicist by otherness, Petrarch is open and porous and heterogeneous. His relation to tradition is not that of a link in a chain of transmission or authorship: rather, tradition is the medium o f his formation as Petrarch, as a historically singular individual who is never fully present in any of his Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 184 incarnations or inscriptions, never properly identifiable, unlike Descartes's purely logical subject. . . tradition is his mode of entering into history (Bruns. 1992, pp.200 and 201 respectively, italics mine). Gadamer too admonishes us to 'think within [our] own historicity" and reminds us that '[t]o be situated within a tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it possible." Moreover, this is 'Where openness [to the other] belongs," insofar as openness is understood as both characteristic and the 'fend" o f hermeneutic reflection (Gadamer, 1994, p.361). In contrast to the Modernist or Classicist, historically effected consciousness lets itself experience tradition by keeping itself open to the truth claims encountered in it. The respective anxieties reflected in these two postions parallel those of Enlightenment thinkers, who argue that truth must transcend all empirical or historical conditions and that reason alone is authoritative, and Romantics who seek to retrieve the authoritative value o f classical texts and traditional norms. However, Gadamer and the consciousness o f the 'historically effected" interpreter, like Bruns, finds both attitudes untenable. For they are neither horrified by sameness nor otherness, for such can never be absolutely so. In other words, a tradition can be neither entirely alien nor familiar, for the past does not exist as a thing-in-itself but can only 'live" in and through others; and so too is the authority of a tradition neither absolute or simply given. Rather, as with any other potential source of meaning or claims to truth, those of tradition must also be tried, tested and subjected to criticism. Therefore, in confronting any historical work, 't must allow tradition's claim to validity, not in the sense of simply acknowledging the past in its otherness, but in such a way that it has something to say to me" (Gadamer, 1994, p.361). Thus, historically effected or hermeneutical consciouness 'fculminates not in methodological sureness o f itself, but in the same readiness for experience that distinguishes the experienced man from Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 185 the man captivated by dogma" (Gadamer, 1994, p.362). This hearkens back to Aristotle's conception of the phronimos and Nussbaum's person of experience and, once again, makes evident the primacy or universality o f questioning and openness in hermeneutic understanding. (7) Nietzsche on History To bolster my case that Gadamer is not alone in his conception of tradtion. I will now examine the claims of yet another thinker who allows for a critical perspective on history. For Nietzsche, despite maintaining that human beings are constituted by history and thus cannot expect to take any stand 'butside" o f it as Heidegger and Gadamer insist, also concedes that there is space for critique. He does this by distinguishing three ways in which we regard the past: monumental, antiquarian, and critical. The first manifests a sense of continuity believing that, 'the great moments in the struggle o f the human individual constitute a chain, that this chain unites mankind across the millenia."57 This view of history pertains to the human 'hs a being who acts and strives," and thus entails an idealized perspective on the past as that which may be used to shape the present. We learn from it 'that the greatness that once existed was in any event once possible and may thus be possible again" (Nietzsche, 1983, pp.68 and 69 respectively, italics his). Such an approach to the historical is not unlike that o f Romanticism in which a respect for tradition is maintained merely because it represents that which has been handed down from the past. Moreover, it also resembles Schleirmacher's claims regarding the pre-existing bond, or Friedrich Nietzsche. "On the Uses and Disadvantages o f History for Life.." Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983) p. 68. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 186 congeniality, which exists between all individuals and makes the interpretation of classical works possible. In essence, both the monumentalist and the Romanticist not only idealize the past but manifest a faith in some kind of bond which unites all o f humankind and transcends all historical or psychological conditions. However, according to Nietzsche, maintaining such an idealized position entails the danger of distortion and precludes any critical moment. Specifically, he claims, there have been periods 'Which were quite incapable of distinguishing between a monumentalized past and a mythical fiction, because precisely the same stimuli can be derived from the one world as from the other" (Nietzsche, 1983, p.70). So, if this approach remains too subjectivistic in its romantic nostalgia for some ideal bygone era, what is the remedy? If the monumentalist is guilty of the kind of 'Sentimental reverence for the past" which simply manifests 'intellectual weakness" or cultural stagnation, is the more objective approach o f the antiquarian model the solution?58 Unlike the monumentalist, the antiquarian studies history for its own sake - not for the sake o f recreating some ideal age. His aim is the preservation o f all that has been handed down from the past without making any normative distinctions. This kind of history pertains to the human 'hs a being who preserves and revers" (Nietzsche, 1983, p.67). 'By tending with care that which has existed from of old, he wants to preserve for those who shall come into existence after him the conditions under which he himself came into existence" (Nietzsche, 1983, pp.72-73). The antiquarain presumes that history can be <Q These phrases have been extracted from Jackson Lears' article in Lingua Franca. "Looking Backwards: In Defense of Nostalgia," pp. 60 and 59 respectively, where he reflects upon the origin of the term "nostalgia" and its supposedly pathological implications. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 187 examined in a 'Value-free" manner or from some objective perspective. But this is not a remedy for monumentalist Romanticism, as it possesses dangers o f its own -namely, if everything is to be preserved, with the attendant assumption that everything is worth perserving, then the present becomes stale and human beings immobilized as there is nothing at all to strive for or no reason to look ahead to a future. In other words, if nothing past is allowed to die, then nothing new can be bom. The antiquarian 'knows only how to preserve life, not how to engender it;" and he assumes, merely from '[t]he fact that something has grown old, [that it should be] made immortal" (Nietzsche, 1983, p.75, italics his). This supposedly objective view o f the past thus succeeds only in rendering it meaningless, insofar as it cannot even provide us with a grounds for present action. Moreover, the antiquarian view is not such a value-free position after all and ends up being virtually no different from the monumentalist - though the latter seeks to preserve the past for the sake of the future, while the former preserves it purely for its own sake. This too reflects a tendency manifest in Romanticism wherein classical works are valued simply because they are classical or intrinsically valuable (a "viciously" circular argument if ever there was one). In both the antiquarian and monumental approaches to history, the problem is that theory is divorced from practice or concrete action and each attempts to disengage from or transcend current prejudices. The former for the sake of preserving what has been handed down without judgment (presuming such is possible), and the latter in order to glorify a tradition in terms of the present or reproduce it for the future. In either case, the past is not regarded critically or evaluated in the light of current concerns. Is this then what Nietzsche proposes for his third model, insofar as it is the critical Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 188 perspective which presupposes a form of engagement with the past that neither idealizes nor objectifies it. Despite being conditioned by history and our traditions, Nietzsche maintains that we can nonetheless be "free o f them" (Nietzsche, 1983, p. 76). The 'fcritical" view also presupposes a 'fchain" o f continuity between past and present to the extent that 'We are the outcome o f earlier generations . . . [including] their aberrations, passions and errors" (Nietzsche, 1983, p.76). Moreover, although it is not possible to entirely free ourselves from these or 'h'ter the fact that we originate in them," we can 'fconfront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge of if ' (Nietzsche, 1983, p.76). This sounds not so different from Gadamer's claims regarding freedom o f historically effected consciousness. There is a normative ideal operating here too, though he, like Gadamer, does not say so directly. Specifically, when Nietzsche refers to viewing history with a critical eye, this critique is largely for the sake of 'destroying" some part o f the past. The critic serves life by killing or dissolving any degenerate aspect o f our inheritance and replacing it with a "second nature." And, although there may be more than one 'tombatant" vying for this role o f second nature, we have no way o f knowing antecedently which would constitute the most viable or best improvement over the former one. All we can do is rest assured that 'this first nature was once a second nature and that every victorious second nature will become a first" (Nietzsche, 1983, p.77). Is this then the kind of critical stance that would fit with Gadamer's conception of tradition? Is this type of destructive criticism consistent with the perspective o f historically effected or hermeneutical consciousness? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 189 I would respond negatively to the two questions above and, at the same time, insist that there must still be a space for some type of critical perspective towards that which has been handed down according to Gadamer. In other words, although one is constituted by his history and the traditions to which he belongs, he is not necessarily bound by them or to them indefinitely. Again, particular traditions provide both the content for the fore- structure o f understanding as well as a context in which understanding can take place. Even if it were possible for the understanding to function without reference to them, or the prejudices that are entailed therein, any interpretation or inquiry would begin with an empty consciousness and a view from nowhere. And its difficult to see how that could ever be fruitful or meaningful in the sense discussed above. Alasdair MacIntyre suggests something similar when he says: [T]he fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities such as those of the family, the neighborhood, the city and the tribe does not entail that the self has to accept the moral limitations of the particularityof those forms of community-. Without those moral particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin (italics his).59 Since MacIntyre, given his reference to moral identity here, is explicitly acknowledging a normative element in one's relationship to tradition, the question now becomes, how does one recognize those limitations as limiting in a harmful sense? In other words, how can one decide which 'particularities" are worth preserving and which are not? Nietzsche, in describing the critical mode of viewing history, seems to abandon any hope of discerning this as well as any possibility of determining the means by which 'hew habits" or 'hew instincts" may be implanted, simply 'because it is so hard to know the <g Alasdair MacIntyre. After Virtue. (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press. 1984), p. 221. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 190 limit to denial of the past and because second natures are usually weaker than the first" (Nietzsche, 1983, p.76). Still, the questions above cannot be forever avoided. And, Gadamer is not willing to give up quite so easily insofar as he, like MacIntyre, thinks that some account of particular goods as well as universals can be offered without denying our human finitude. This is the reason he develops a conception of historically effected consciousness that manifests affinities with both Heidegger's Dasein in addition to Aristotle's phronimos. For this is a human subject that embraces the particularities of his own historicity and finitude, yet maintains the respect for the authority o f the other that enables him to risk his own prejudices in such a way that their legitimacy or illegitimacy may be revealed in and through the interpretive process. As previously indicated, there is an affinity between the Wirkimg o f the text and the traditional prejudices o f the historically effected consciousness that interprets it. Further, there can also be an overlap between the history of a particular work and the history o f the subject. If this were not the case, then no 'fusion of horizons" of horizons would be possible. In other words, understanding involves some point of union or agreement between subject and object. But, how does this fusion occur? In addition, how can one be certain that her prejudices are in accordance with those of the text or conducive to agreement, as this would seem to be what is necessary if one intends to evaluate them in terms of their legitimacy or illegitimacy? These questions are related to those raised earlier regarding the distinction between dogmatic opinions and fruitful prejudices. And, since these are concerns which strike at the very heart of Gadamer's hermeneutics, perhaps another look at tradition is called for - again, one which preserves the relationship Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 191 between reason and tradition by allowing the interpreter a critical perspective without denying his historicity or finitude. This may be done through an examination o f MacIntyre's conception of tradition as narrative. (8) Tradition as Narrative To be able to risk a prejudice intially entails becoming conscious that one possesses it in the first place which also means recognizing that one's other presuppostions may be somewhat lacking as well. Yet, it is this particular lack o f knowledge that leads one to pose particular questions. For, once again, it is only from within a concrete and specific horizon that questioning can occur. Some sense of direction or meaning must be projected to begin with, even if that projection is initially misguided somehow. Nonetheless, it has already been shown that all truths or projected truths (i.e., prejudices) will always contain an element of untruth as well. Thus, it will be more consistent to speak of degrees o f truth here. Still, if one remains open and allows questions to arise naturally in the dialogical process o f interpretation, previously unrecognized misunderstandings will be revealed. In other words, if indeed questions are more like passions than actions, then one need only to avoid suppressing their flow or attempting to control their course. Moreover, this is consistent with Heidegger's conception of truth as disclosure or unconcealment and with his famous admonition to 'let beings be" -i.e., to simply allow Being to disclose itself or to let truths emerge in as unimpeded a manner as is possible. However, this means admitting not cnly that one is finite but fallible as well, and therefore vulnerable to an 'fepistemological crisis" o f greater or lesser proportions. On the other hand, if this Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 192 possibility is suppressed, and one fails to see gaps or any distinction between what he once believed to be true and what now seems to be so, then many relevant and important questions will never arise and he will truly be imprisoned by his opinions. Still, what does this tell us about traditions themselves and our relation to them? And, how can Gadamer's account of experience as inherently negative, and the ever-present possibility o f such a crisis, serve to further a more open, positive conception of tradition? MacIntyre asks us to consider what it means to "share a culture." Belonging to a tradition is in many respects tantamount to sharing a culture - whether it be linguistic, religious, ethnic, etc. MacIntyre maintains that this involves 'fchar[ing] schemata which are at one and the same time constitutive of and normative for intelligible action by myself and are also means for my interpretations o f the actions of others" (MacIntyre, 1977, p.453). This is equivalent to what I have insisted Gadamer means by tradition, and its authoritative function in the interpretation o f texts or other human artifacts. Specifically, the traditions to which one belongs, and the prejudices that these entail, limit his openness. For these particularities not only provide a space in which understanding can occur but give one a sense of direction. "Prejudices are biases o f our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something - whereby what we encouter says something to us."60 In other words, while openness furnishes a 'Space" for interpretation, it must be circumscribed by one's questions and pre-understandings. Thus, openness serves as a necessaiy but not sufficient condition for the possibility fusion of horizons, for this can actually occur only in accordance with one's own prejudices or in terms o f one's 60 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Universality o f the Hermeneutical Problem." Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. David E. Linge. (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1976), p. 9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 193 own schemata. However, these same schemata are just as likely to lead us astray. As said earlier, in relation to Heidegger's account of truth and untruth, the conditions for understanding and misunderstanding are the same. As MacIntyre puts it, "while it is they which normally preserve us from the pressure of the other-minds problem and the problem of induction, it is precisely they which can in certain circumstances thrust those very problems upon us" (MacIntyre, 1977, p.454). So, what is one to do when faced with this kind of epistemological crisis? Or, how can an interpreter readjust her prejudices in a way that is most likely to foster understanding and minimize its opposite? Both MacIntyre and Gadamer claim that one of the fundamental tasks of hermeneutic reflection involves evaluating and re-evaluating the prejudices one has inherited or schemata that have been shared. What we learn from MacIntyre, specifically, is that an epistemological crisis precipitates the rewriting of the narrative that has been disrupted. Like Hegel and Gadamer, MacIntyre also speaks of a 'Reversal" o f consciousness, but he frames it in more concrete terms using Shakespeare's Hamlet to illustrate his point. For Hamlet, in a very poignant way, has been forced to reexamine beliefs that he has held to almost all his life. Specifically, what he had formerly believed to be true, regarding the nature of his parents relationship, his father's death, and his uncle's loyalty, has been seriously challenged. In MacIntyre's terms, the behavior and actions o f those around him have become unintelligible, as his schemata not only have failed to assist him in making sense of his world but have actually disabled him or thwarted his understanding. When faced with this kind of crisis, Hamlet's job is 'to reconstitute, to rewrite that [previous] narrative, reversing his understanding of past events in the light o f present responses to his Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 194 probing" (MacIntyre, 1977, p.455). We could say that the same is true for any interpreter when her prejudices prove to be disabling. Moreover, in most cases, one is not even aware of the projected meanings that are brought to bear in an act of interpretation until they are contradicted or understanding is thwarted somehow. When considering a text, this should cause the interpreter to question or probe further by delving deeper into the work (via secondary sources, for example) in addition to reflecting upon her own interests, concerns, commitments, etc. in such a way that will allow her to readjust those particular prejudices in light of new information. However, this does not necessarily mean that the schemata which prove to be disabling or illegitimate in one context should be discarded altogether, for it may be the case that they will serve one quite well under different circumstances or in relation to a different object of interpretation. This may provide a clue as to why Gadamer refuses to tell us which prejudices or which kind of schemata are conducive to understanding and which are not, as there is no ultimate criterion and this can only be determined situationally. It also underscores what was discussed earalier when Gadamer refers to the negativity of experience (Erfahnmg), and further illutrates both his own and Nussbaum's claims with regards to the struggle and suffering that is endemic to almost any act of genuine understanding. Rewriting a narrative that had heretofore served one well is not only a painful process but one which demands courage, commitment and the right dispositional attitude (hexis). Moreover, this is not merely a practical matter of readjusting schemata so that they "fit" better, but is one governed by certain norms or values. Despite one's openness and the fact that he cannot know beforehand which prejudices will serve him effectively and which will not (especially since he might not even Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 195 be aware of what they are until the dialogue begins), one must still have some general sense of direction or basic forms of guidance. So, are there any traditional norms or values which might assist us here? According to MacIntyre the rewriting process is informed by two ideals - 'truth" and Intelligibility." Specifically, the new narrative must enable the agent 'to understand both how he or she could intelligibly have held his or her original beliefs and how he or she could have been so drastically misled by them" (MacIntyre, 1977, p.455, italics his). However, once again, this is no simple matter and there is no way of being certain or guaranteeing that the new narrative one has constructed will continue to hold or is the correct one. In fact, if there is one thing that we can state definitively, it is that this account too will change as time goes on. Just as Nietzsche argued that every second nature will become a first and must therefore yield to yet another 'Second," so too will every new narrative require revising and rewriting. The interpretive process being one without end. However, while this may all sound very well in theory, it is a difficult reality to live with and is perhaps why so many of us tend to seek exemption from this consequence of our historicity when it comes to our own narratives. Jean Grondin makes says as much when he states that, '[t]he first given for a hermeneutic phenomenology...is that o f a finite Dasein, vowed to projects o f meaning o f which the last foundation will always escape it."61 Thus, the quest for ultimacy must be given up if one accepts a Heideggerian ontology as Gadamer does. Dasein may 'dream" of ultimate foundations, as Grondin puts it, or yearn for them; but this kind o f certainty is simply not to be had in 61 Jean Grondin. Sources o f Hermeneutics. (Albany: Slate University o f New York Press. 1995). p. 45. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 196 hermeneutic inquiry, or in any type of inquiry involving a human subject. We would all like to think that our personal narratives accurately reflect the 'facts" o f our histories, that our interpretations of other human phenomena are the correct ones, and so forth. Moreover, the implications of admitting that such guarantees are not, and most likely never will be, forthcoming always seems to raise 'the spectre o f relativism." 62 However, as Bernstein argues, giving up the 'braving for absolutes" need not lead to despair '{n]or does it mean accepting the other side of the Cartesian Anxiety -- 'anything goes'" (Bernstein, 1988, p.69). What it does entail is recognizing human finitude and frailty by learning to live with the fundamental anxieties o f hermeneutics. And, most significantly, 'hever giving up the regulative ideal of seeking to defend and argue for what we take to be important and valid" (Bernstein, 1988, p.69). Still, what one takes to be important and valid does not retain the consistency of logic, but neither do narratives or a traditional set of norms and values change spontaneously or radically. As MacIntyre made clear above in his account o f the incommensurability o f goods, we might say that interpretations too should be regarded as incommensurable and that it is not a matter of choosing one single account which can be deemed correct. For there is no ultimate standard or objective criterion to which one can appeal. What can be said, however, is that an interpretation is better or worse to the extent that it takes account o f specific prejudices and traditions in the context o f an actual dialogue or particular encounter with a text. For example, let's again consider Plato's discussion of the immortality o f the soul in the Phaedo. Is this really a proof of immortality, or an an argument concerning the nature of knowledge? Was it intended as an ^2 Bernstein. Richard, " Hermeneutics and Its Anxieties," in Hermeneutics and The Tradition, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom. (Proceedings o f The American Catholic Association. Vol. LXII. 1988), p. 65. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. anticipation of Plato's theory o f forms, or does it stand on its own as a meditation on the nature of life and death? My question is, why must we choose? Must there by only one way of understanding this dialogue? Or, is it possible to live with different, equally valid interpretions o f it? On the one hand, it seems clear that this is a work which will invariably provoke us to ask universal questions by challenging us not only to reflect upon what death means but to also consider how knowledge is possible, even if we do not accept Plato's doctrine o f anamnesis. Yet, on the other hand, we can also evaluate distinct interpretations on the basis o f how well or how poorly they respond to questions or concerns of our own. In other words, what are the assumptions that I bring to Plato's work, and to what degree do they shed light on the claims o f the text that enable me to better understand the world in which I live? Differently put, how meaningful or significant is a particular interpretation or set o f interpretations for me and my contemporaries? How can this notion of an immortal soul or the conception of knowledge as recollection be seen as relevant here and now, in an age characterized by secularism and skepticism? These kinds of issues are what hermeneutics is primarily concerned with, not whether different interpretations are contradictory or consistent. The bivalent structure of logic is simply inadequate for understanding what is peculiarly human. So we need not be disturbed if different interpreters, at different times and in different contexts, discover distinct or conflicting truths in the same text. This is not to say that hermeneutic reflection is irrational. While the principle o f non-contradiction may not be sufficient for evaluating its truth claims, there is, nonetheless, a basic respect for rational thought and rigorous argument. Let me appeal to one more illustration to underscore this point further. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 198 Without going into too much detail, there has been a long-running debate as to whether a specific 'light to privacy" was intended in the Bill o f Rights. Since no explicit mention of it was made by the authors, some assume that it would be illegitimate to 'read this into" the document; while others maintain that such a right is entirely in keeping with 'the spirit" of constitutional government. So, who is correct? It is my contention that any appeal to 'briginal intent" is misleading and chimerical, for that too will always be a matter o f interpretation since the authors cannot speak for themselves. Moreover, this appeal already presumes that this primary meaning (if it were discernible) is of value - i.e., that one should be concerned with what the original authors intended. If this is a value that I do not share, then what? I would insist that the question becomes a practical, ethical one - namely, how do I think the government should act with regard to the privacy of its citizens, or to what extent can a private sphere be carved out which is exempt from political intervention? In other words, the question of which interpretation is correct becomes merely academic; and the one which really has meaning for me is whether privacy is something worth protecting or not and to what extent. Do I share the prejudices of those who wish to curtail it, whether they do so in the name o f 'bur forefathers" or not? Or, do I see myself as belonging to a tradition where such is expanded? Is it possible that I can stand in both positions depending on the issue at hand? To this last query, I would say, most definitely and so too would those like Gadamer and MacIntyre. There may be instances when protecting one's privacy may come at a greater cost than not, and there may be others when it should be regarded as absolute. Again, the point is that individual rights, like values, cannot be ranked according to any ultimate standard, and there may Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 199 even be cases where they not only conflict but are incommensurable. In the sphere o f ethics, this can be 'tragic" as MacIntyre contends. Nonetheless, we cannot avoid making choices, regardless o f how much or how little is at stake, and I fail to see how a commitment to original intent facilitates that in any positive manner. Assuming then that a respect for tradition does not mean the abdication o f reason or one's own critical capacities, let me now return to examine the relationship between them? And, if reason and authority are not antithetical, then how do they complement one another? Again, MacIntyre's concept of narrative will help to illuminate Gadamer's conception of tradition for both reveal a history. But this is not a history which can be understood as some kind of seamless whole. Rather, MacIntyre says the narrative itself is "a history o f epistemological transitions" which underscores the claim that traditions are constituted by rival interpretations. As an example of this, MacIntyre says, '{sjuppose I am an American: the tradition is one partly constituted by continuous argument over what it means to be an American and partly by continuous argument over what it means to have rejected tradition" (MacIntyre, 1977, p.460). So too with narrative might we say that the idea o f America itself is constituted by discussion over what it stands for and the ideals that it has been designed to embody; or, that our Constitution represents just such a narrative -i.e., a document which gives us our legal history or manifests the story of law in this nation. What this tells us, and what the example above illustrates, is that conflict is inherent in or endemic to traditions and/or narratives. For neither could be adequately described by appealing to some constant or perfectly consistent element (like the original intent o f the framers), yet this is precisely how most traditions have been construed from the Modern Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 200 era to the present. MacIntyre suggests that this is due to the influence of Descartes and his misdiagnosis o f his own epistemological crisis and the type o f remedy that he sought for it: The agent who is plunged into an epistemological crisis knows something very important: that a schema of interpretation which he has trusted so far has broken down irremediably in certain highly specific ways. Hamlet's doubts are formulated against a background of what he takes to be-rightly-well-founded beliefs; Descartes's doubt is intended to lack any such background. [0 ]f course someone who really believed that he knew nothing would not even know how to begin on a course o f radical doubt; for he would have no conception of what his task might be, o f what it would be to settle his doubts and to acquire well-founded beliefs. Conversely, anyone who knows enough to know that does indeed possess a set of extensive epistemological beliefs which he is not putting in doubt at all (MacIntyre 1977, p.458. italics his). Thus, no matter how much one may want to deny it, human understanding is dependent upon tradition. And traditions themselves do display some degree o f coherency or continuity, though not in the form of logical consistency. Moreover, while it must be possible to criticize a particular intellectual or political tradition and specific personal interests or cultural ideals, it is not possible to escape the influence o f tradition itself if we accept the fundamental historicity o f human existence. Because of this, MacIntyre insists that '[a]mbiguity, the possibility of alternative interpretations, becomes a central feature of human character and activity" (MacIntyre, 1977, p.459). So, instead of providing a safe haven in which one may hide from the 'frightful realities o f life" (Gadamer, 1994, p.239), instead of functioning in a fundamentally conservative or strictly preservative manner, this view of tradition presents us with an even bigger hermeneutical task. Specifically, it is not merely rival interpretations o f a text that one must confront and mediate between, but conflicting theories as to what a particular tradition may entail. The question then is how do we do this? Bernstein has already given us a hint as to where to look for an answer - Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 201 namely, by committing ourselves to 'dialogue instead of totality" and holding to a regulative ideal of rational argument. Still, if we cannot stand outside of our traditions, won't standards like these be conditioned by them too? The short answer to this is, yes, but this is only a problem if one insists on searching for something firm, unchanging or ultimate. And, at least, these kinds o f ideals or commitments preserve the dialectical relation betwen tradition and reason -namely, that reason is always prejudiced by tradition but so too must the authoritative value of tradition be rationally grounded. However, can't one still ask by what process may the illegitimate prejudices o f a tradition be weeded out? Or what signifys "degenerate" elements o f a tradition? MacIntyre demonstrates the depth, and perhaps intractability, of this problem when he shows that conflict arises not only within but between traditions. Moreover, because each of us stands witnin more than one particular tradition at a time, maybe the best that can be hoped for is that we can critique the claims of one from the vantage point o f another. For example, many black feminists were more sensitive to the racist practices or assumptions o f the women's movement because they could see them through the lens o f their traditions as members of the African-American community; and, conversely, were able to see the sexist attitudes and implications in the struggle for black power and identity because of their personal histories as women. (This should not be taken as an instance of essentialism, for I am not presuming that there is either a feminine or an African-American essence. In fact, recent history has shown that debates as to what constitutes 'Sisterhood" or 'blackness" are ever present, and that the boundaries o f these ostensible 'fcommunities" continually fluctuate.) By mediating between the various traditions to which one belongs Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 202 or claims membership, one can find an immanent space for critique. There is thus no 'Gods-eye" or over-arching point o f view from which one may claim an entitirely 'bbjective" or universal stance. As with ethical deliberation, the human subject or agent is a multi-faceted being who brings several diverse elements to the table. Each of us has many different allegiances and commitments which, in cases o f moral or epistemological crisis, must be taken into account and mediated between. A woman's duties to her children, for instance, may enable her to look more critically at her marital relationship and vice-versa. Still, whatever kind of crisis one is faced with, there are no ultimate or absolutely correct answers. Rather, there are decisions, interpretations, and new narratives that are either better or worse. How then can we mediate between these? Again, for the last time, can we find any criteria which might enable us to evaluate whether an interpretation is better or worse, or a when a tradition is worth preserving and when it is not? According to MacIntyre, it is possible to distinguish between 'degenerate" and 'healthy" traditions. The sign of the former is 'that it has contrived a set of epistemological defences which enable it to avoid being put into question or at least to avoid recognising that it is being put into question by rival traditions" (MacIntyre, 1977, p.461). This hearkens back to Gadamer's appeal to openness as a sign of a good interpreter and the distinction between dogmatic opinion and enabling prejudice, for MacIntyre agrees that degenerate traditions are those which are not open to question or interrogation - i.e., those which are 'fclosed" and have become 'hardened" dogma or ideology. They are, in effect, precluding the possibility of dialogue, rather than facilitating Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. it. The same can be said for questions which are 'Wrongly put" - those which '[do] not reach the state o f openness but preclude reaching it by retaining false presuppositions" (Gadamer, 1977, p.364). Such questions merely 'pretend" to openness. Throughout the history o f philosophy this distinction has been made in various ways - for example, Plato's separation o f rhetoric and dialectic in the Gorgias and elsewhere. However, in most cases, the means by which this has been done is to posit some transcendent subject, necessary and universal principles, or privileged perspective which is exactly what Gadamer and his sympathizers refuse to do. For understanding and interpreting human artifacts - namely, texts, works o f art, historical events, human actions, or traditions themselves - can only be done by standing within the proscribed area of a particular horizon. Or, as MacIntyre puts it, "the practice o f putting in question, whether within a tradition or between traditions, itself always requires the context o f a tradition" (MacIntyre, 1977, pp.461-462). So too are there no 'Unloaded" questions, insofar as they always point us in some particular direction. We cannot simply criticize or question without reference to something else or from outside a specific set o f conditions. Descartes' model of universal doubt is not only a false model or misdescription of what skeptical thinking involves. According to MacIntyre, it is an Invitation...to philosophy as a means o f mental breakdown" (MacIntyre, 1977, p.462). Simply put, one cannot doubt everything or undermine all o f the foundations upon which he has rested for a lifetime without losing his mind. Thus, even if the problem of criteria seems intractable and will not go away, we still have to forge ahead - i.e., find answers, come to conclusions and make decisions -without assurances. An epistemological crisis may cause us to call Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 204 certain things, perhaps even many things, into question, but we can survive it whether it be one o f minor or mammouth proportions. To do so, however, requires much more than a view from nowhere. One must have some relatively firm place to stand from which these questionable aspects may be looked at or critically examined, even if there can be no guarantees that this is the 'fight" place. As I stated in chapter 1, Descartes himself admits as much when be fails to doubt the moral tenets and principles o f his time and culture, and is quite willing to submit his ethical judgments to the claims of traditional authorities - namely, God and the laws and customs o f his country.63 Thus, he too notes that one must have a 'home" in which to reside when the foundation for the new one is being razed and rebuilt. So, it is apparent that even with his explicit rejection of tradition, Descartes himself manifests an implicit ambivalence towards its authoritative function (at least when it comes to concrete action) and, in fact, could not escape it entirely. But, what about Gadamer? Can he make prescriptive claims about the nature o f understanding or appeal to truth in interpretation without invoking ultimate ideals or grounds even implicitly? Again, even if all of our standards of judgment - norms, ideals, values, etc. - are inherited or historically conditioned, we can and should continue to evaluate them critically. Isn't one entitled to ask, what then is the basis for such criticism? Even if one agrees that there is only the dialectic and that the space for critique must be immanent, can't she still ask, what are the marks or signs o f a 'fational argument" or a 'genuine dialogue?" Or, how do we distinguish between the genuine article and those who are merely pretenders? Simply put, what do these "regulative ideals" consist in? 63 See Descartes "Third Discourse," Discourse On Method, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith. Descartes' Philosophical Writinns. (New York: The Modem Library. 1958). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 205 It seems that we keep pushing the questions back further and further by seeking some basic foundation or ultimate aim o f interpretation, yet all the time insisting that such is not to be found or explicitly determined prior to an actual dialogical encounter. From the distinction between prejudice and opinion to the question of enabling vs. disabling schemata, to the relationship between critical thinking and repect for tradition's authority, to the nature o f dialogue or reason itself, it appears that no definitive method of understanding can be offered -certainly not one that is foolproof -and we are always brought back to questions of ultimate criteria or standards of interpretation, whether those are understood in terms of grounds or ends. This is a problem which has proven to be remarkably resilient despite Heidegger's ontology of finitude, so perhaps it is time to give Gadamer's critics their due. In the next chapter, therefore, I will consider the specific nature of their claims and try to show, in defense o f Gadamer, that although questions of ultimacy or foundations may not ever be satisfactorily resolved, they can be dissolved or replaced with those of a more practical kind. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 206 Chapter V: Gadamer Meets His Critics There are basically two sets of objections which are leveled at Gadamer's hermeneutics and, ironically, they seem to contradict one another. On the one hand, Gadamer is often charged with 'bonservatism" for appealing to tradition and respecting its authoritiative function. Specifically, the claim is that Gadamer simply preserves the ideals, norms and values of the Western metaphysical tradition without critically examining them. John D. Caputo argues that Gadamer 'bemains attached to the tradition as the bearer of eternal truths, which...does nothing more than modify Plato and Hegel from a Heideggerian standpoint."64 Yet, on the other hand, he is also accused of lapsing into a subjectivistic relativism due to his claim that it is one's own prejudices, which are rooted in a tradition, that function productively in the constitution o f meaning. For example, E.D. Hirsch argues that Gadamer is guilty of falling under the sway of the 'fallacy of the inscrutable past" and, as an antidote, recommends 'that we vitalize the inscrutable texts of the past by distorting them to our own perspective."65 Can Gadamer be both a conservative relativist or a dogmatic subjectivist? If Gadamer's position on truth and the 64 John D. Caputo. Radical Hermeneutics. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 111. 65 E.D. Hirsch, The .Aims o f Interpretation. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1976), p.39. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 207 conception of tradition which corresponds to it is to be defended, it will be necessary to consider these criticisms in greater detail and show how they can be addressed. (1) Warnke and Caputo on Gadamer's Conservatism Although Caputo claims that, 'Gadamer is extremely good at defending the idea o f a mobile, flexible tradition which never congeals into timeless, canonical formulations," he also maintains that his appeal to it indicates a rejection of 'the deeper and more radical side o f Heidegger's thought" (Caputo, 1987, pp. 110 and 111 respectively). In a similar vein, Warnke insists that Gadamer's thesis regarding the authority o f tradition is 'the fundamentally conservative one" -namely, that 'Since we have no concept o f rationality that is independent o f the tradition to which we belong, and hence no universal norms and principles to which we can appeal, we ought not even to attempt to overthrow the authority of that tradition."66 What justifys these positions, and what would constitute a sufficient Gadamerian response? Gadamer does make claims that appear to support the criticisms above. For instance, he agrees with the Romantic objections to Enlightenment thought insofar as becoming master does not mean that a person becomes his own master in the sense that he is freed from all tradition. The real force o f morals, for example, is based on tradition. They are freely taken over but by no means created by a free insight or grounded on reasons. This is precisely what we call tradition: the ground of their validity. And in fact it is to romanticism that we owe this correction of the Enlightenment: that tradition has a justification that lies beyond rational grounding and in large measure determines our institutions and attitudes (Gadamer, 1994, pp.280-281). 66 Georgia Warnke. Gadamer: Hermeneutics. Tradition and Reason. (Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1987). p. 136. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 208 What are we to make of this? At first glance, Gadamer seems to have fallen directly into the trap of philosophers or monumentalist historians who idealize the past over the present and make tradition the ultimate ground of morals and values. To make matters worse, he then asserts that 'fclassical ethics are superior to modem moral philosophy" because I t grounds the transition from ethics to 'politics,' the art of right legislation, on the indispensability of tradition" (Gadamer, 1994, p.281). Specifically, Gadamer is referring to Aristotle's ethics and his claims that, while words evidently do have the power to encourage and stimulate young men of generous mind, and while they can cause a character well-born and truly enamored o f what is noble to be possessed by virtue, they do not have the capacity to turn the common run of people to goodness and nobility (Aristotle. 1962. p.295). Since this has often been taken as an example of Aristotelian elitism, can we say that Gadamer too is presupposing a similar distinction between 'the common" people and a 'Well-born" nobility? In other words, is the latter identifiable as those who preserve conventional norms and values, while the former are those who fail to respect such traditions? I would say, no, for this simply reiterates a point made earlier regarding the nature of moral deliberation and phronesis - namely, that one must already be good, or have been brought up with some concern for the good, in order to become good. If one is nurtured in an environment where no sense o f right and wrong is ingrained, then she cannot possibly be expected to demonstrate any interest in ethical issues, nor is it likely that she will ask or even understand moral questions. Gadamer too can be understood as merely underscoring the point that no amount of rational argument will suffice when it comes to convincing someone who is not so inclined already that that they should become moral creatures. As Aristotle indicates, 'the soul of the listener must first have been Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 209 conditioned by habits to the right kind of likes and dislikes, just as land must be cultivated before it is able to foster the seed" (Aristotle, 1962, p.296). Differently put, 'there must first be a character that somehow has an affinity for excellence or virtue, a character that loves what is noble and feels disgust at what is base" (Aristotle, 1962, p.296). Thus, what Gadamer finds 'Superior" about classical ethics is the acknowledgment of this paradox of moral virtue, and the willingness to accept that such does not, indeed, cannot depend on reason alone but must be grounded in the authority of a tradition. In contrast, Enlightenment thinkers (like Kant) have sought to deny the effects o f tradition and ground morality in the pure practical reason of an autonomous subject. But, this approach to moral questions presents us with a merely formal method of understanding and is void of any specific content. On the other hand, when Gadamer appeals to Aristotle and his paradigm of moral reasoning he does so only in order to make a general point about the nature of ethical inquiry -namely, that the subject must begin from some concrete set of assumptions and does not possess an empty consciousnes. However, this does not necessarily imply that he accepts the particular traditions to which Aristotle himself belonged or is defending any specific set of conventional prejudices. I fail to see the evidence for Caputo's claims that 'Gadamer has a deeply Hegelian streak which leads him search for some hermeneutic version of the Aufhebimg' - one 'Which consists in the continual appropriation and reappropriation of the ageless contents (the Sache) o f the tradition" (Caputo, 1987, pp.96 and 113 respectively, italics mine). For Gadamer does not refer to the tradition, or the canon of Western philosophy, as one which is normative for all understanding. Certainly, he too is subject to the historical conditions o f his time and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 210 his hermeneutics belongs to this Western tradition, but I do not see how he is necessarily bound to it. Moreover, Caputo's charge rests on two unstated assumptions o f its own: One, that Gadamer is valorizing a particular tradition which he sees as something singular and static; and two, it fails to recognize the significance of Gadamer's distinction between the classical as normative and the classical as historical. First, as I have argued extensively above, tradition is not to be construed as something fixed or reified. It is a formal concept which exhibits no concrete content of its own, although particular traditions certainly do contain specific norms, beliefs, practices, etc. which serve as a foundation for the kinds o f prejudices one holds. Further, any continuity that a particular tradition may exhibit is to be found in the ongoing and continual raising of timeless questions, not in how those questions are actually addressed or answered in any definite context or specific instance. We cannot neutralize ourselves to the effects and conditions placed upon us by our traditions, but we do have a choice to accept them as our own or not. Perhaps it would be more fruitful to speak to those elements or prejudices o f a tradition which one chooses to embrace or reject, for it is not clear what would consitutute a tradition in its entirety or how one is clearly distinguishable from another. Specifically, we can choose to reinvest elements of a tradition with some kind of authority or reject them as degenerate, obsolete, or irrelevant, but we cannot transcend the effects o f tradition as a general rule. Particular prejudices may be more or less likely to facilitate understanding but 'fctep[ping]-back from all horizonality," as Caputo implies we should is impossible (Caputo, 1987, p.96). Like questions, we too must have a sense o f direction -one must always already be attuned to or possess some knowledge o f the world in which Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. they live - but, in addition, we must remain open to the possibilities which may be disclosed to us when we encounter this world or the objects which constitute it. This becomes evident when one considers how we stand in relation to the traditions which constitute us. For example, when Gadamer describes the activity o f preservation, he admits that it involves 'hn act of reason, though an inconspicuous one" (Gadamer, 1994, p.281, italics mine). What he is suggesting is that appropriation does not necessarily preclude taking a critical stance towards who we are or what constitutes us. Rather, preservation includes and requires this critical perspective if the truth claims of any tradition are to be 'freely taken over." Still, what is not freely chosen or 'Nationally grounded," are the historical conditions in which one finds herself and the traditions which she must confront. For that is what we are 'thrown into" as Heidegger would say, or what is 'thrust upon" us as Bakhtin maintains. In other words, 'the authority of what has been handed down to us...always has power over our attitudes and behavior;" however,'[t]rue authority does not have to be authoritarian" (Gadamer, 1994, p.280). Even in rejecting some aspect of tradition, we are still responding to its claims. In sum, Gadamer refers to tradition as a general idea, or in a merely formal way, not to any one in particular. Thus, it is not clear what kind o f a conservative Gadamer would be even if he were one, since he manifests no commitment to any specific tradition or set of prejudices. Certainly, he would be unable to deny that he too is constituted by traditions to which he belongs but that does not mean that he considers those normative for all understanding. Second, Caputo conflates the normative concept o f the classical with 'the tradition" or what is popularly referred to as 'the canon." He also indicates that this fusion, between the classical which Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 212 represents the historical period of antiquity and the classical as that which has "suprahistorical value," leads to many misconceptions about the nature of authority and tradition. The tendency for us today is to identify classical works as those belonging to ancient Greek and Roman times, which is perhaps due to the influence of the Renaissance's retrieval o f the texts and documents of this epoch. But, does this mean that all works of antiquity should be understood as having suprahistorical value? Not necessarily, for what is classical in the normative sense must be proved to be so time and time again, as Gadamer maintains. This is what Romanticism failed to recognize - i.e., that the classical works which have authoritative value are not Scriptural writings alone or those which belong to antiquity; but rather, are those which 'present tasks of historical understanding to a developed historical consciousness, one that is aware of historical distance" (Gadamer, 1994, p.290). This is what leads Gadamer to conclude that understanding is to be thought of "as participating in an event o f tradition" (Gadamer, 1994, p.290, italics his). Thus, through such participation we are not preserving what has been handed down by merely repeating it. If a work is to be deemed classical in the normative sense, even if it is a classic in the historical sense of the term or has traditionally belonged to the canon o f Western philosophy, it must be because it is meaningful or relevant for us here and now. In other words, 'It] he classics only become classics when they are relevant again. They [works of antiquity] are like the ghosts Odysseus met in the underworld. They cannot speak until Odysseus performs the sacrifice that gives them fresh blood to drink." (italics his)67 Thus, historically classical works must prove themselves 67 Wills. Gary, "There's Nothing Conservative About the Classics Revival." (.Vew York Times Magazine. Feb. 16. 1997). p.42. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 213 time and again - i.e., whatever meaning they may have had previously cannot simply be taken for granted. If a classic is to have any normative value at all or can be said to possess any timeless truths, then this must continue to be revealed by different interpreters under different conditions for different periods and in different ways. Lastly, Caputo insists that Gadamer ultimately resists the radical implications o f Heidegger's phenomenology by remaining 'Attached to the tradition" in such a way that precludes critique: Gadamer remains within the tradition, which he regards as an inescapable facticity. but he sees no need to think through the tradition to that which is at work, or at play, in the tradition. He is concerned with what is given in the tradition-with keeping it alive, with passing on the word and teaching us to listen-but not with the giving process itself, the event o f unconcealment itself which comes to pass in and as the tradition (Caputo. 1987. p.l 14). Which tradition is Caputo referring to here? As I have above, I will continue to assume that this means the tradition of Western metaphysical thought. Caputo indicates as much himself when he argues that Gadamer, like all metaphysicians, 'Wants to give us comfort in the face of flux, to reassure us that all is well, that beneath the surface of historical transition an unchanging, infinite spirit labors" (Caputo, 1987, p.l 12). However, once again, Caputo fails to distinguish between the general concept o f tradition which assumes no substantive content in particular, and those elements or prejudices that do provide such content to a specific tradition. As Daseins, we are always already thrown into a set o f existential conditions which involves a complex network of traditions, but this does not necessarily mean that there is any particular tradition or set o f prejudices - i.e., any specific content - to which he is appealing for its authoritative value. Again, when Gadamer invokes Aristotle's phronesis as a model for hermeneutic understanding, he is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. not thereby appealing to any of the specific moral virtues that comprised Aristotle's cultural traditions or political community. To be more specific, the excellence o f courage that is described in reference to the exploits o f the heroic warriors o f ancient Greece reflects an ideal that would be meaningless for today's soldier. Nonetheless, what Aristotle's ethics does not allow us to ignore is that any possibility o f understanding a virtue such as courage, or any insight into how moral excellence may be realized, depends upon some sense of community or traditional norms, if even in only a negative sense. In other words, our understanding o f the good is often gleaned from, or first worked out in terms of, what it is not. For instance, at some point in my life, I may be called upon to act courageously. And, if I want to inquire as to what this entails, I might start by taking a look at Aristotle's ethics which tells me that, like any other virtue, courage should be understood as a mean between the extremes o f cowardice and recklessness; and, that it is a mean relative to the agent (in this case, me). Thus, Aristotle's work is true or meaningful insofar as it provokes me to ask further questions regarding the nature o f these extremes as well as my own capacities, commitments, and so forth; it does not unilaterally answer the question, what is courage? or how can I become a courageous person? Again, it is the questions with which we are confronted that allow for a dialogue to ensue and for truths to emerge, and it is they which must be taken authoritatively insofar as they should be taken up and considered by any interpreter who is interested in such things. To fail to ask the questions which are relevant in a particular context is to fail to understand, not doing so means not engaging in the play that is essential for any kind of understanding. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 215 This leads to my last point regarding Caputo's critique. Specifically, how is the charge - that it is not the 'process itself," or Went of unconcealment," with which Gadamer is concerned - even plausible, given his constant claim that understanding always means understanding differently? Especially when it is the dialectical or dialogical nature of understanding that Gadamer repeatedly emphasizes, and when he himself uses the term 'fevent" to characterize it. While I have described Heidegger's influence on Gadamer, Caputo persistently contrasts the two thinkers. Saying that, for Heidegger the Sache is not any particular metaphysics or fusion of metaphysical standpoints but the very happening o f metaphysics as such . . .He wants to think the truth-event itself, the happening of truth and untruth, which is what a-letheia means. Gadamer is interested in the verum, alethea, what is true here and now and ready for our consumption (application), not a-letheia, the event o f concealment and unconcealment (Caputo. 1987. p.l 15). In chapter 2, I argued that this is exactly what Gadamer is concerned with -the event of concealment and unconcealment. But Gadamer does have a practical side as well in as much as understanding is considered inseparable from application. In other words, if anything is to be meaningful to me, then it must be in some way applicable to my life or the conditions of my existence. Moreover, I have argued repeatedly that the 'fusion of horizons" Gadamer refers to is not that o f particular traditions or metaphysical perspectives; instead, fusion is only possible to the extent that one is asking the same questions as the 'bther" in the dialectic. If the interpreter and the object, or conversational partner, do not at least agree on the questions or the nature o f the matter at hand (the Sache), then dialogue is manifestly impossible. Perhaps Caputo's point here is that Gadamer remains hopelessly trapped within the perspective o f metaphysics, whereas Heidegger has somehow transcended it. But, is this really the case? Has Heidegger Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 216 succeeded in overcoming his own historical conditionedness by getting 'butside" the metaphysical tradition in Western philosophy? Is this what Caputo is referring to when he deems the early Heidegger a radical and Gadamer a conservative? As mentioned previously, despite Heidegger's insistence on the historicity o f understanding, he himself displays a typically Modem attitude toward the philosophical tradition he has inherited. Specifically, he is convinced that his phenomenological approach to fiidamental ontology has succeeded in doing away with the degenerate metaphysics of the past. But how is this kind of escape possible if one accepts an ontology of finitude? Isn't it more likely that his thought too would remain tinged with traditional metaphysical elements? If we take claims like his seriously, one might say that this actually renders him less o f an historical thinker, or less radical, than Gadamer. For not only does Gadamer give extensive accounts of the thinkers who preceded him recognizing his debt to them, but he also, unlike Heidegger, 'fefuses to drive a wedge between metaphysics and hermeneutics."68 In fact, according to Grondin, what distinguishes Gadamer from his 20th century peers is that his is the only philosophy 'that did not recommend itself as an overcoming of metaphysics" (Grondin, 1995, p. 17). So, despite Heidegger's emphasis on temporality and Dasein's finitude, it is he, not Gadamer, who does not go far enough or 'backs off' from radical historicity. For Heidegger's 'tnassive shift 'from metaphysics to hermeneutics'...[remains] tacitly metaphysical in nature" (Grondin, 1995, p. 16). This is due to the very conditions which tradition places upon us, as Gadamer consistently maintains. So, despite the claims of Heidegger or those who insist we are in a postz o Jean Grondin. Sources of Hermeneutics. (Albany. State University of New York Press, 1995), p. 14. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 217 metaphysical age, we still cannot avoid asking metaphysical questions. Why is this? Perhaps ultimate questions -those pertaining to first principles -remain meaningful to the extent that the act of questioning itself always reveals something true (for example, about myself or self-understanding) even when definitive answers continue to elude us. No human being is capable o f going so far that he or she can claim to have discovered something entirely new - paradigm shifts never prove to be quite as 'massive" as they might first appear. 'It is only if we pretend to stand on a firm, universal, principled and logical ground that we can discard an entire tradition" (Grondin, 1995, p. 16). Otherwise, we must rest content with making moves which are slightly less radical and settle for a finite form of transcendence. As Grondin puts it, [hjermeneutical thinking disbelieves the notion that there could be something like a completely new era in philosophy. We are too finite, too dependent on tradition and the work of history (U'irkungsgeschichte) to entertain the utopian and perhaps dangerous hope o f a new beginning in the realm of thought. Indeed such a rupture would disregard the achievements of the past out of which contemporary thought continues to nourish itself (Grondin, 1995. p. 17). Grondin concludes that the truly universal character of hermenetics lies precisely in this admission and acceptance o f human finitude. That '[t]he metaphysical claim o f Gadamer's hermeneutics only renews the universal or ontological claim o f philosophy, while shunning its theological (or ultimately grounding) foundation" (Grondin, 1995, p. 18). Still, critics like Caputo suggest otherwise namely, that there is or must be a dogmatic assumption behind the appeal to tradition. Is this warrented? Or, is this critic merely assuming something that Gadamer does not? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 218 In many respects, Caputo's arguments suggest that Gadamer's position depends upon an Implicit acceptance o f the metaphysical distinction between a more or less stable and objective meaning and its ceaselessly changing expression" (Caputo, 1987, p.111). But, he offers no textual evidence for this, and Gadamer's entire work has been devoted to overcoming those sorts o f dichotomies or towards blurring the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism. While Caputo's criticism presupposes dualisms like these, I would maintain that Gadamer does not, for nowhere does he indicate that meaning can exist outside of its particular concrete expression. This is the very point o f conflating understanding and application, for there can be no access to 'fneaning per se" or 'truth-initself ' any more than we can lay claim to the apprehension o f 'facts-in-themselves" (be they empirical or historical). According to Gadamer, 'Understanding always involves something like applying the text to be understood to the interpreter's present situation" (Gadamer, 1994, p.308). Ironically, it is precisely this conflation of 'frieaning" and Significance" that leaves Gadamer open to charges o f relativism and subjectivism by 'heo-Schleiermacheans" like Hirsch. By failing to allow for any stable content or objective truths and rejecting the separation o f understanding and application, Gadamer's position is deemed nihilistic (see part 2 below). So, although a text, particularly a classical one, may represent a universal for hermeneutic understanding, it is a purely formal universal. One which is devoid of any actual meaning or content until the questions which it raises are taken up by the interpreter and applied to some concrete situation. As with Aristotle's idea of natural law, this kind o f universal has 'bnly a critical function. No dogmatic use can be made of it" (Gadamer, 1994, p.320). Yet, this is what Caputo's claim suggests - i.e., that Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 219 Gadamer accepts some notion of 'bbjective meaning" that will serve as a substantive criterion for determining which particular 'Expressions" of it are correct or incorrect in a categorical fashion. In other words, Caputo is construing the process o f interpretation as analogous to an act o f subsumption whereby a particular interpretation o f a text may be subsumed under some notion o f 'the text itself' and in accordance with " the tradition." So, is it really Gadamer who is manifesting a pretension to ultimate meaning or objectivity in interpretation? It is precisely this notion of interpretation, found in 'legal dogmatics," that Gadamer says is 'Untenable" (Gadamer, 1995, p.330). Only if one equates universality with ultimacy, assumes that meaning and its expression are distinct or separable, and identifies the authoritative function of tradition with something dogmatically authoritarian, are Caputo's charges plausible. Again, it is just this insistence - that we must recognize the search for an Anfhebung or ultimate foundations as unending, along with the willingness to abandon all hope of objectivity in interpretation -that has led other critics to accuse Gadamer o f the most crude forms relativism. As I will show below, philosophers like Hirsch and Soffer are not concerned that Gadamer is insufficiently radical," as Caputo maintains, but that his hermeneutics is radically subjective to the extent that it undermines the conditions for the possibility o f truth in interpretation altogether. Yet, in many respects, both forms of criticism share fundamental assumptions that Gadamer has already explicitly rejected. However, before I turn to these directly, I think it is worth considering what another critic has to say regarding Gadamer's "conservatism." Georgia Wamke suggests that it is Gadamer's 'knticipation of completeness," among other things, that gives a conservative spin to his account of hermeneutical understanding. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 220 This concept represents Gadamer's version of a principle of charity or rationality. Specifically, the interpreter assumes that the text constitutes a coherent whole - that the parts will cohere with the whole in such a way that truths will emerge, and that these truth makes an authoritative claim upon the interpreter. This is, in essence, how enabling prejudices or Heidegger's fore-structure o f the understanding function. But, according to Wamke the question is, what constitutes the truth o f the text as a whole? She herself does not make clear what she takes this to mean, but seems to assume that it involves some inherent or "Essential" content in the text itself. In other words, that one must accept, at least provisionally, what the text says explicitly and assume that he has something to learn from it. Wamke refers to Mein Kampf 'm order to illustrate her point that there is a danger in even temporarily accepting the text as authoritative. I f we have to assume the normative authority and possible truth o f a work in order to allow for an adequate understanding o f it, how can we possibly learn to criticize it?" (Wamke, 1987, p.90) Her concern is that texts like this, whose primary aim is to spread some pernicious form of propaganda, will be accepted without reservation or question. Still, what kind o f 'truth" is she referring to here? The implicit presupposition is that the truth of Mein Kampf would be constituted by what Hitler himself intended. Yet, this appeal to authorial intent is one that Gadamer explicitly rejects as irrelevant, if not impossible. Instead, if one accepts the hermeneutic priority of the question (discussed above), then it is not so much what a work or its author attempts to tell us directly that forces the interpreter to confront his own prejudices as well as those of the work but the questions which are raised in the context o f reading it. To reiterate: We are confronted with certain questions to the extent that we are Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221 challenged or provoked by the answers proposed by a text. And these arise only insofar as we are already engaged in dialogue. Like facts, which are inacessible or meaningless in themselves and always call for interpretation, questions too can only emerge in an actual encounter with a text or in conversation with another. The historically effected interpreter is one who allows herself to be challenged and risks her own prejudices, thus enabling a fusion of horizons to take place. This is a fusion which occurs at the level o f questioning, not to the extent that substantive responses can be given or are passively assimilated. "Adequate understanding can only be achieved if one ventures into the realm of questioning. A questioning which is not always stated, or cannot be fully articulated, but which is nevertheless essential to the penetration of what is said" (Grondin, 1995, p. 14). Thus, one need never '£ive up the attempt to learn from Mein Kampf ' as Wamke implies we must (Wamke, 1987, p.90). Certainly, I may not be interested in reading such a work, but this does not mean that no one has anything to learn from it. Most likely, if one has any degree of historical awareness and human sensitivity, what he will learn from it will be very different, if not altogether contrary, to whatever Hitler himself may have intended which, to me, seems to be a one good reason for ignoring authorial intent (see part 2 below). Last, as indicated above, there is no need to assume that understanding requires a grasp of the 'text as a whole," as Wamke suggests. There is no ideal of the whole truth being appealed to in Gadamer's hermeneutics, for such would depend upon a static conception of the object of interpretation and this is not the case with human artifacts like texts. Again, the anticipation of completeness is simply that -an anticipation that the work is coherent and intelligible. But this does not mean that inconsistencies Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 222 might not become evident, either within the text or between different interpretations of it. However, mediating between conflicting claims, or apparent contradictions, is precisely what interpretation entails. So, again, we find Gadamer appealing to a regulative ideal here rather than a substantive one - one which not only allows for but facilitates the kind of openness that is essential for interpretation. There is another criticism that Wamke levels at Gadamer with regard to his conception o f reason. Specifically, she claims that Gadamer's hermeneutics merely presents us with 'h new form of subjectivism" (Wamke, 1987, p.91). However, her concern here differs from those below who fear that such a subjectivism sows the seeds o f relativism. Wamke, like Caputo, sees Gadamer as not going 'far enough" in his historicization o f reason. What disturbs her is that Gadamer does not give up 'the notion of a reason that can transcend conventional bounds" but instead 'tries to preserve it while recognizing the demands of history" (Wamke, 1987, p. 166). In a similar vein, Caputo says that Gadamer merely 'bffers us the most liberal possible version o f a fundamentally conservative idea" (Caputo, 1987, p. 115). Wamke too is accusing Gadamer of being a conservative subjectivist that 'fetains something like a deabsolutized Hegelian conception [of reason]" (Wamke, 1987, p. 165). Following this line o f argument, one might also characterize him as a Cartesian who manifests a sensitivity to history. But, are these the only possibilities -i.e., either Gadamer is a Hegelian without the absolute or a historically conscious Cartesian? Is this what is generally meant by those who label him conservative? To respond to this, we need to again consider what Gadamer says about reason, and about its relation to tradition? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 223 While Gadamer denies that reason and authority are necessarily antithetical, arguing that authority is something that must be earned and depends less on obedience than on knowledge (Gadamer, 1994, p.279), he spends more time critiquing others' conceptions o f reason than he does developing a positive one of his own (as is also the case with tradition). But perhaps there are good reasons for this. Gadamer himself asks whether his own attempt at historical hermeneutics has succeeded in freeing itself 'from the metaphysical claims o f reflective philosophy." In other words, he puts the same question to himself that he levies at others; and, he acknowledges 'that absolute reflection is powerfully compelling and admit[s] that Hegel's critics never really succeeded in breaking its magic spell" (Gadamer.. 1994, p.342). Presumably, Gadamer includes his own hermeneutics in this and is no more immune to what Grondin calls 'Dasein's dream" than anyone else. The dream, manifest in our yearning or need for something ultimate or for some firm ground, is something that no human subject can escape entirely. Whether that ultimacy lies in the kind of stable foundation sought by Descartes, or in the final culmination of the development o f reason in Absolute Spirit that Hegel hoped for, the fundamental denial o f human finitude and the refusal to confront our limitations remains the same. So, must not Gadamer be guilty o f this too9 If this implies that Gadamer, like any other human being, still wishes for ultimate answers (or is searching for an Aujhebung, as Caputo insists) and is never quite content to live imprisoned within his own temporal conditions but continues to project himself beyond them by testing the limits that confront him, then, yes, I would say he is guilty as charged. But this can be said of any human being who, as Dasein, must find a means o f living within the tension between limitation and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 224 transcendence. To me, this is simply evidence of what it means to be human - that is, to forever wish for the unconditioned despite, or maybe because of, our fundamental conditionedness or sense of limitation and to continue to transcend ourselves immanently if not ultimately. Moreover, how can one even expect to recognize their limitations until he actually runs up against them in some concrete context. Still, dreaming for the impossible is not the same as seeking it or believing that such is attainable. Aristotle also distinguishes between the object o f wishing and that o f deliberation and choice - namely, that we can wish for anything but we only deliberate about matters that are in our power to change. Gadamer uses 'Hegel's polemic against Kant's 'thing-in-itself " to make a further point about the nature o f reason and practical kinds of reflection (Gadamer, 1994, p.342). Specifically, if reason sets limits to itself, it has already effectively gone beyond those limits. For '[w]hat makes a limit a limit always also includes knowledge of what is on both sides o f it" (Gadamer, 1994, p.343). Thus, to place limits on an inquiry before actually proceeding to inquire is an almost absurd undertaking, and certainly not conducive to the kind o f openness that is required for genuine understanding. For it implies that one really does know what is on 'both sides." Is this the kind of claim Gadamer is making? Is he, like Hegel, suggesting that he himself has reached the state o f absolute consciousness? Or, like Descartes, claiming to have reached truth by singlehandedly attending to the contents o f his consciousness alone? In his article on 'Historical Transformations of Reason," Gadamer notes that [hjuman reason occurs in manifold forms."69 Thus, he is not explicitly appealing to some singular or 69 Hans-Georg Gadamer. "Historical Transformations o f Reason," Rationality To-Dav. ed. Theodore F. Geraetes. (Ottawa: University'of Ottawa Press, 1979) p. 13. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 225 monolithic conception o f rationality. Rather, he traces reason's development and acknowledges that the tradition we have inherited from the Greeks forces us to taise again and again the question of the Logos, o f the rationality o f being itself' (Gadamer, 1979, p.9). According to his research, there have been three basic attempts to respond to this problem: The first answer is Leibniz's subordination of the new science under the o<d metaphysics: the second. Hegel's renewal o f the Greek Logos in attempting to discover reason in nature as well as in history on the basis of a universal 'logic'; and the third is the attempt o f our century to break through the subjectivist approach of modem philosophy and to restrain the primacy o f self-consciousness in favor o f a broader concept of reason and being (Gadamer. 1979. p.9). In addition, Gadamer insists that we cannot completely escape the particular form in which this question occurs for us today. Specifically, the challenge for contemporary philosophers is to strive to break away from subjectivism as he indicates above. That this is the task which we, as historically aware interpreters, must face up to seems clear. But, whether or not we can actually achieve it is another matter. And nowhere does it appear as though this is an achievement to which Gadamer has explicitly laid claim. On the contrary, he admonishes us to take up this task for ourselves and offers us hope by reminding us that, [ejach experience that breaks the Egocentrism of the individual by recognition, solidarity, or love, stands in the bright space o f what we have to justify by thinking, and in front of which we justify' ourselves. Science may dedicate its investigatory efforts to the world o f nature, and to the social life which carries us on, as well as to the historical worlds which are transmitted to us:--philosophical thought will participate in all the different forms o f human rational creativity, not with the despotic superiority o f a system of concepts which integrates everything in its framework, but with the thoughtfulness o f someone, who never knows totally and definitely what he knows (Gadamer. 1979. p. 14). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 226 What this seems to suggest is that philosophy should remain a primarily second-order and critical discipline. In other words, the suggestion is that philosophers must be content to reflect upon the claims of the sciences, be they natural or social, and raise questions concerning their methods and conclusions, all the while resisting the temptation to seek ultimate answers or provide firm foundations and reminding the rest o f us o f what we do not know. The prejudices which may presently constitute who were are and how we think are not brought to the fore or made evident until they are challenged by those o f another. The same has been said of limits, for what else are prejudices but the particular limitations which prevent us from reaching an ideal state o f absolute consciousness or complete openness. Like questions, which also circumscribe or limit certain possibilites while opening up a space for others to emerge, prejudices enable understanding to take place. Without prejudices and questions, experience and understanding would be impossible. This is the sense in which they may be said to be authoritative, for what else inspires a challenge or confrontation except that which is taken seriously or authoritatively. Only once one has effectively risked her prejudices and found reasons by which they may be defended or rejected, can she say that she has understood something. This is what makes dialectical understanding an 'fevent," in which one must actively participate, and enables it to maintain the critical aspect o f appropriation. In sum, I see nothing inherently conservative in this position. Rather, it seems to me that it merely reflects an acknowledgment o f the historical conditions which affect us all and of which we can and should be critical, even though we cannot completely transcend or break away from them. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 227 In conclusion, Gadamer may not be able to entirely avoid the charge o f 'Subjectivism," insofar as undei standing will always involve the projected meanings of the interpreter and any objectivistic ideals have been rejected as chimerical. However, what prevents this historical conception of reason and understanding from lapsing into a merely arbitrary form o f subjectivism? What checks are placed on the interpretive process which will stop it from becoming entirely arbitrary? And, what specific model o f objectivism is Gadamer responding to? The question remains as to how faithful this model of interpretation really is to the 'things-themselves" or the Sache selbst, and what these terms might imply for Gadamer's hermeneutics. I am now led to raise these questions because I have been arguing that Gadamer is sufficiently radical, open and undogmatic. But there are also those who claim that this means he has gone 'too far." Is this what we are left with then? Must we choose between these two conclusions? Specifically, do we have to accept that either Gadamer is irredeemably conservative in his outlook due to his appeals to tradition and its authoritative value, or he is guilty of an unmitigated relativism because he valorizes prejudice and insists on the historicity of human consciousness? (2) Hirsch on Authorial Intent and Objectivity in Interpretation What is the ultimate aim of interpretation according to Hirsch, and why does he object to Gadamer's model of understanding? First, he argues that the novelty o f Gadamer's hermeneutics is not to be found in its central thesis namely, that '[n]o method can transcend the interpreter's own historicity - but that Gadamer 'introduces new concepts Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 228 and gives old words new meanings."70 For example, Vorurteil is not to be avoided but welcomed; interpretation does not require the neutralization of one's personal horizon but involves a process of Horizontverschmelzung, the history of interpretation is a history o f application--a Wirkungsgeschichte (Hirsch, 1967, pp.245-246). Hirsch also recognizes Gadamer's debt to Heidegger but finds that, ultimately, his theory o f interpretation merely amounts to skepticism regarding historical knowledge that long predated Sein und Zeit" (Hirsch, 1967, p.247). And it is precisely this kind o f Skepticism" or Radical historicism" that precludes any possibility o f objectivity in interpretation, notwithstanding Gadamer's compelling appeals to 'hew" concepts and meanings. Hirsch says that despite 'the positive embracing of historically distorted knowledge as something 'real' and 'phenomenal' in contrast to academic pseudo- knowledge which is 'abstract' and 'constructed,'" Gadamer's hermeneutics 'tnay be more destructive in its implications than he had reckoned" (Hirsch, 1967, p.247). He also insists that Gadamer's theory of understanding 'fcontains inner conflicts and inconsistencies" as well. So, what evidence does he offer to support these critical remarks regarding the insidious ramifications and internal contradictions of a Gadamerian hermeneutics? And, how might Gadamer respond? Hirsch takes up the latter point first by pointing to Gadamer's notion of the Sache as the locus o f meaning "which, while independent o f author and reader, is shared by both" (Hirsch, 1967, p.247). But, what this supposedly entails is an identification o f 'fneaning and subject matter - as though meaning were an autonomous entity quite independent of 70 E.D. Hirsch. Validity in Interpretation. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p.245. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 229 consciousness;" or, differently put, 'that textual meaning can somehow exist independently of individual consciousness" (Hirsch, 1967, p.248). In other words, Hirsch is accusing Gadamer o f not only reifying the text but of hypostatizing its meaning - an absurd move that I have been arguing all along he does not make. Moreover, how is this even plausible given Gadamer's dialogical model o f understanding which insists on the essentiality of the players to the game? For meanings can only emerge in an encounter or 'fconversation" between text and interpreter which presupposes the activity o f human consciousness. It appears as though the grounds for this criticism lies in Gadamer's notion o f the text as autonomous - namely, as detached or separable from its author or original audience - and that this, according to Hirsch, serves only to reduce it to Its intelligible significance" which is effectively to render it indeterminate (Hirsch, 1967, pp.248-249). Specifically, to view the text as an autonomous piece of language and interpretation as an infinite process is really to deny that the text has any determinate meaning, for a determinate entity is what it is and not another thing, but an inexhaustible array of possibilities is an hypostatization that is nothing in particular at all (Hirsch. 1967. p.249). Who is being inconsistent here? On the one hand, Hirsch accuses Gadamer o f reifying the text's meaning rendering it an independent being yet, on the other hand, he says that this is a determinate entity which is unintelligible or indeterminate. Perhaps this can be cleared up if one reminds Hirsch not to conflate the actual language o f the text, or the written word, with the meanings which may or may not be attributed to them. Isn't it then possible to argue that the language of the text is relatively determinate (certainly the choice o f words and style found in Plato's dialogues are not my own) while its significance or meaning remains much more open or indeterminate without contradicting oneself? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 230 Apparently not, according to Hirsch, who claims that Gadamer attempts to get around this 'disconcerting" and, ultimately, 'hihilistic" conclusion by introducing the concept of tradition (Hirsch, 1967, pp.249-250). That, in order to determine both in principle and in practice what a text means and does not mean, Gadamer refers to tradition as providing the ultimate criterion for truth in interpretation. When Hirsch refers to tradition as normative for understanding, o r 'h principle for resolving disagreements between contemporary readers," it becomes immediately clear that his conception o f it is one-dimensional, static and monolithic. 'The reader who follows the path o f tradition is right, and the reader who leaves this path is wrong" (Hirsch, 1967, p.250). This position initially ignores the possibility that there may be more than one 'tradition" operating in any act of interpretation, that there may be many 'paths'' to follow some o f which may intersect and some of which may diverge, and that Gadamer is more concerned with exploring the various possibilities manifest in better and worse interpretations than with finding any definitive or ultimately 'fcorrect" one. Hirsch is invoking an ideal o f tradition which fails to recognize its complexity, richness or, in some cases, internal conflicts. This is not unlike Caputo's claim that Gadamer employs "''the tradition" as normative for understanding, which prevents him from taking the more radical Heideggerian turn away from metaphysics. However, Hirsch is concerned that Gadamer is already too radical - i.e., that because Gadamer's conception lacks a 'hierarchical structure," it 'fcannot in fact save the day" and leads to a nihilistic relativism. In other words, Hirsch is disturbed that Gadamer's putative ideal cannot do what Hirsch himself wants it to do - i.e., 'function as a stable, normative concept, since it is in fact a Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 231 changing, descriptive concept." An odd claim especially when considered in conjunction with Caputo's charge that tradition represents an 'fetemal truth" or h power play and [that] its unity [is] something enforced by the powers that be" (Caputo, 1987, p. 112). However, according to Hirsch, it is precisely because tradition lacks any unity or authoritative power that the same problem has merely 'trapped up again in another form." Specifically, 'the problem o f determining the true character of a changing tradition is the same as the problem o f determining the true character o f a changing meaning" (Hirsch, 1967, p.250). On this point, I would emphatically agree. For it coincides with what I have been arguing above in my defense of Gadamer against Caputo's and Wamke's charges o f conservativism. Since any act o f understanding involves mediation or dialogue, the 'true character" of any human artifact will remain an open question. The problem of the indeterminacy of universals, or what Nussbaum calls 'Ultimate particulars" (whether these are represented by texts, traditions, or values), will not go away. Rather, indeterminacy of varying degrees is endemic to human activities and relations where mediation between the universal and the particular is required. MacIntyre makes virtually the same point with regard to the incommensurability of values and the conflict that one finds within traditions themselves. Since, in so many cases, there is no ultimate principle to which one can appeal in order to discern which values should be realized over others, so too do we have no definitive means of accounting for conflict and change in something (specifically, 'tradition" or 'truth," even human persons themselves) that is inherently dynamic. But, once again, must we then infer that 'Anything goes?" If we deny that tradition has any such essence or 'true character," insofar as it is not a singular or static object and does not Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232 possess the authority of an omnipotent or omnipresent being, does this necessarily imply that it too is nothing or that the term itself is meaningless? Is Gadamer's hermeneutics really as nihilistic as Hirsch indicates? This issue, I think, has already been sufficiently addressed in Chapter III where I have attempted to provide some positive or determinate meaning for Gadamer's concept o f tradition without reifying it. Understanding, whether the 'bbject" is a text or a tradition, always involves mediating between what is determinate and what is indeterminate, or between particulars and universals. For both traditions as well as texts are limited by an historical horizon, and might best be described as dynamic heuristic structures which entail not only an openness to various possibilities of meaning but also some circumscription o f their potentiality. As long as texts and traditions are not construed as static, objectively present things, they will always retain some degree of openness or indeterminacy insofar as their truth-value is manifold. Both possess a range of potential meaning which can only be definitively or concretely determined in a particular context or with reference to a specific situation, and such truths will always be provisional or relative. Moreover, ultimate principles of method or truth criteria cannot be appealed to a priori, but the reasons or arguments offered in support of a particular interpretation can always be further examined, criticized, or evaluated retrospectively. The fact that this too will depend on one's prejudices or pre-understandings cannot be avoided, if one accepts Gadamer's historicization of both subject and object; or, that interpreters as well as the texts or traditions they seek to understand are vital historical beings (see below.) However, this open-endedness is not something that Hirsch is willing to embrace insofar as he asserts Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 233 that without a firmly established norm, "we are left with the consequence that a text means nothing in particular at all" (Hirsch, 1967, p.251). I don't see that this necessarily follows. Instead, I have continuously argued that Gadamer's model o f understanding leads to the conclusion that a text may legitimately possess a manifold of good interpretations, and that this can only be determined in the context of an actual situation or in terms o f what the work means to a particular interpreter and how she applies it to some specific set of circumstances. Where Caputo is critical of Gadamer's notion of tradition because it functions too effectively as an authoritative norm, Hirsch sees it as failing in this very same regard. Thus, Hirsch insists that the only way a hermeneutic nihilism can be conquered is to separate understanding and application which exactly what Gadamer refuses to do. Specifically, Hirsch concludes that Gadamer fails to the extent that he overlooks the distinction between 'the meaning of a text and the significance o f that meaning to a present situation" (Hirsch, 1967, p.255). It is through this distinction that Hirsch takes on the problem of historicism and seeks to maintain some degree o f objectivity as a means of guarding against the kind o f nihilistic relativism of which he finds Gadamer culpable. Hirsch's position amounts to saying that understanding and application are distinct and separable, which is something that Gadamer expressly denies. Moreover, Hirsch claims that the meaning of a text is constituted solely by what the author intended, while the significance of this meaning is determined by the way in which the interpreter applies it to a present situation. Lastly, Hirsch argues that it is wrong to view the text as an autonomous piece of language and interpretation as an infinite process and seems confused when Gadamer suggests that meanings are and are Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 234 not repeatable - that 'the repetition is not really a repetition and the identity is not really an identity" (Hirsch, 1967, p.252). Where Hirsch sees an internal contradiction, I see an essential paradox of human understanding. As human artifacts or representations o f human thought, texts are more like living beings than inanimate objects or self-identical things. Thus, any criterion of repeatability would be inappropriate here (as I've extensively argued above). What Hirsch sees as a choice between identifying the text as a determinate thing, which is in possession o f an unchanging meaning, or regarding it as indeterminate hothing" which is therefore unintelligible is, for Gadamer, the very space within which understanding can take place. For it belongs to the essence o f the hermeneutical circle that texts remain open to various possibilities of interpretation as well as limited in specific ways. And it is precisely because of this that dialogue may ensue and meanings will emerge. Understanding may mean understanding differently each and every time, so that strict identity is impossible in principle as well as in practice, but the subject matter (Sache) is not entirely disntict and new nor arbitrarily construed. Finally, the text's autonomy is also crucial if a genuine dialogue is to occur between the work and the interpreter. For if the text were not detached from its place o f origin and its author's intentions, then it could not be rendered meaningful for someone who may be differently situated. (This 'productive" notion o f 'distanciation" will be further developed below in the context of Ricoeur's critique.) Hirsch considers one last possibility which might save Gadamer's hermeneutics from its nihilistic implications. Again, his singular concern is that, because Gadamer does not provide any ultimate criterion and even claims that there is no such principle or final court Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 235 o f appeal either in theory or in practice, a text can mean virtually anything which is tantamount to saying that it means nothing. Moreover, Hirsch believes that it is because Gadamer himself would want to avoid this, that he attempts to broker a 'fcompromise" which he calls a fusion o f horizons (Horizontverschmelzung) (Hirsch, 1967, pp.253-254). But here too, Gadamer's attempted solution turns out, on analysis, to exemplify the very difficulty it was designed to solve. How can an interpreter fuse two perspectives-his own and that of the text-unless he has somehow appropriated the original perspective and amalgamated it with his own? How can a fusion take place unless the things to be fused are made actual, which is to say. unless the original sense o f the text has been understood? (Hirsch. 1967, p.254) Hirsch continues to tenaciously hang onto three assumptions which Gadamer has long ago given up - namely, that there is some unchanging particular meaning (or 'briginal sense') which can be ascribed to the written words or 'text itself," that this is determined by the author's own intentions, and that these inteded meanings are ultimately accessible to the interpreter regardless o f any historical, cultural or personal distance. Since I have already discussed these presuppositions at length, and the ways in which Gadamer seeks to overcome them, I will not belabor the point here. However, it is worth noting that these might be the reasons why Gadamer and Hirsch seem to lack a common language or vocabulary, and that this impasse is traceable to whether or not one accepts a Heideggerian ontology - specifically, Heidegger's reconstruction of subjectivity as inherently finite and historical. Hirsch suggests as much himself when he says that, 'tt]his kind o f historicism, like the psychologism to which it is intimately related, is not a theory that is capable of empirical confirmation or falsification" (Hirsch, 1967, p.42). I would concede to Hirsch on this point as well. As I too believe that there is not even any point o f Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 236 agreement here as to what would constitute evidence or the lack thereof, and their conceptions of truth fundamentally differ. Thus, for the most part, one either accepts or rejects the claims of historicism. Perhaps this is why it appears that Hirsch and Gadamer are Speaking" different languages or 'talking" at cross-purposes, insofar as they do not share similar concerns, aims or ontological premises. While Gadamer is speaking the Heideggerian 'dialect" o f human finitude and historicity, and refers to truth as a form o f disclosure or as that which is concretely relevant to an actual situation; Hirsch still speaks the 'language" of the Enlightenment and looks for objective truth as that which corresponds to authorial intent. Hirsch may continue to hold onto 'Dasein's dream" as though it were a realistic ideal; whereas Gadamer and his defenders may secretly wish for this kind of clarity and certainty but recognize that actually pursuing such a phantom would serve only to preclude so many other meaningful possibilities. So, how does Hirsch justify accusing Gadamer of dogmatism? What makes his position any less doctrinal? Specifically, Hirsch maintains that Gadamer's historicism reflects a Simple" or 'dogmatic" acceptance of Heidegger's ontology of finitude, and that his defenders hold to its basic tenets 'fcs to a religion" (Hirsch, 1967, p.44). Why are those who proceed from the assumption that human beings are constituted by their histories and reject a prepositional or correspondence theory of truth guilty o f a credulous dogmatism; while those who hold to transcendental ideals are supposedly being objective or impartial? Isn't this indeed a viciously circular argument -i.e., that one can only be undogmatic to the degree that one is objective which means assuming an completely unprejudiced point of view? Thus, objectivism simply validates itself and denies that it is in any way prejudiced -one is then Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 237 only objective or critical to the extent that he accepts the possibility o f objectivity in interpretation. In sum, I do not agree that allowing for degrees o f indeterminacy leads inexorably to nihilism in interpretation any more than Aristotle's relativistic conception of virtue precludes the possibility o f an ethics. Moreover, strictly positivistic or logical principles (like that o f non-contradiction, identity and repeatability) have no place in human affairs. An individual human being does not remain identical from year to year, or even from day to day, and yet we have no problem recognizing him or her as the 'Same" person over time. A 'logic o f things" illegitimately applied actually creates more intractable difficulties than it may hope to solve. Not everything is permitted simply because one denies a transcendent or 'God's-eye" point o f view by accepting the historicity thesis. Reasons and justification must always be offered which takes us beyond blind faith and dogmatism. I cannot 'hiake a text say" anything I want or force it to bend in accordance with my whimsical desires. It would be absurd to assert, for example, that Kant defends moral relativism or that Platonism is merely another version of materialism. Nonetheless, it may be said that Gadamer's hermeneutics reflects a 'prejudice" for finitude and historicity over and against scientific objectivity, or for truth as contextualized meaning as opposed to method and certainty. It may be said that this is indicative o f a basic difference in values, or that it reflects a concern with distinct types o f questions and aims. In other words, philosophers like Hirsch begin from the assumption that objectivity or validity in interpretation is to be valued and that uncovering authorial intent is a worthy goal; whereas Gadamer would insist that these are chimerical ideals and, instead, that genuine understanding means applying something to one's situation or rendering it Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238 relevant to the present. Is there no way then to mediate between these two positions? Do they both start from basic premises and values which are so radically distinct that there is no space for common ground or dialogue? Gail Soffer who, while sympathetic to Hirsch and critical of Gadamer, offers a mitigated version of what objectivity entails (one which is more sensitive to historical effects and personal differences) and considers authorial intent as remaining a valid aim o f interpretation though on different grounds. (3) Soffer on Authorial Intent and the Ethical Implications of Gadamer's Hermeneutics Soffer is disturbed that Gadamer claims a universal status for his account o f understanding and interpretation. Specifically, she argues that by making textual interpretation as Spiel the model for understanding in general, Gadamer ignores what is essential to living conversation - namely, empathy (Einfithlimg) and respect for the speaker's intended meaning. Thus, she argues that a better paradigm for hermeneutics is one which is closest to a living dialogue -i.e., one which attempts to preserve, as much as possible, the author's original meaning. While I would agree with Soffer that empathy and intended meaning should not be ignored in the context o f interpersonal communicaton, I would still concur with Gadamer by maintaining that they are ineffective and ultimately irrelevant when it comes to interpreting texts or other human artifacts. But, Soffer proceeds to question whether Gadamer's paradigm is universally valid in the case of written works by arguing that, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. there does not seem to be a single mode of understanding, but rather that both the Gadamerian and the traditional hermeneutical models are phenomenologically accurate in certain circumstances. [And, m]uch depends upon the aim, background knowledge, and attitude o f the interpreter.71 She also insists that it is traditional hermeneutics that attempts to reconstruct the intended meaning of the author through empathy (Einfulung) and not via any Romantic or Schleiermachean notion o f 'divination." On the one hand, Soffer is sympathetic to Hirsch insofar as she considers the attempt to reconstruct original meaning a legitimate aim of interpretation, at least in principle, although in practice it may not be fully realized. However, unlike Hirsch, she admits that this need not be the aim of all forms of understanding and that there are degrees of accuracy in such reconstruction. Nonetheless, she finds Gadamer's paradigm o f play (Spiel) 'hn 'over-essentializing o f the phenomena." 'For as we all know, language is not simply dialogue, and dialogue is not as Gadamer conceives it" (Soffer, 1994, pp.45-46). Moreover, she insists that if we instead follow the model of a living conversation, we will undoubtedly recognize that 'the thoughts of the other" retain an autonomy of their own which means that they are in no way determined by or dependent on the interpreter's own projections or prejudices. As she puts it, in a face-to-face encounter the 'bbject" of interpretation - namely, 'the thoughts o f the other" - 'has a being and a temporality distinct from the being and temporality o f my apprehensions of it; even though my access to the former is always mediated by the latter."72 Because the access to intended meanings is always mediated by our own 71 Soffer, Gail, "Is Language a Game?: Phenomenological Reflections on lerstehen and Einfiihlung in Gadamer." (Etudes Phenomenologjques. No. 20, 1994), p.56. 72 Gail Soffer. "Gadamer, Hermeneutics, and Objectivity in Interpretation." (Praxis International. Vol. 12, No. 3, October 1992), p.239. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 240 preunderstandings to some degree, we cannot expect to achieve the kind o f strict identity or repeatability that Hirsch is after. Nonetheless, Soffer continues to objectify or reify meaning insofar as she maintains a relatively strict separation between 'the noematic side," or 'tneaning intended by the other person," and 'the subjective or noetic side" which is represented by 'tny apprehension of the meaning intended by the other" (Softer, 1992, p.239). In other words, although she might not defend Hirsch's claim that understanding the intentions of another must always precede any application of such, she does accept the distinction as a basic principle o f interpretation and as an essential feature of 'living dialogue." So, while she would accept the historicity thesis with regards to the subject or interpreter, she is concerned about the implications of applying it to the object of interpretation: Indeed, if the object of interpretation (e.g., the intention o f the other) presented itself as having the same historicity as the interpretation, then the phenomenological basis for the distinction between noema and noesis (object and subject) would collapse, consciousness would lose its intentionality, its quality of being directed at something other than itself, and phenomenologically considered, there would be no object at all (Soffer. 1992. p.239). But isn't this the very dichotomy (between subjectivity and objectivity) that Gadamer, under the influence of Hegel as well as Heidegger, has been questioning all along? Although Soffer claims that this distinction 'fcannot be rejected as a remnant o f a surpassed Cartesian dualism," that appears to be exactly what Gadamer is doing when he invokes play as a paradigm of hermeneutic understanding (Soffer, 1992, p.239). Moreover, the 'bbject" of interpretation for Gadamer is not the intentions or thoughts o f another, although it must be something "other." The question then is, what is it? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 241 I have argued above that Gadamer is undoubtedly concerned with truth but not with truth in a prepositional sense, yet its is precisely this sort which Soffer seems to be presupposing here insofar as she is holding to a correspondence ideal. In contrast, Gadamer's conception o f truth is much closer to Heidegger's notion o f disclosure, which is not only equated with what is meaningful in a particular context but will also always contain an element o f untruth. On the other hand, Soffer implies that authorial intent is something static and simple -i.e., something that one either truly grasps or does not grasp; or, at least, than one can come closer to apprehending it or fall short of doing so to varying degrees. But, if it is truth as meaning that one is seeking, then it is not something which is realized or demonstrated to the extent that it corresponds to some other object that is somehow 'hlready-out-there-now" (whether these "Objects" are facts, corporeal things, thoughts or intentions). Moreover, I would argue that even when one really is attempting to apprehend the thoughts o f another, Gadamer's model o f understanding and conception o f truth will still hold. For intentions and meanings (like values or 'Objects" of ethical inquiry) are uniquely human truths, and thus cannot be reduced to the level of objectively present beings or understood accordingly. Soffer is right to say that, "phenomenologically" speaking there thus is no 'Object" at all (no 'there" 'there" so to speak). For in this case the 'Object" is a Subject" -that is, language whether written or spoken is a manifestation o f human consciousness and has no ultimately determinate or autonomous identity o f its own. Does this mean then, as Soffer asserts, that consciousness "loses its intentionality" insofar as it is no longer "directed at something other than itself?" Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 242 Briefly stated, no. For my intentionality, as an interpreter, is directed towards whether or not I can find anything meaningful in what another says to me. It does not follow that because all understanding involves self-understanding, the object of that must simply be oneself. Questions give consciousness its intentionality, not predetermined objects. Certainly we ask questions about 'Something" in particular but, in the case of hermeneutic inquiry as I've indicated above, these particulars remain at least partially indeterminate. And, even if one did consider meanings and intentions as having a 'thing-like" status and allowed for their independence, she would still need to account for our access to them. In personal or intimate conversations where the thoughts o f another are of primary importance and to a greater extent independent of the interpreter, there is still a space for interpretation. Tn other words, despite a person's demands that we understand her 'from the inside out" there will always be a gap which can only be 'filled in" (presuming this is possible in principle) with one's own projected meanings or by applying the claims o f the other in a way that makes sense to onself. Otherwise, we would merely repeat verbatim or quote what our partner in conversation had said which would, in effect, constitute a failure to grasp its meaning. In sum, while I would agree with Soffer that the Gadamerian model o f play does not hold for all types o f dialogues, especially those of a more intimate nature, (Gadamer says as much himself when he distinguishes between 'Authentic" and 'Inauthentic" forms for the purpose o f distinguishing the human sciences or hermeneutical understanding from other kinds), I do think that 'bbjects" o f interpretation as well as "Subjects" are historical beings. Gadamer's notion of dialogue surely is not that of private discourse or interpersonal communication where the 'Interiority o f an individual psyche" is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 243 the issue (Soffer, 1994, p.33). Rather, his conception is much closer to what one might call academic discourse - for example, a Platonic dialogue or what Soffer calls inner deliberation" or a 'fconversation o f the soul" (Soffer, 1994, p.46). For in these cases, it is not clear where the speaker 'fends" and the interpreter 'begins" -that is, 'the players are absorbed into the dynamic of the interaction [and] experience a loss of the boundaries of the self' (Soffer, 1994: p.32). Platonic dialogues, especially the early or aporetic ones, manifest this dramatically in as much as Socrates' interlocutors are often left wondering 'What did I mean?" or end up merely 'hodding" in agreement with Socrates' own projections. Still, Soffer wonders to what extent play is 'Adequate as an account of language in 'outer' dialogue" or 'jjhenomenologically accurate at least in the case of written texts" (Soffer, 1994, pp.47 and 56 respectively). In conclusion, she states that it is 'bnly sometimes accurate in textual interpretation" (Soffer, 1994, p.60). So, how would she apply the 'traditional" hermeneutic model to written expression, and why is this approach preferable even if we cannot expect to actually reconstruct original meaning? Soffer acknowledges that, unlike a live encounter with another speaker, in textual interpretation the reader must 'Supply the 'voice'" and already has some 'Anticipation" of meaning which allows him to 'highlight" certain aspects o f what is written, thereby rendering determinate what is otherwise indeterminate (Soffer, 1994, p.56). However, she also notes that there is 'So much in the text [that] bespeaks unmediated alterity." For example, the language is not the reader's mode of expressing himself, the ideas are not his own. the train of thought proceeds irritatingly on its own way, ignorant of the reader's wishes or questions. One feels the presence of the author in and behind the words (Soffer. 1994. p.56). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 244 Though the extent o f this felt presence may vary, depending on the measure of historical distance, one's relation to the author or lack thereof, the existence of shared concerns or questions, and so forth, it nonetheless cannot be denied and should not be ignored. Thus, SofFer claims, if dialogue is a model for understanding in general, as Gadamer insists, textual interpretation ought to proceed more along the lines o f living dialogue where one feels obliged to grasp what the author has written as he intended it. In this way, a completely subjectivist reading, or the kind o f 'distortions" with which Hirsch is concerned, can be minimized. The problem is that access to this 'presence" or intentions is always mediated, which means that it will invariably include the 'presence" of the interpreter as well. SofFer acknowledges this herself when she says that 'there is no escape from the circle o f inner dialogue," and that "Self-projection is always present" (SofFer, 1994, p.59). But, she remains troubled that Gadamer '£ives too little weight to the wide range of degrees o f distortion or transformation of meaning that occur in textual interpretation" (SofFer, 1994, p.59). Her argument is, that even if complete identification with the author is impossible, one can still more or less approximate what his original intentions were. In other words, that although the interpreter 'tannot confirm the accuracy of his interpretation directly with the author...the closed circle of confirmation is widened through historical and biographical research" (SofFer, 1994, p.59). What about this? Is it not the case that the more one already knows about a particular person or issue, the more likely she is to understand it better? Isn't this consistent with Gadamer's own claims (following the Aristotelian model o f phronesis and Heidegger's fore-structure o f understanding) regarding the hermeneutical circle and paradoxical nature of knowledge? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 245 First, we must ask whether this is the kind o f 'Accuracy" with which Gadamer is concerned. I would insist that it is not, in as much as for Gadamer the aim o f understanding is not separate from the objective o f application. Specifically, the question for him is, how can this text be applied or understood in terms of the exigencies o f the present or under the conditions in which one lives today? To reiterate: Truth, for him, is not to be understood in terms of correspondence whether such is a question o f identity and repeatability or a matter of degree. SofFer, like Hirsch, seems to be presupposing what Nietzsche called the antiquarian view of history which seeks only to reconstruct the past without reference to any value it may or may not have for our contemporary world. (She admits this herself when she privileges "antiquarian historical research" below.) And, although she is not necessarily offering a singular prescription or proposing one method for all interpretation or types of understanding, she does say that a fundamental concern for original meaning would be more consistent with the conversational paradigm and is preferable because it does not depersonalize the other as Gadamer's hermeneutics does. Again, she argues that the traditional approach would involve looking for biographical information about the author, researching the cultural and historical conditions under which he lived, and engaging in the active use o f one's imagination. In this manner, the interpreter can 'yield a relatively vivid apprehension o f the author in his words" (SofFer, 1994, p.57, italics mine). This is not only consistent with face-to-face encounters but also shows that 'the function of language in reading is similar to its function in living speech" (SofFer, 1994, p.57). To stress this point in another essay, she argues that this same use of imagination can be of assistance in the reconstruction of historical events. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 246 For example, when we affirm that something "really"' happened in the past, an essential part of what we mean is that, e.g., if someone capable o f perceiving the event had been there, he or she would have witnessed it. This claim is in practice unverifiable. and yet it is precisely the counterfactual activity of the imagination that gives the experience o f something determinable and decidable, what 'really'' happened (e.g., something I would have seen if I had been there). [Moreover,] it should be emphasized that although these counterfactual claims contain certain idealizations, they do not posit a suprahuman transcendence (SofFer, 1992. p.252). But, we must ask, is this really what goes on when one is an eyewitness to an event? Is 'Seeing believing'? - that is, is being a first-hand witness to a past incident sufficient for the kind of objective knowledge? If so, then why are there often so many discrepancies among eyewitnesses? Even between two similarly situated spectators or well-respected historians, differences in interpretation will abound. Of course, one can again assert that attaining a factually accurate account will also be a matter o f degree. Still, let's suppose that it is at least possible to reconstruct historical events or verify experiential data to greater or lesser degrees of satisfaction, won't the same hermeneutical questions and issues arise? For instance, when one reads biographical or historical documents, there still remains a problem of interpretation even if reconstruction or repetition is the ideal aim. We cannot assume antecedently that all biographical accounts will be consistent, or that a relatively coherent or nearly complete picture of a particular event will emerge. On the contrary, in the former case where one strives to reconstruct the life o f another, she will often have to weed through various conflicting biographical and/or autobiographical accounts, and the only means of meditating between them will be in accordance with her own prejudices and anticipations of meaning. The same can be said o f historical data or the reclamation of some past state of affairs, as 'the facts" simply do not 'Speak" for themselves any more than a written text does So, even in those cases where one attempts Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 247 to discover 'What really happened," interpretation is called for or a 'Voice" must be supplied. There may be some degree of continuity as to how historical facts are represented or how an historical figure is characterized, but there will always be contradictory information as well and any congruity that is disclosed will most likely be due to the interpretive activity o f 'highlighting" certain things and discarding others. And, what else is highlighting if not the kind of creative interpretation that requires one to use her own imagination and prejudices in the anticipation of meaning? Moreover, if the use of one's own imagination is called for, then it is difficult to see how this would yield an apprehension of the author's meaning in his own words. Soffer's appeal to 'Imagination" and 'fcounterfactuals" above serves only to raise further questions, and reinforces Gadamer's position that interpretation is a truly creative activity that is inexorably dependent upon the preunderstandings of the interpreter. So, it is worth asking what kind of creativity is preferable? In what specific ways must the interpreter rely on her imagination, and to what extent is this possible or legitimate if the aim is the reconstruction of original meaning? Soffer does not explicitly state what she means by imagination, how it should be utilized, and in what manner should it be restricted. Certainly, the completely free or arbitrary use of imagination would be deemed illegitimate by Soffer as well as Gadamer, for this would yield a genuinely subjectivist or perhaps arbitrary interpretation. When Gadamer refers to the hermeneutical function of imagination, he says that '[i]t serves the ability to expose real, productive questions."73 That 'the real power o f hermeneutical 73 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Universality o f the Hermeneutical Problem," Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. David E. Linge. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 12. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable" (Gadamer, 1977, p. 13). But, he does not suggest that the questions themselves must somehow be 'bbjective" or independent o f one's anticipations or relation to the present. Rather, he acknowledges that, 'the scholar -even the natural scientist -is perhaps not completely free of custom and society and from all possible factors in his environment" (Gadamer, 1977, p. 13). This means that historians too, or anyone who is called upon to interpret phenomena, will be 'prejudiced" though not necessarily in a crudely subjectivist or capricious sense. What Gadamer is effectively saying is that, i t is not so much the 'laws o f ironclad inference' that present fruitful ideas to him [the scientist], but rather unforseen constellations that kindle the spark of scientific inspiration" (Gadamer, 1977, p. 13). So, even when it comes to natural science or the non-human phenomenal world, Gadamer holds to his Heideggerian conception o f truth and the notion of experience as Erfahnmg (i.e., as inherently negative). On the other hand, Soffer's appeal to imagination seems to place us back in the realm of Romantic hermeneutics and amidst the network of concepts and principles contained therein. In other words, the apparent differences between Soffer's and Gadamer's conception of imagination and its role in interpretation may be due to their distinct concepts of truth or ideas about the nature of experience. Facts or the phenomena themselves are not directly accessible, for there can be no objectivity or immediacy in apprehension if all understanding is mediated, as Gadamer consistently insists. Soffer too does not lay claim to such unmediated access in practice, nor does she maintain that experience is to be construed as Erlebnis, but she still insists on these ideals in principle. Moreover, Soffer appears to equate truth with the acontextual ideal o f correspondence, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 249 and separates truth in understanding from truth in application; whereas for Gadamer, it is identical with meaning, and the meaning o f something cannot be separated from its significance or applicability which means that truths can only be determined contextually. To try to transcend one's concrete conditions in order to understand another object, thought or person is not only impossible, but meaningless. How will it be meaningful for me to attempt to identify with the thoughts, feelings, intentions, and beliefs o f another if I have no point of reference to my own? How can the world in which I am immersed, the objects which surround me, or the words o f another be rendered significant if I am denied the use o f my own voice? How is any attempt at reconstruction, supposing for a moment that it is possible, going to end up being at all meaningful or fruitful? Returning to the traditional paradigm which strives to remain somewhat true to authorial intent, consider what Gadamer says about translation: Even there meaning must be 'tonsciously created by an explicit mediation" that i s undoubtedly not the norm in a conversation" (Gadamer, 1994, p.384, italics mine). So, who determines which words or phrases are significant or insignificant, who supplies the 'Voice," if the author himself is not present and on what grounds? Also, if one were an actual partner in the dialogue, is it not possible that the translator's or interpreter's assertions might be found true in ways which he had not foreseen? Further, isn't it even likely that some truths may emerge in the context o f the conversation which were initially contrary to his intentions? As MacIntyre has already said, conflict is endemic to all types o f narrative including traditions, and how else would one characterize history except as just that? -yet another narrative. Although Soffer does not say that intended meaning should always be the aim of interpretation, her position is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 250 not value-neutral any more than Gadamer's is. For I do not believe that any such 'Valuefree " perspective exists for human subjects (despite explicit protests to the contrary), or that normative principles of some sort are not operative when it comes to accounting for human actions and interactions. So, if imagination is a necessary element in any act of understanding, whose notion o f imagination is the better one? It is still not clear to me why Soffer prefers the traditional model or what advantages it offers. What values then is she implicitly or explicitly appealing to? Specifically, what is the source of Soffer's skepticism regarding the self-proclaimed "humanism" of Gadamer's hermenutics? Soffer maintains that insofar as Gadamer employs the paradigm o f play, he depersonalizes the 'Thou" which provides the basis for all T-Thou" relations. Or, differently stated, that Gadamer effectively removes the presence o f the human being as 'bther," and so cannot rightfully call himself a humanist. She states, 'fc>lay does not exist in the mind of the players, nor even depend upon them for its being, but rather itself determines them in their being." This means that 'jjlay is 'independent' and 'prior' in the sense that its spirit overtakes and governs the wills of the players" (Soffer, 1994, pp.BI- SS) 'The second crucial feature o f the model of language as Spiel is the way it recasts the I-Thou relation. . . [whereby] the I and the Thou become two aspects o f a deeper underlying unity" (Soffer, 1994, p .34). Thus, Soffer seems to wonder, where is the concretely human element in Gadamer's supposedly humanistic hermeneutics? Because o f Gadamer's 'tendency to universalize," Soffer claims that Gadamer's model is 'hot merely a characterization o f textual interpretation, but of human relations in general, and I-Thou relations in particular" (Soffer, 1994, p.60). So, she asks, is this 'the morally best or most Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 251 'understanding' attitude to adapt towards others?" (Soffer, 1994, p.60). Besides the fact that Soffer is already assuming an empathy model of interpretion here - that is, we could quite easily substitute the word 'fempathic" for understanding in the quotation above - and thus may be begging the question, we can still ask which paradigm represents the more ethical approach toward 'the other." Hirsch suggests something similar when he says that ultimately '(w]e can depend neither on metaphysics nor on neutral analysis in order to make decisions about the goals of interpretation." And, that we must therefore, 'fenter the realm of ethics" (Hirsch, 1976, p.85). Specifically, he insists that the Kantian imperative to always treat other persons as ends-in-themselves and never as means is, transferable to the words of men because speech is an extension and expression o f men in the social domain, and also because when we fail to conjoin a man's intentions to his words we lose the soul of speech, which is to convey meaning and to understand what is intended to be conveyed (Hirsch. 1976. p.90). Hirsch, like Soffer, is applying the model o f interpersonal dialogue to textual interpretation, effectively reversing Gadamer's approach, and equating the 'Thou" of the text with a living human being. Is this legitimate? While I would agree that speech or spoken words are the means by which one expresses himself in a society of other persons, this does not necessarily hold for a text. For, it appears to me, that most authors write in order to convey something true or to make manifest that which is universal to the human condition, not merely to express his own particular feelings, thoughts, and ideas or to display his irreducible 'bthemess." Even biographies or autobiographies are written not merely to communicate what is unique to the subject's own experience, but to declare something true or reveal something which others might identify with or find meaningful. Of course, this will depend upon how others interpret what is said which can only be Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 252 determined in accordance with their particular prejudices or attitude toward the subject. Is there any further justification for collapsing the distinction between textual interpretation and interpersonal conversation, or for deriving the former from the latter? Soffer is willing to recognize that, '{a] person is not an anonymous text; and what is most valuable and productive in a relation between persons is not necessarily what is productive in the interpretation of a text" (Soffer, 1994, p.61). But, she still finds the traditional hermeneutic paradigm more ethical. Why is this? To bring his point 'home," Hirsch directly addresses those who dismiss authorial inent by asking, '[w]hen you write a piece o f criticism, do you want me to disregard your intention and original meaning?" (Hirsch, 1976, p.91, italics his). Speaking for myself, I would most definitely say, yes. I would be more than happy to see someone strive to preserve the relevance o f what I had to say for future epochs or for others who might live under very different conditions. And, while this may hold in particular for philosophical writings, it would also be true if I were to write an autobiography. Here too my aim would be to convey something which others would be affected by or find resonant in their own lives. My own peculiarities or idiosyncratic experiences would be kept to myself or shared only with intimate acquaintances or loved ones. For what would be the point of communicating something irreducibly 'bther" or unfamiliar? How could others find meaning in events or feelings which are atypical or alien to most? Like many o f the artists with whom I have been acquainted, the meaning of their work often reverberates with others in ways which they could never have anticipated and they are delighted by this. Perhaps we are being faithful to the creator's intention and 'Understanding" simply by Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 253 discovering something meaningful in their work, for that is their very intention - that is, simply to be recognized in some way. The object o f representation may be apprehended by another in a manner which goes beyond the original grasp of the artist, but this does not necessarily mean that the latter would find this objectionable, a misunderstanding or misappropriation of his work. He may find a an interpretation which differs from his own complementary, even if he 'doesn't see" or 'doesn't get" what the interpreter does. This also need not imply that one has 'feone beyond" or 'fead against" the artist's or author's intentions, and understands his work 'better." Rather, this kind of understanding is merely different from how the originator understands it and his relation to it. However, what if an author strongly disagrees with one's interpretation of his work, or actually resents it? What about those who really do want to be understood 'in their own words," and would not be pleased if their work is differently appropriated by others? Don't we have some moral obligation to these individuals, living or dead? For example, I have often heard it said that Nietzsche or Rousseau 'Would have been horrified" to see their writings interpreted as sowing the seeds for fascism or totalitarian ideologies, and that Descartes or Kant 'Would have been appalled" by the suggestion that their epistemological or moral theories have solipsistic implications. This appears to be Soffer's main concern when she refers below to the interpreter who intentionally reads against an author's intended meanings. In other words, she will argue that respect for authorial intent must be granted some degree of authority so that pretensions to have '£one beyond it" can be eliminated, and that one should take care to avoid doing "violence" to the text. As she puts it, what is really objectionable in interpretations that read the text against the author's intentions is not the lack o f concern with interpretive accuracy, but the pretension to have grasped the authorial intention and gone beyond it. Where the interpreter does not aim at an accurate Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 254 reconstruction, he should possess enough self-reflective honesty to admit this, and speak in his own name (Soffer, 1994, p.63, italics hers). Hirsch insists upon a similar distinction when he claims that, 'deliberate reconstructions are different from deliberate anachronisms whether or not we follow Heidegger, and a particular reconstruction may be fairly accurate even under his principles" (Hirsch, 1976, p.83, italics his). The question then becomes, how can this distinction be maintained and how can this goal be achieved? Perhaps what Gadamer needs is a 'dose" of traditional hermeneutics as a 'fcorrective" to his own theory of interpretation? Is Soffer's postion really the more ethical approach, insofar as it at least attempts to be faithful to original intent and does not conflate understanding and application? In a living dialogue, where the aim is to understand the other person - who she is and how she thinks or feels - this may be the case. However, I am maintaining that in academic discourse, as in textual interpretation, meaning must be projected although not necessarily in the fashion that Hirsch and Soffer denigrate. For the concern in textual interpretation, intellectual conversation, philosophical reflection or an Inner" dialogue of the soul is with what is being asserted and how it applies to me or to some present circumstance. To concede or submit to the authority o f the author, as the primary or sole source of truth in interpretation, reflects a more genuinely authoritarian position than anything Gadamer has suggested. And, although Soffer does not identify Gadamer directly by name in the quote above, I think it is safe to infer that she would deem him one o f those Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 255 who is guilty of these interpretive injustices.74 However, Gadamer makes no such pretensions to have '£one beyond" any particular thinker, but instead has expressly denied that this grasp of authorial intent is possible or particularly meaningful. Moreover, how can one say for certain that an interpreter has effectively read against an author's intentions when it cannot even be determined what they are to begin with? If the original intended meaning is ultimately inaccessible to the reader, as Gadamer argues and Soffer agrees to some extent, then it is equally impossible to determine whether one has read against it. (It would also be impossible to determine if the interpreter had done so Intentionally.") If it is a matter o f degree -i.e., o f the interpretation's remaining more or less consistent with authorial intent - there will still be the question of 'how much" projected meaning, on the part o f the interpreter, is 'too much." In other words, the problem o f finding an ultimate criterion for truth or degrees o f truth in interpretation has not disappeared. Claims to objectivity, like claims to universality in judgment, may be invoked but they are much harder, if not impossible, to justify. Nonetheless, I do believe that Soffer is correct when she says that an interpreter should state whether his aims are reconstructive in nature, and speak in his own name if this is not a goal. But, in all fairness to Gadamer, I would also insist that this is largely a matter o f convention which almost everyone employs in order to defend one's own interpretation, develop one's own ideas, or support one's own arguments (as I too have done throughout this paper). I most definitely do not claim to be actually speaking for Gadamer himself when I use his name. In fact, it might very well be the case that he would be 'horrifed" or disturbed by certain "74 In fact, during a year-long seminar on Gadamer and his critics (Fall '96 and Spring '97). she often referred to Schleiermacher as a thinker whom Gadamer had unfairly appropriated or seemed to have intentionally read against Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 256 aspects o f my interpretation or how I have applied his words. Nonetheless, I do think that what I have said can be defended by attending to what he has written and considering the implications, whether or not these ramifications were intended or foreseen by Gadamer himself Again, I am concerned with what his writings entail or with their possible consequences, and do not feel constrained by any speculation as to whether he personally would or would not agree. Certainly, much of any interpretation depends upon which words one focuses on or which elements o f a work are 'highlighted," but this is precisely why Gadamer regards the interpreter's prejudice as constitutive o f understanding. This may also be a justification for the authoritative value that he assigns to tradition (the text's or those to which the interpreter belongs). Thus, some creative activity or projection must be included as part o f the process, since no author or thinker is completely consistent and their written works would be meaningless without a concrete context. So, for the sake of brevity and simplicity, it is may be easier or more expedient to say 'Gadamer indicates" or 'he argues;" rather than 'What I interpret these words as saying to me is...," or 'the relevance of this text for me today consists in...," or 'the significance of what is written here is...," etc. Perhaps we should simply regard the use of the author's name as form of short-hand for these types o f statements, and make it clear that our projected meanings are not to be taken as a sign of disrespect for the author or a misappropriation of his words and intentions. Would this get Gadamer and his sympathizers off the hook? Or, would Soffer or Hirsch still believe that I would be acting unethically towards the other? Isn't the intentional disregard for another's intentions inherently contemptuous or insolent? For if it is the case that one 'bwns" her words in a living dialogue and that we should at least Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 257 attempt to understand what he means by subordinating our own concerns and interests as much as we can, why aren't we under the same obligation to a text insofar as it is a uniquely human mode of expression? Perhaps this is why Socrates never wrote anything himself - that is, he recognized the potential 'danger" of having his intentions misunderstood if words are detached from the original speaker or the voice o f the author can no longer be heard. But, why should we privilege one person's perspective above all others; or, grant the author 'bwnership" o f the words (as though they will always remain his exclusive property) and valorize intended meaning over and against the truth of what is being said to others and its living significance? In order to better illustrate this point, let me turn again to Plato's Phaedo and ask, for example, what value would his doctrine of anamnesis be to an interpreter who is an atheist existentialist? If one's holds to the prejudice that there is no life o f the soul prior to or following this current bodily incarnation, then is there anything to be learned here? Or, if one will never be convinced that there is such a thing as a human essence, is there any reason why she should read this work? I would say, yes. That despite one's lack of interest in a proof for immortality, lack of faith regarding the eternal nature of the soul, or skepticism towards the doctrine o f anamnesis (assuming, o f course, that it was Plato's intention to defend these views here), one can still attain the insight that knowing always presupposes knowledge. In other words, even if it is not the recollection of pre-life experiences that enables one to recognize when he knows something, he might nonetheless discover that one can only learn that which he already knows in some sense or is 'Attuned to," so to speak. To be able to grasp the paradoxical nature o f knowledge is perhaps one of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 258 lessons of this dialogue. This paradox of practical wisdom, which is emphasized in both Gadamer's hermeneutics and Aristotle's ethics too, is evident in Plato's doctrine of anamnesis, whether or not one cares about immortality or accepts his theory of Ideas and conception of the soul. If this interpretation runs contrary to Plato's own intentions, presuming we could discern them, then so be it. Is it not more important to seek out what may be true for oneself in spite of, or even because of, one's own limitations than to attempt to remain faithful to the words of another however insignificant they may be for any present purposes? Despite her earlier distinction between texts and persons, Soffer remains convinced that it is worth considering what would happen if we reversed Gadamer's procedure and viewed 'the relation to the text on the model o f relations between persons" (Soffer, 1994, p.62). For then, antiquarian' historical research would be the form o f interpretation that most strives to resemble friendship and intimacy between persons. The objectifying forms of historicism Gadamer attacks would then not be the norm, but the result of overlooking singularity, and of separating the interest in the other from friendship and fellow-feeling (Soffer. 1994. p.63). However, I think that this would be a mistake and not necessarily any more ethical. In fact, 1 think that in certain cases it might actually serve those with unethical tendencies. For instance, consider how Aristotle explicitly denies that women are capable of virtue or citizenship (in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics)-, or the manner in which Rousseau describes the different sexes in Emile. If the thoughts and ideas o f these thinkers were taken seriously, one would have a rationale for misogyny and ample evidence for why women should remain subordinate to men. On the other hand, I believe that it would be equally wrong for a feminist to ignore these works or dismiss them entirely because their Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 259 authors did not share the basic prejudices or ideals o f her tradition. In contrast to these positions, I am arguing that the best approach is the dialectical one - namely, one in which we find some means o f mediating between what is presented to us through the words o f another and that which we bring to the work. Further, we cannot expect there to be any iove," 'friendship," or 'fellow-feeling" between a human subject and a written work insofar as the latter cannot reciprocate. Still, one might ask whether reciprocity is really required here? For isn't this precisely what makes our responsibility to those who are not present or cannot 'Speak" for themselves even greater? Don't we the living have a moral obligation to the dead, or to distant 'bthers," despite or perhaps because o f this lack of exchange? As I see it, we do not have the same moral obligations to the written word or a deceased writer as we do to living human beings and the distinction between persons and texts, or personal conversation and public dialogue, should remain. Soffer concurs in as much as she admits that " violence' is committed against persons, not texts, and the 'life' and destiny of a text are not identical to its author" (Soffer, 1994, p.63). I see nothing fundamentally unsympathetic about admitting that even when I do not share the concerns of the author or wish to reconstruct his intentions, I can still find something meaningful in what he says. This is the kind of appropriation that keeps works and traditions alive instead of allowing them to become a 'tnuseum" of the dead, as Bruns suggested. For example, I do not share Kant's distress over the possibility o f moral relativism (or certainly not to the degree that he does), nor do I believe that desires and inclinations necessarily interfere with acting dutifully or with one's capacity for cultivating a good will. Yet, I still Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 260 find the arguments in the Grounding for the Metaphysics o f Morals compelling and provocative. I always find something of value in what he says, although this often changes each time I look at this work. At the very least, Kant challenges me (and hopefully others) to ask questions which I might not have raised if I hadn't read his work, and to find something meaningful in what he has written - something which is applicable to my life or to the circumstances of my place in time, despite the vast differences between us and our world views. Thus, I will continue to insist that it is more ethical to attempt to render the words of another relevant in some manner than to try to excavate or reiterate an intended meaning that possesses no significance or fails to have any concrete applicability to a present situation or concern. Gadamer too says that 'the Thou" of the text, though not strictly speaking an object, is not identifiable as a person either. For understanding 'does not take the traditionary text as an expression of another person's life, but as a meaning that is detached from the person" (Gadamer, 1994, p.358, italics mine). And, if the author's meaning means nothing to me (again, presuming that one can at least come close to grasping it), isn't it actually 'better" to strive to appropriate his words in another way? Wouldn't one be showing greater respect for the work o f another if she struggles to render it meaningful as best she can? Like Petrarch, in Bruns' account of tradition above, Gadamer also insists that we do no one any harm if we 'forget" the author and what he might have intended. Lastly, I would maintain that one in fact does not 'bwn" the words she uses to express her thoughts or ideas, nor can one even claim custody of the thoughts or ideas themselves. First, as I've argued above, these are not determinate 'bbjects" and thus cannot effectively 'belong" to anyone; secondly, it is not clear where one person's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. thinking 'fends" and another's 'begins," especially when they are actually engaged in dialogue. Still, this need not mean that an indeterminate being is unintelligible or meaningless either. On the contrary, it is within this 'play" that meanings emerge and are idenfiable as such even though they are not subject to rules o f logic or laws of physics. It should also be said here that the play model o f understanding need not imply that the players' roles are insignificant or that they are 'depersonalized" in a way that objectifys them. In fact, I have been insisting that we cannot render the subject, or anything which is dependent upon consciousness, an objectively present being. The point of Gadamer's play paradigm is simply that truth emerges in a dialectic between two interlocutors that is not subject to the will o f either one; or, in the case o f textual interpretation, meanings arise which are mutually dependent upon both text and interpreter not exclusively determined by either one or the other. This resonates with Heidegger's admonition that Dasein should comport itself in such a way that allows 'beings to be" -i.e., that projection means enabling beings to reveal themselves in a manner which is consistent with the thingsthemselves , which is not necessarily compatible or congruent with what the interpreter or players might want them to be. Thus, the conception o f understanding as Spiel lets truth be disclosed without reifying it or the subjects who serve as the condition of its possibility. This metaphor is designed to show that interpretation is not an arbitrary process o f selfprojection , or a matter o f imposing one's own prejudices onto the work of another. But it also demonstrates that hermeneutic understanding is not mere repetition either for that would render truth in interpretation stagnant and one-dimensional. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 262 In conclusion, I have arguing that Gadamer's approach is the ethical one because it expressly admits that a creative synthesis or fusion o f horizons between text and interpreter, with the interpreter playing an active role, is the best we can hope for and does not pretend to objectivity. Moreover, he acknowledges that even in the case o f translation, where one's primary aim is to be as faithful as possible to the words o f another, there will always be a '£ap" between 'the spirit of the original words and that of their reproduction;" and, that 'fi]t is a gap that can never be completely closed" (Gadamer, 1994, p.384). Gadamer thus admonishes us to find the truth in what the other is saying regardless of whether it is what he intended, to seek out what is meaningful or relevant here and now by making the other's position as strong as possible. This is done not by subordinating one's own intentions to those of the author, but by remaining open to the questions that the text puts to me or elicits in me. In other words, if I wish to understand the words of another I must not only risk my own prejudices, but be familiar with how they serve as the very conditions o f the possibility of understanding in general. This is because the text does have an autonomy of its own, and we are justified in detaching it from its point of origin. What then does this justification consist in? To conclude, I will turn to Ricoeur in order to shed some light on this final issue. (4) Ricoeur on the Antinomy of Tradition and Autonomy of the Text Ricoeur recasts the debate between the Enlightenment and Romanticism in terms of the present day controversy between critical theorists, represented by Jurgen Habermas, and the hermeneutics o f Hans-Georg Gadamer. Specifically, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 263 [wjhile hermeneutical philosophy sees in tradition a dimension of historical consciousness, as aspect of participation in cultural heritages and reactivation of them, the critique of ideologies sees in the same tradition the place par excellence of distortions and alienations and opposes to it the regulative idea, which it projects into the future, of communication without frontiers and without constraint.75 Moreover, Ricoeur maintains that what is exemplary about this debate is that it gives us access to the question of the origin o f values and the meaning o f human freedom. This quarrel is also fradical" insofar as both sides 'dig down to the roots'' by forcing us to ask 'Whether doing philosophy is to assume a condition of finitude for which historicity, preunderstanding, and prejudice are the implications, or if to do philosophy is to say 'no' - to criticize in the strongest sense of the word, in the name o f the future of freedom, anticipated in a regulative idea" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 156). In essence, much more is at stake here than different conceptions o f tradition and its authority, or lack thereof. What seems to be going on, in the deepest sense, is a struggle for the 'Soul" of philosophical thinking - that is, a battle over the very meaning of philosophy itself. According to Ricoeur, both approaches repeat certain theses of the Enlightenment and Romanticism but add important new elements of their own. First, Gadamer's hermeneutics revolves around the concept of 'hlienating distanciation" ( Verfremdung) and argues that this, whether in its historical, aesthetic, or linguistic form, is what must be overcome if understanding is to be achieved. For him, understanding is constituted by the interpreter's participation in an event - i.e., in a "fusion of horizons": [T]he horizon o f the present is continually in the process o f being formed because we are continually having to test all our prejudices. An important part of this testing occurs in encountering the past and in understanding the tradition from which we come. Hence the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. [However, ejvery 75 Paul Ricoeur, "Ethics and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer in Dialogue." (Philosophy Today. Vol. XVII. No. 2/4, Summer 1973). p. 155 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 264 encounter with tradition that takes place within historical consciousness involves the experience o f a tension between the text and the present (Gadamer. 1994. p.306). Because of this tension between participation and alienation, Ricoeur argues, we can see how a retrieval of tradition becomes possible since 'h human being discovers his finitude in the fact that, first o f all, he finds himself within a tradition or traditions" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 157). This underscores what Heidegger says about attunement - namely, that before we understand our world, we find ourselves always already attuned to it in terms o f certain pre-understandings. In acknowledging this, we are recognizing our fundamental facticity as well as accepting "that our consciousness never has the freedom to bring itself face to face with the past by an act of sovereign independence" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 157). Rather, freedom for the historically effected consciousness appears to mean no more and no less than becoming conscious o f the effects of tradition and its corresponding prejudices. However, this kind o f immanent mediation is ultimately unsatisfying for Ricoeur. What appears to be missing in Gadamer's hermeneutics o f tradition is a 'productive" notion of distanciation or one which will allow for that elusive critical moment. '{I]f hermeneutics limits itself to this antithesis between distanciation and participation, it has only renewed the positions of Romantic philosophy against the Enlightenment without really rejuvenating them" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 157). For example, Schleiermacher was also sensitive to the effects o f history and sought to overcome them through 'divination" which would serve as the principle of mediation between past and present. But, Gadamer insists that 'however universal the hermeneutics that Schleiermacher evolved, it was a universality with very perceptible limits (Gadamer, 1994, p. 197). There are several reasons for this, but the limitations of Schleiermacher's Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 265 hermeneutics are primarily due to the fact that he was concerned with texts 'Whose authority was undisputed." His interest was more 'theological" than historical in as much as his primary focus was directed towards understanding 'bne particular tradition, the biblical" (Gadamer, 1994, p. 197). So, although historical consciousness -one imbued with the effects o f history and aware o f this historical distance - may be a necessary condition for the possibility o f a critical perspective it is not sufficient in itself. For it reflects an incomplete and ultimately impotent conception of freedom which lacks a genuinely critical moment. How might this be remedied? More specifically, how does Gadamer's hermeneutics evade this constraining aspect of Romantic thought? What might be added or subtracted to historical consciousness, and how can this crucial missing element be supplied? In response, Ricoeur first considers what critical theory has to offer but ends up affirming that, in fact, hermeneutics has 'bther resources" and is 'Required by its own internal logic to reintroduce a critical moment' (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 157, italics his). Ricoeur argues that 'k hermeneutic o f traditions can only fulfill its program if it introduces a critical distance" or a 'productive" conception of alienation (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 159). The consciousness of historical efficacity, in effect, contains within itself the moment of distance. [For historical efficacity is efficacity at a distance, which makes distance near. Without the tension between the self and the other, there is no historical consciousness (Ricoeur, 1973. p. 160). Thus, it is due to the dialectical relation between participation and distanciation, or the immanent tension between self and other, that a fusion of horizons is possible. In other words, it is precisely because o f rather than in spite o f the tensions between what is past and what is present, the strange and the familiar, that a space for mediation is opened up. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Where there is a situation, there is a horizon which may either be narrowed or expanded. This makes possible communication at a distance between two differently situated consciousnesses.. .The tension between the self and the other, between the near and the far. is accomplished on the distant horizon (Ricoeur, 1973. p. 160). Moreover, because horizons are not closed or fixed, and one does not live entirely in a world of his own, it is possible to 'blend" or 'fuse" with another in that open space which lies ahead of us - namely, 'bn the distant horizon" which belongs to no one and does not yet actually exist. This is where Heidegger's notion of projection and futurity comes in, to the extent that Dasein is always already ahead of itself and truths are disclosed accordingly. However, Heidegger's position here remains somewhat vague as he does not make clear how this occurs in a concrete context. This is where Gadamer's hermeneutics, which focuses on the Sache o f the text, may be more illuminating. For '(tjhat which makes us communicate at a distance is the 'issue of the text,' (la "chose du texte ") which no longer belongs either to its author or its reader" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 160). Herein lies the argument for the autonomy of the text, and a ground from which one can defend a hermeneutics that ignores authorial intent. In 'The Hermenutical Function o f Distanciation," Ricoeur presents his case for the autonomy of the text. He claims that, 'Writing makes the text autonomous in relation to the intention of the author."76 As opposed to Hirsch, Ricoeur argues that 'Verbal significance and mental significance have distinct destinies" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 133). In other words, the meaning of the text is not to be equated strictly with what the author intended, for the text has a history o f its own which exists apart from that o f its creator's. 76 Paul Ricoeur. "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation," f Philosophy Today. Vol. XVII, No. 2/4, Summer 1973), p. 133. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 267 Soffer herself acknowledges this difference in 'destinies" and also recognizes that '{a]n interpretation which makes no pretense o f addressing, reconstructing, or criticizing the author...does not [necessarily] misconstrue him," even though she does seem to prefer the traditional approach (Soffer, 1994, p.63). But, for Ricoeur, this distinction is crucial and invites us to give a positive signification to distanciation which does not at all have the pejorative nuance o f Gadamer's Verfremdung' (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 133). Under this conception of distanciation the autonomous text belongs to a world of its own which enables it to 'break away" from the world o f its author. Any possible meaning it may have conforms neither wholly to what the author intended nor to the prejudices o f an interpreter. Thus, it stands on its own, at a distance from both: The essence of a work o f art a literary w ork, or a work in general, is to transcend its psycho-sociological conditions of production and to be open to an unlimited series of readings, themselves situated within different socio-cultural contexts. In short, it belongs to a text to decontextualize itself...and to be able to recontextualize itself in new contexts (Ricoeur. 1973. p. 133). According to Ricoeur, it is this 'productive" conception o f distanciation which overcome the 'hiassive oppostion between alienation and participation." For it serves not only as that which must be confronted and struggled against, but also as the very condition of the possibility o f interpretation or understanding. Moreover, it is that which distinguishes the written word from spoken discourse or living dialogue. In other words, writing 'hssures the triple autonomy o f the text" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 160). Specifically, " (1) distanciation from the author; (2) from the situation of discourse; [and] (3) from the original audience" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 134). If this psychological-sociological-cultural alienation were not the case, then the reduction o f truth to authorial intent might be more Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 268 plausible. But again, as I asked above and as Ricoeur seems to be suggesting here, what significance or value would there be in a truth of this nature? Ricoeur claims that his conception of alienation is productive in as much as it 'tnakes possible the transmission of every past heritage" for any literate civilization (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 161). So, what more can be said about Ricoeur's 'productive distanciation" as a condition for the possibility of truth in interpretation? And, what leads him to attribute a pejorative connotation to Gadamer's Verfremdung, and initially accuse him of dichotomizing alienation and participation? To reiterate. Ricoeur insists that the moment of distance is contained within the consciousness o f the effects o f history. Historical efficacity is efficacity at a distance which makes distance near. Without the tension between the self and the other, there is no historical consciousness. This dialectic of participation and distanciation is the key to the concept of a "fusion o f horizons" within which is expressed the communication of the present with the past (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 160). Moreover, as horizons are neither closed nor unique, dialogue and coming to an agreement is aways a possiblity. If an event of understanding is to take place, there must be something shared as well as something distinct - that which is familiar and that which is alien - 'the near" and 'the far." The dialectic thus involves both participation and distanciation, and the 'feffacement" o f both subject and object 'before the things spoken o f '(Ricoeur, 1973, p. 160). Gadamer looks to drama (tragedy, in particular) to exemplify this kind of play (Spiel) that takes place between text and interpreter. In dramatic representation, actor and spectator alike, though essential to 'the playing of the play," lose themselves in the process o f mediation and a truth emerges which depends on both but Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 269 belongs to neither (Gadamer, 1994, p. 130). This is only possible, Ricoeur claims, if the work itself is assured its 'triple autonomy" through writing. By recognizing the text as free from its original context as well as from the intentions o f both author and reader, 'it is open to a whole series o f reinterpretations which reactualize it each time in a new situation" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 161). Further, it implies that 'hn old value" can be reactivated 'Within a new situation" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 161). But, how is it possible to understand an 'bid value" to begin with? Aren't values, like facts, always subject to interpretation? Isn't this why Gadamer insists that understanding a written work will be different each and every time it is interpreted, and that any fusion of horizons that takes place will only hold provisionally? Yet, if this is the case, then the problem of relativism comes to the for once again, only now it is framed in terms of a relativity o f values. Perhaps this is why Ricoeur initially suggests that hermeneutics needs to find its complement in critical theory and vice-versa. For not only must an interest in communication be present, which is what characterizes hermeneutics and distinguishes it from critical theory's interest in emancipation, but so too must the latter be present if hermeneutics is to realize its critical function. It is this interest in liberation which allows for an 'ethical distance" and provides one with the incentive to transvaluate the values that have been inherited. This is the only way that freedom can effectively manifest itself - i.e., in the transvaluation or reexamination o f that which has already been evaluated (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 165). This constitutes Ricoeur's 'practical" solution to the antinomy of values for which he anticipates no theoretical solution, since analytic understanding sees only a contradiction between future projection and past conditioning. Like the antinomous debate Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 270 between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, in which the former defined reason 'by its power to uproot itself from 'tradition'" and the latter 'pleaded for the old at the expense of the new," Gadamer's critics presuppose a similar dichotomy. In other words, whether one is accusing him of conservativism or relativism, the assumption is that respect for tradition or the admission that human beings are constituted by their prejudices stand opposed to reason and emancipation. However, Gadamer's hermeneutics of tradition allows us to have it both ways, so to speak. For he, following Heidegger and Aristotle, insists that human beings are free as well as determined, or are subject to limitation and have the capacity for transcendence at the same time. Logically or analytically, these concepts stand in an antithetical relationship to one another yet, practically speaking and in everyday existence, individuals continue to overcome limits or move beyond their particular horizon all the time. Problems arise when these terms are regarded in an absolute and mutually exclusive sense and the element o f degree is neglected. Certainly, the possibility of completely transcending all psychological, sociological, cultural, historical and political conditions is illusory, though the 'dream" o f doing so refuses to die and questions of ultimacy or first principles cannot be suppressed. But this is tantamount to admitting, as Heidegger declares, that transcendence is always finite. For we can only project ourselves in terms of the conditions into which we are thrown. Still, in doing so, one creates a new situation or another set o f circumstances which redefines his facticity to some extent, and provides a different basis from which he may act. This process continues indefinitely or, perhaps, is finalized only in death. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 271 In essence, Ricoeur finds that some degree o f detachment or 'fethical distance" is necessary in as much as it is productive for understanding and enables us to interpret the past in terms o f the present. Specifically, it is the 'positive factor" which allows us to attain a critical perspective towards 'kny heritage", o r that which has been handed down and makes us who we are (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 165). For it is not enough to simply be conscious of the effects o f history. On the contrary, it is also necessary to see them at a distance - i.e., to acknowledge what is strange in addition to that which is familiar - in order to appropriate such effects in a critical manner. The ethical life is a perpetual transaction between the project of freedom and its ethical situation outlined by a given world of institutions. If we break this living circle somew here, the self-positing of freedom is condemned to remain either an empty concept or a fanatical demand...(Ricoeur. 1973. p. 165). Gadamer too looks to a practical or existential solution to the antinomy of tradition and finds it in a hermeneutical circle o f his own. This is evident when he speaks o f the mutual dependence o f reason ('freedom') and tradition ('kuthority'), or refers to the activity o f 'freely taking over" what has been handed down to us. Moreover, his fusion o f horizons not only presupposes a possible point o f contact but a gap or open realm of separation, and it is within just such a space that dialogue can occur and truths emerge. This constitutes an ongoing dialectic o f participation and alienation. In other words, our relation to texts and traditions is one which forces us to confront what is both strange yet familiar - that in which we feel at home and yet simultaneously alienated from. Thus, I do not see any justification for Ricoeur's claim that Gadamer regards alienation and participation as antithetical, nor is it clear that his conception of distanciation (as Verfremdung) must be construed in a pejorative sense. This may refer to something which Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. can be overcome, but not necessarily in terms o f an Hegelian Aufhebung which indicates a sublation or points to some kind o f progressive and final transcendence. Differently stated, the aim of interpretation is to render familiar or meaningful what is estranged or seemingly insignificant, but this need not imply an understanding which is 'better" or somehow superior to any previous or other interpretations. What should be remembered is that Gadamer's primary objective in Truth and Method was to show how understanding is an historical event which is always different, and that to understand anything which is foreign requires applying it to the present. He states explicitly that he is offering a 'torrective" here, not constructing an entirely new method. And, although he has demonstrated how the Enlightenment and Romantic hermeneutics have influenced our understanding of prejudice and tradition in ways that are misleading and unproductive, he has also acknowledged r. great debt to them. Gadamer may not have emphasized the affinities he shares with these traditions, but it cannot be said that he is claiming to have transcended his own historicity or gone completely beyond his predecessors. We might give him the benefit o f the doubt and assume that he, like any child o f the Enlightenment, is as interested in freedom or in emancipating himself from degenerate traditions or the deleterious effects of history as he is with preserving traditions or respecting authority. As I have argued above, Gadamer's appropriation of tradition is not to be equated with simple preservation or a recapitulation o f 'the Same," nor does it reflect a 'Horror o f the other" (to use Bruns' terminology). For not only is pure reiteration impossible, it is meaningless. Since one cannot effectively apply inherited norms and values without Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 273 examining what they mean to her in the context o f a present situation or set of circumstances, at least some degree of critical examination must be assumed. In conclusion, I would agree with Ricoeur that the antinomy o f tradition culminates in an antinomy of values. Specifically, that the debate between a hermeneutic of traditions and a critique of ideologies 'finds its confirmation in a similar antinomy at the level of the cultural conditions of axiology" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 164). And, isn't it the ethical ramifications of Gadamer's theory of interpretation with which critics like Hirsch and Soffer are most concerned? Their misgivings seems to be more about the possibility of moral relativism than with the possibility of interpretive differences. Nonetheless, none of us finds himself placed in the radical position o f creating the ethical world ex nihilo. It is an inescapable aspect of our finite condition that we are bom into a world already qualified in an ethical manner by the decisions of our predecessors...we are always already preceded by evaluations beginning from which even our doubt and our contestation become possible (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 164-165). Thus, for better or worse, we can only prescind from the conditions into which we are thrown. Of course, this reflects a historicity thesis which some will continue to deny, as Hirsch has pointed out, and for which no rational proof or theoretical solution can be given. But Ricoeur and Gadamer do proceed from this assumption and, at the same time, insist that this does not mean we are entirely bound to the particulars of our traditions or the evaluations and values which preceded us. For, we never receive values as we find things or as we find ourselves existing in a world of phenomena. It is only under the aegis o f our interest in emancipation that we are stirred to transvaluate what has already been evaluated. It is this interest in emancipation which introduces what I call 'fethical distance" in our relation to any heritage (Ricoeur, 1973. p. 165). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 274 This is the hermeneutical circle in which finite human beings live and act. It reflects the dialectic between thrownness and projection which goes on indefinitely. Still, there are those who believe that this constitutes a vicious cycle which can and should be broken, those who refuse to accept or see any value in finitude and historicity, those who see only the dangers o f relativism if we capitulate to a hermeneutic of tradition. Perhaps this reflects an even more fundamental difference in values and is what distinguishes the antiquarian scholar from the critical theorist from the pragmatist. The first represent those who ignore historicity for the purpose o f uncovering the actual intentions of an author or in order to reconstruct past events in accordance with the facts; the second refers to those who seek an ultimate standard of criticism or objectively rational perspective for the sake of freeing us from the constraints of the past; and the latter are those who accept, even embrace, our historicity and attempt to work within the tension of limitation and transcendence in the name of practical understanding. As Ricoeur puts it: 'Only the work of evaluation -which is also a work of transvaluation -assures us that the relation between the project o f freedom and the memory of its past conquests constitutes a vicious circle only for analytic understanding, not for practical reason" (Ricoeur, 1973, p. 165). Moreover, I would insist that to deny or ignore human finitude and conditionedness, and to posit models of interpretation that reflect this, is intellectually dishonest and possibly unethical. For we do not live in a world where distances o f space and time, or cultural and historical differences, don't matter -at least, not yet. So, unless or until we reach that point, I believe that one must acknowledge those variations and remain sensitive to the prejudices which correspond to them. For only then is it possible to put them and Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 275 ourselves at risk in order to find some point of union with another, even if this is only transitory or tangential. Otherwise, so many supposedly universal or objective ideals (e.g., reason, rationality, truth, meaning, etc.) really do become 'infected" with or unconsciously 'tainted" by dogmatic prejudices. And, how often have we seen this actually occur in the history of philosophy? How frequently have the values or assumptions o f a particular tradition been unintentionally smuggled into a method or principles which were designed to transcend these very factors? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 276 Chapter V I: Conclusion The fact that Gadamer's Truth and Method has generated so much criticism, from both sides of the debate over Heidegger and the historicity of understanding, should be considered a strength. For it is my contention that if he were truly guilty of conservative thinking or of blindly accepting canonical presuppositions of the Western metaphysical tradition, concerns over the relativistic implications of his hermeneutics would most likely not have arisen. Or, if his conception of truth was consistent with appeals to authorial intent or in accordance with a traditional correspondence ideal, he might not have been accused of subjectivism or nihilism. On the other hand, if Gadamer had regarded truth as a socio-cultural construction or reduced all understanding to the perspective o f the individual, then it is unlikely that he would have been reproached as conservative. Or, perhaps, if he had claimed to have transcended metaphysics and embraced the presuppositions o f a post-modern relativism, his hermeneutics would not have been considered conventional. Ultimately, what these arguments reveal to me is the genuinely dialectical nature of Gadamer's conception of reason and the subtlety o f judgment wliich characterizes Gadamer's theory o f interpretation. For Gadamer is not a thinker who can be easily pinned down, nor one whose position is reducible to either side of the reason versus Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 277 authority, objectivity versus subjectivity, freedom versus determinism debates. The kind of dichotomous thinking that has prevailed throughout the history of Western philosophy has not so much been overcome by Gadamer as it has been transformed. In other words, Gadamer should be counted as among those, like Hegel and Heidegger, who have helped to convert traditional either/or issues into questions o f degree or fodder for dialogue. In other words, insofar as hermeneutics has supplanted traditional epistemology and the quest for certainty has been remade into a search for meaning, knowledge claims have become mostly a matter o f interpretation and less a question of truth versus falsity. Hermeneutical consciousness sees paradox and complexity, whereas those who are guided strictly by logic or are still captivated by the Cartesian legacy perceive only contradiction and confusion. Specifically, the dialectical relationship between truth and untruth, as well as the contextuality and non-repeatability of any act o f judgment regarding human actions and relations, are embraced by those who are sympathetic to Gadamer and the tradition o f 'process" philosophy or the conception of understanding as discourse. Moreover, Gadamer himself stands as a quintessential example o f the fact that we are all constituted by our histories and the traditions to which we belong without necessarily being inextricably bound by them, in as much as he has creatively and critically appropriated his own inheritance in ways which are both novel and meaningful and does not pretend to have transcended it What is also worth noticing about Gadamer is that even those who significantly differ from him in other ways (e.g., Nietzsche, Foucault or Nussbaum) allow for or defend conceptions of truth or tradition, or manifest an understanding of history, which are Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 278 similarly multifaceted and refined. That there are so many other thinkers, from varying backgrounds and with diverse intellectual and political commitments, who share an affinity with Gadamer in this respect, I find compelling and encouraging; for it stands as further testimony to his depth and versatility. This is even more evident if we recall which philosophers he is most deeply influenced by and whose work he chooses to appropriate most extensively - namely, Aristotle and Heidegger. And, it may also provide a clue as to why he is so widely criticized. In some sense, Gadamer's "Aristotelianism" could be regarded as a return to the past and as indicative o f his respect for conventional authorities. To be sure, it is Aristotle who first insists that we can only become what we are, and that this is largely determined by our tradition or the social order and cultural conditions to which we belong. Perhaps this is what has reinforced charges of conservatism, for many of us have not forgotten the all too obvious sexist and elitist elements in an Aristotelian ethical or political position. In this same vein, Gadamer often refers to Plato and the Platonic dialogues as models for his conception of dialectical understanding. And this too might be seen as supporting the claims of conservatism, insofar as Plato privileges philosophical knowledge and regards the philosopher as one who is uniquely situated or oriented toward truth in ways which 'the masses" or ordinary folk are not. However, in spite of his high regard for Plato and Aristotle, or for classical philosophy in general, I do not think Gadamer is necessarily 'Stuck in the past" or reactionary, insofar as his esteem for the ancients is balanced by an equal degree o f respect for the more radical thought of Heidegger and its revolutionary implications. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 279 It is Heidegger who continues to tell us, some 2,000 years after Aristotle, that human beings are finite creatures who are constituted by their history, and that truth is not reducible to any correspondence between subject and object. Rather, truth and untruth is revealed in and through an act of projection or in terms o f how one comports herself into the world. Thus, for Gadamer, the meaning of the past is determined by one's present questions which depend upon how she projects herself into the future. Moreover, an individual's prejudices are not merely personal biases but reflect the historical reality o f her being. But it is exactly this kind o f talk which bothers the traditionalists who see here nothing but another form o f subjectivism - one which is just barely hidden under the guise o f a new nomenclature. Nonetheless, relativism, subjectivism or historicism come in more or less crude configurations, and Gadamer does not deny the problem. However, the 'problem" o f subjectivism, and its close relatives, is much greater for those who refuse to give up Cartesian ideals o f method and certainty. If truth is a propositional matter of either 'Ves" or 'ho," then shades o f meaning will be unattainable. And, if understanding requires a clear methodology or following the proper technique, then only those who are acquainted with such will be entitled to make truth claims. On the other hand, if one accepts that there is no presuppositionless philosophy or definitive method for understanding the human condition and that interpretation demands a horizon or context, which means that it is fundamentally an historical event, then the issue of relativism is mitigated if not entirely eliminated. In sum, it has been my contention that the 'problem" of the historicity of understanding (and, by extension, the debates regarding tradition and prejudice) is Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. inextricably linked to the enigma of human consciousness and existence. This is why I agree with both Ricoeur and Hirsch that no purely theoretical 'Solution" is possible. In other words, since we have no clearer idea of 'Where we came from" than we do of 'Where we are going," how can we expect our knowledge or lives to be governed in accordance with ultimate norms? It seems to me that this is what it means to think dialectically or historically -that is, to evaluate our present circumstances, which stand between a largely ineffable beginning and a mostly indeterminate end, in a dialogical fashion. If our very existence is complex and uncertain, how can we assume that our mode of understanding should be any less so? Thus, the ongoing conversation with ourselves, with one another, and with our traditions is the fundamental task o f hermeneutical reflection. We can no longer expect basic questions to conform to an either/or proposition -e.g., either tradition constrains us absolutely and we submit to its claims or we transcend it completely and manifest our own autonomy. Rather, issues involving tradition and our relationship to it should be a matter o f 'how much" or 'how to." In other words, how can I maintain a healthy degree o f freedom and openness as well as some respect for tradition and a sense of my own limitations? Or, how much must I risk or to what extent should I hold on to my prejudices in this particular instance? More specifically, in what ways do my pre-understandings serve my attempt to find something meaningful in this text before me, and in what respects do they preclude it? In sum, these are questions o f process - or how to proceed - and depend upon context. So, since they can only be answered in practice, perhaps questions o f ultimate grounds and aims should be suspended as I have sought to do here. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 281 Bibliography Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Martin Ostwald. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1962. Bacon, Francis. The Neyv Organon and Related Writings, ed. by Fulton H. Anderson. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1960. Bakhtin, Mikhail. Problems o f Dostoevsky's Poetics, trans. by Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. Bernstein, Richard. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983. - "Hermeneutics and Its Anxieties." Hermeneutics and The Tradition, ed. by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Proceedings o f The American Catholic Association, Vol. LXII, 1988, pp. 5870 . Bruns, Gerald L. Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. Caputo, John D. Radical Hermeneutics. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987. Dallmayr, F.R. and McCarthy T.A. Understanding and Social Inquiry. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being-in-the-World. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992. Foucault, Michel. Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. and trans. by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method, trans. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. New York: Continuum, 1994. - Dialogue and Dialectic, trans. by P. Christopher Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 282 - Philosophical Hermeneutics, trans. by David E. Linge. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. - Reason in the Age o f Science, trans. by Frederick G. Lawrence. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992. Grondin, Jean. Sources o f Hermeneutics. Albany : State University o f New York Press, 1995. - Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics. New Haven. Yale University Press, 1994. Hirsch, ED . The Aims o f Interpretation. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1976. - Validity in Interpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Hollinger, Robert. Hermeneutics and Praxis. Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1985. Hoy, David Couzer-s. The Critical Circle. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Kant, Immanuel. Critique o f Judgment, trans. by James Creed Meredith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952. - Critique o f Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965. - Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, trans. by Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1959. - Political Writings, trans. by Hans Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Kermode, Frank. Selected Prose o f IS . Eliot. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1975. Lears, Jackson. "Looking Backwards: In Defense of Nostalgia." Lingua Franca, December/January 1998, pp. 59-66. MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1984. - "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy o f Science." The Monist. October 1977, Vol. 60, No. 4, pp. 453-471. Mueller-Vollmer, Kurt. The Hermeneutics Reader. New York: Continuum, 1985. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 283 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Untimely Meditations, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Nussbaum, Martha. The Fragility o f Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. - Love's Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Palmer, Richard E. Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969. Rabinow, Paul and Sullivan, William M. Interpretive Social Science. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987. Ricoeur, Paul. "The Hermeneutical Function o f Distanciation." Philosophy Today, Summer 1973, Vol. XVII, No. 2/4, pp. 129-152. Schmidt, Lawrence Kennedy. The Epistemology o f Hans-Georg Gadamer: An Analysis o f the Legitimization o f Vorurteile. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1985. Schurmann, Reiner. "Twentieth Century Philosophy." Course Lectures Vol. 6. Shapiro, Gary and Sica, Alan. Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984. Smith, Christopher P. Hermeneutics and Human Finitude. New York: Fordham University Press, 1991. Soffer, Gail. "Gadamer, Hermeneutics and Objectivity in Interpretation." Praxis International, October 1992, Vol. 12, No.3, pp. 231-268. - "Is Language a Game? Phenomenological Reflections on Verstehen and Einfiilung in Gadamer." Paper delivered at The New School for Social Research Philosophy Department Workshop, Fall 1994, pp. 1-23. Later published in Etudes Phenomenologiques, Vol. 20, 1994, pp. 27-63. Wachterhauser, Brice. Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. - Hermeneutics and Truth. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1994. Wamke, Georgia. Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 284 Williams, Bernard. Descartes: The Project o f Pure Enquiry. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978. Wills, Gary. "There's Nothing Conservative About the Classics Revival." New York Times, February 16, 1997, pp. 38-42. Wilson, A. Leslie, German Romantic Criticism. The German Library: Vol. 21. New York: Continuum, 1982. Wright, Kathleen. Festivals o f Interpretation. Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1990. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET ( Q A 3 ) 1.0 l.l 140 2.2 2£ 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6 15 0 m m I I W I G E . I n c 1653 East Main Street Rochester. NY 14609 USA Phone: 716/482-0300 Fax: 716/288-5989 O 1993, Applied Image. Inc.. All Rights Reserved Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.